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ABSTRACT

This dissertation, entitled “The Contagion of Sharing: Rhetorics of Community in
an Age of Digital Media,” interrogates the relationship between rhetoric, ethics, and
politics in community building, practice, and critique in an age of online communities
and new media writing. I focus on how rhetoric and composition scholars overemphasize
the role inclusion plays in communal phenomena and that not enough attention is paid to
understanding how community practices and processes require both sharing and
protection, identity and difference, and thus, inclusion and exclusion. I argue that, as
teachers of rhetoric and writing, if we intend to help students write for, with, to and about
various discourse communities, then we need to develop rhetorics that engage with
problematic inclusivities, such as cultural appropriation.
In order to realize such rhetorics, my research draws on continental philosophers
who have engaged with the concept of community following the atrocities of World War
II. I place these thinkers alongside rhetoric scholars to redefine how rhetorical theorists
can critique, produce, and practice community in political and pedagogical situations. To
avoid appeals of nostalgia and false sentimentality, my starting point is to begin viewing
constitutive and normative theories of community practice as related but distinct—
something very few if any community theorists in rhetoric studies have done. Given my
desire to balance theory with praxis, I offer case studies of religious communities, art

ii

communities, and political communities to serve as examples of how my theory relates to
the pragmatic ways we engage in community practices in our everyday lives.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE CRISIS IN RHETORICS OF COMMUNITY
Community is both necessary and impossible.
Roberto Esposito
Sharing is contagious. It is also contagious to value sharing. Now the reader of
these statements may assume a figurative connotation of contagious as a positive emotion
or attitude that is easily spread to others, resulting in a desire to be included in this
contagiousness. However, what if what is being shared is contagious itself, such as the
common cold or the flu? Or, if we remain in the figurative, what if what is shared is an
ideology of hatred? Then the contagiousness of sharing takes on a new meaning, and is
not so positive, resulting in less of a desire to be included in or include this kind of
sharing in our notions of community. Nevertheless, the appeal of sharing, in particular
sharing as inclusion, remains.
In the 2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Charlotte, North Carolina
one of the themes repeated over and over by some of the participants was that they were
“the party of inclusion.” By this they meant they shared interests with groups who have
been historically marginalized in American society at large, including those concerned
with political issues of gay and lesbian rights, racial equality, equal pay for women, and
other important political problems. The DNC participants wanted to include these groups
in the “big umbrella” of the party. However, when the ethics of inclusion informing these
rhetorics of inclusion are put to the test by the satirical news reporters from The Daily

Show with Jon Stewart, viewers quickly discover that this party of inclusion actually
excludes many people and many value systems.
Stewart begins the piece by stating, “Tolerance. It’s one of the basic tenets of the
Democratic Party. But is there truly room for everyone under the DNC’s big tent?” When
asked what the key message of the party is, DNC members’ and participants’ answers
include the following: “We are the big tent party. We represent everyone.” “We’re
definitely the arms wide open party.” “We have just about everyone you can possibly
imagine in the party.” And “We’re the party of inclusion.” However, when asked by the
reporters to mention who is not included, the interviewees respond with the following
answers: “Everyone’s welcome, except unless [sic] you own a corporation, or if you’re a
hunter, or a gun owner, white males . . . they [the Republican Party] are a bunch of guntoting hillbilly tea-partiers. That’s all I have to say.” And “We wouldn’t include those
beer-toting fakers down in Florida, the Tampa [Republican National] convention guys.”
The reporters then encourage the respondents to describe these types, and a whole host of
derogatory terms are used to describe Republicans and conservatives.
Of course, the mock news reporters’ task was simply to make fun of this stance,
and argue for more inclusivity, while perhaps playing on the interviewees’ willingness to
keep talking. One can speculate on the many reasons these DNC “conventioners” spoke
the way they did—from the simple appeal to perpetuate the conversation, to feeling safe
to criticize in that environment. However, what is really exposed is that for the
Democratic Party to include these LGBT, racial equality, and women’s rights issues, the
party members felt they had to exclude other positions—namely, positions that would
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attempt to oppress LGBT, racial equality, and women’s rights. Thus, while inclusivity is
one of the DNC’s practices, an ethic of inclusion is neither the actual basis nor the end
justification for their rhetorical practices. Of course, such an absolute ethic of inclusion
would be impossible to put into practice, even in their “big tent” community.
Nevertheless, the appeal of absolute inclusion, particularly within discussions of
community, remains.
Thus, let me begin by arguing that the importance and value of this dissertation on
Rhetorics of Community is, in the beginning and in the end, very connected to everyday
concerns of human life. The character of such connected concerns depends greatly on our
particular, moment-by-moment perspectives: we all belong, are a part of, or even might
think we own various communities. These perspectives are expressed daily in our very
thought and communication. In one moment I may say that I belong to a community. In
the next moment that same community may become my community. As I state above,
such language of community, whether in terms of “sharing,” “inclusion,” or
“togetherness,” is contagious, for being in a community is not only part of who we are,
but who we want to become.
Generally, we humans want to belong to a community, and in Western traditions
we use the term community to create a sense of belonging and togetherness. We are
extremely aware of some of these human collectives with which we are associated; we
give little thought to others. Some we are not even conscious of until that group we did
not see ourselves being a part of comes into crisis. Often this crisis is the result of a
“contagion” of our community by other communities—a contagion that threatens our
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sense of a “we,” even if that “we” had gone unacknowledged until the threat occurred.
Our group then becomes, or at least is then recognized as a community, even though the
sense of community those in the group felt most likely preceded that conscious
recognition. Thus, to reiterate, the term contagion in the title of this dissertation should
connote at least two meanings—we love to talk about, participate, and advocate
“community”—it is contagious; however, we also fear exposure to others, or at least we
often fear the “contamination” of our community by other communities. As a result of a
fear for the social or biological life of our community, oneself, or a loved one, we often
attempt to protect from those elements that threaten these community lives.
Thus, at minimum this phenomenon of contagion is almost always related to that
community’s exposure to the difference of other communities, followed by a practice of
sharing with or protecting from those who are different—such practices of sharing and
protection are often viewed as inclusion and exclusion. Of course, contemporaneous with
this exposure to difference is the phenomenon of identification. This relationship between
difference and identification is one of the dominant tensions in rhetorical thought about
community (which I take up in chapter 1); however, it has very real-world implications.
Let me provide a brief personal example that helps explain what I mean by this—an
example I think helps bring out many of the tensions in the problems with communities
and the concept of community. It may also begin to indicate my own investment in the
topic.
I grew up in a Mormon community in Utah. From an early age I thought almost
everyone was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the LDS
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Church),1 and my daily encounters with others appeared to reflect that assumption.
However, the older I became, and the more I began to “experience the world” and meet
people who did not identify as Mormon, the more I began to explicitly recognize their
differences from me. I began to identify and value similarities I had with those in the
community of the Church and identify and devalue the differences I had with those in
different communities. If I did not recognize these identifications and divisions, my
parents, church leaders, and friends were often quick to point them out to me. We were
trained to make such identifications, which then determined whether and how we
included or excluded. These disciplined recognitions of similarity and difference were
common practices of everyday communication in the Mormon community in which I
grew up. When introduced to someone new, one of the first things I was expected (and I
expected others) to ask was, “are you a member [of the Church]?” or some similar
question. Of course, there were reasons, beyond habit, for asking such a question.
Identifying this seemingly banal similarity or difference established by a simple “yes or
no” provided a great deal of information for the questioner, often exposing details
ranging from different ideological values to habitual practices. This question potentially
exposed everything from the new acquaintance’s social acts of establishing and
practicing dating criteria, how he or she endorsed and applied conventions of style in
music and clothing, chose what to eat and drink, and of course, navigated the languages
he or she spoke. Obviously this question did not necessarily expose what this person
actually did believe in and practice (it was not a positive practice, unless the person
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identified as a member of the Church), but at minimum it exposed what he or she did not
believe in and practice, namely Mormonism.2
As a result of this constant recognition of similarity and difference, I became
hyper-aware of inclusivity and exclusivity, terms not synonymous with identification and
difference—though there are parallels and connections between these two binary sets.
Within the Mormon community, some of these practices of inclusion and exclusion were
openly discussed, some were just an effect of the community’s way of life; nevertheless,
they were a direct result of how others identified or differed from my local Mormon
community.
These practices of exclusion and inclusion based upon identifying the similarities
and dividing the differences went hand-in-hand with my experience of community. I
could not seem to have one without the other. Because the LDS Church is a proselytizing
religion, it places a great emphasis on recognizing those who “are not like us,” and then
including or attempting to include them in the hopes of converting them to the belief
system of the Church. To begin to include others, I had to first learn to differentiate and
exclude them from the category of “Mormon” to recognize why they were not a part of
my group. In seeming irony to this attempt to include, as a Mormon youth I was
constantly reminded to “avoid even the appearance of evil,” by avoiding those people and
things that went (or appeared to be) contrary to the values of my faith. Thus, as
paradoxical as this may sound, I was to avoid those whom I wanted to convert, but it
made complete sense to me. Through my “terministic screen,” as rhetorician Kenneth
Burke would have it, Mormonism’s terminologies in practice reflected, selected, and

6

deflected how I viewed others in relation to myself, and vice versa, to the point of
naturalizing these processes (see “Terministic Screens” 45, in Language as Symbolic
Action). Mormonism was the lens through which the world was filtered for me; all other
communities were inferior to the degree that they were not part of us.
For some time now I have separated myself from the LDS faith. I no longer
believe in the foundations of the Church or its doctrines. I do not practice the ordinances
or follow the leaders of the Church. In fact, many of my own values are in explicit
opposition to many of the positions of the Church. However, I still consider myself
connected to, if not a part of, the Mormon community (and I know most active members
of the Church consider me a member, too—to a degree that is perhaps the cause of some
discomfort). Even in my self-initiated separation from the Church, who I am now (or
what my “I” is) is in great deal still partially defined, even constituted by my historical
experiences and continual relations to the Mormon community and its practices. My “I”
is partially constituted by a “we,” a “we” of which I may not be particularly proud or
fond at times, though I am very proud and fond of many of the members of that “we.”
Now I am not unique in this analysis of my self in relation to one of my
communities, neither is my dissertation concerned directly with a criticism of the
Mormon community; however, I share this brief example for a few reasons: First, I
explain this simply to demonstrate how communities, inasmuch as they are an
aggregation of individuals, also affect and even effect those individuals with regards to
who and what they are, in relation to everyday concerns of life. In other words, a project
concerned with what community is and what to do with it can and should concern any
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individual, within or outside of academia. Second, I share this example to expose how
inclusivity does not work without exclusivity, and vice versa—rhetorically and
ontologically. No matter how much we may wish to privilege or valorize inclusivity over
exclusivity, the latter will be right there next to us, informing and enabling that
privileging. Excluding all exclusions for the sake of inclusion itself is not only a
paradoxically challenging and troubling thought and act, it is a utopian ideal—and in this
dissertation I will go further than this view and consider such an extreme position
ethically, politically, and rhetorically problematic, if not dangerous at times. Third, which
is connected to the second, I relate the example above regarding my problematic relation
to the Mormon community to begin to expose how many of our notions of community
have been romanticized. As Raymond Williams famously observed, community “seems
never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or
distinguishing term” (Key Words 76). In addition to Williams, Miranda Joseph has
argued, “community is almost always invoked as an unequivocal good, an indicator of a
high quality of life, a life of human understanding, caring, selflessness, belonging”
(Against the Romance of Community vii). And more recently, Cezar Ornatowski and Linn
Bekins have stated, “the concept of "community" is typically used as a "god-term" . . .
reified, ubiquitous, always positive, and ultimately unexamined” (253). 3
Yet even though phrases like “a sense of community” almost always carry with
them a positive connotation—contagiously leading to the valorization of themes of
inclusion and sharing—in some contexts we may feel that some communities to which
we belong, or which endanger those we love, should be challenged, should not be
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affirmed, and in some cases should not be tolerated. Obvious examples of such
oppressive communities are Neo-Nazi communities, Ku Klux Klan communities, and of
more recent fame, the community of the Westboro Baptist Church.
I hope I have at least made an effective, if cursory, argument about the value of
my project beyond academic discussion. The goal of the remainder of this chapter is to
explain the broader exigencies of this dissertation within the fields of rhetorics, including
a chapter outline describing where my dissertation contributes at the level of theory
within these fields. However, I think that any project concerned with the topic of
community will and should always have in mind how it is concerned with day-to-day
problems that arise in relation to human collectives. I reference such issues throughout,
including more detailed exposition and analyses of certain communities and their
rhetorics: In particular, I discuss more on the Mormon community (chapter 2) in which I
grew up, a communal phenomenon in the art world called, “biennialism” (chapter 3),
Black Wall Street communities (chapter 4), and others.

The Crisis in Rhetorical Theories of Community
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The
critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naïve
believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to
gather. The critic is not the one who alternates haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya, but the
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one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is fragile and
thus in great need of care and caution.
Bruno Latour
The exigencies in the fields of rhetorics are not dissociative of the broader societal
exigencies implied in the two examples I mention in the above section. Like the rhetorics
of community found in Mormonism and in the Democratic National Convention—both
of which rely on tropes of inclusion to define and brand what they are, yet encounter
practical problems when attempting to put such an ethic of inclusion into rhetorical
practice—the exigencies in the fields of rhetorics are also problematic in theory and in
practice. Because of this, the topic of community is not unpopular. One has only to
conduct a brief search on any Internet bookstore website or online library search engine
for literature on the topic of community to realize that the subject is an important one for
many scholars, whether the audience for their texts is academic or not. While the specific
application of the term may differ—such as the development and criticism of non-profit
organizing, community literacy initiatives, the theory and politics of public writing, the
advocacy of social change and justice with regards to inequalities of race, gender,
sexuality, and class in communities in and out of the classroom, and of course, all these
issues through various social media technologies—most of theses “real world”
applications rely on unexamined concepts of community that broadly privilege
identification over division, inclusion over exclusion, consensus over disagreement, and
unity over difference.4 Such privileged associations seem obvious: the term community
most often carries with it thoughts of togetherness, sameness, and participation.
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However, while these and other texts do some great work and should not be
neglected, they use two approaches that are problematic: First, they almost always see
community production from a top-down approach. They are concerned with creating
better governing systems that organize and distribute. Thus, they presuppose the
necessity of or access to a privileged position within a power relation for anyone to create
or direct a community effectively. Indeed, while many of these theories are concerned
with marginalized and oppressed groups, most of these theories rely on someone in the
community having access to some sort of institutional or technological power relation.
This is not a negative thing in and of itself. These rhetorics of community are productive,
and generally should be affirmed; however, they do not account for communities built
from the bottom-up, from individuals or groups that are not even counted in some way
among a social order. In other words, these handbook rhetorics consider such
community-building actions from the position of a benevolent gatekeeper. Second, as I
mention above, these handbooks and other similar application texts privilege traditional
notions of community, such as consensus over disagreement, and unity over difference. A
recent history of theory on the topic of community from Continental Philosophy has
criticized this privileging of unity over difference, and discovered problems of
totalitarianism inherent in the presuppositions of constructions of community by
consensus. This dissertation, with the help of such Continental philosophies, works
toward rhetorics of community that are alternatives to such approaches.
While for some, digital media may seem the ideal topoi to begin rethinking
community (and I will not ignore this—see chapters 3 and 5), such a rethinking should
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not neglect the 2500+-year history in Western thought of community in philosophy and
rhetoric. From Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, and from
contemporary political theorists like John Rawls and Robert Nozick to numerous
continental philosophers, arguments for more ethical structuring and better understanding
of “the social” continue to occur. My focus for this dissertation will be on the rethinking
of community that has been occurring within French and Italian thought for at least three
decades now. Particularly, I focus on the fields of rhetorics’ response to this rethinking,
which arguably started, or at least found resurgence, with Jean-Luc Nancy’s essay, “The
Inoperative Community,” which later was published as the opening chapter to his book
under the same title.5 The thinking engaged in the re-questioning of community following
Nancy’s essay has been in great deal a response to the direct engagement and experience
with European totalitarianism, which by common definitions of community, as a unified
group of people, would be a community par excellence. This, of course, is a conception
of community that Nancy and the thinkers responding to his essay reject. Because of this
direct and sustained engagement with the topic of community—from thinkers who lived
during or in the wake of such explicit practices of fascism—rather than start at the place
of digital media to begin articulating an ethical, political, and rhetorical framework of
community, I think it is important to understand first what some of these thinkers have to
offer.
However, while many of those in the fields of rhetorics have not neglected this
work in Continental Philosophy theoretically, and have done a thorough job criticizing
what destroys or betrays community, my broad conjecture regarding the crisis in rhetorics
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studies is that rhetoricians employing Continental philosophies of community have not
yet been able to articulate or rearticulate these theories in such a way that the theories
might be extended outside of academic discourse to a place where they can be employed
in “real world” politics and pedagogies. This may sound cliché; however, following
Bruno Latour’s call to rethink criticism as assembling (see the epigraph above from
“Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam”), I argue that while rhetoricians concerned with
Continental philosophies of community have done a persuasive job exposing the
problems with other’s thought on community, they have not offered alternative “arenas in
which to gather” (see Latour 246) for the purposes of producing, or what Latour might
call “composing” community (see “An Attempt”). This call for more application of
rhetorics for “practical use” is of course not new. Classical theorist Vincent Farenga
argues that the origins of rhetorics emerged “out of the desire for democracy” (1035).
Nevertheless, I define this as a current and actual problem with regards to the relevancy
of the fields of rhetorics, in particular, with thought that employs Continental
philosophies of community and singularity, identity and difference, inclusion and
exclusion. Situating this exigency is the main aim of chapter 1, in which I begin by
discussing how rhetoricians employing Continental thought have attempted to depart
from Kenneth Burke’s notion of identification to work toward rhetorics privileging
difference. I then engage with such rhetoricians, in particular Diane Davis and Pat
Gehrke, who draw upon the work of Continental philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy to make
informed critiques in the name of community, but who also provide no alternative models
for producing better community practices.
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To supplement their critiques and to offer such alternative arenas of gathering, I
negotiate with constitutive and normative theories of rhetoric and community, as both are
problems in the fields of rhetorics. In chapter 2, I make arguments regarding what
constitutes community: this is a concern with what some might call ontological issues,
what community as a phenomenon is, or what makes a community a community.
However, I am only concerned with this element of the argument to the extent that when
rhetorical theorists, in general, use the term community we have some consistent if
flexible idea of what is being presupposed in the term. Though over- and underdetermination of meaning will no doubt occur, I think it is important that the reader and I
share a similar understanding of the term community. To be clear, I am not concerned
with creating an exhaustive foundational account of the being of community. Still, I am
concerned with what community is to the extent that as a referent it allows us to critique
how well our constitutive models of community reflect our everyday experiences of
community. Also, I want a model of community to reference and presuppose when
advocating for better non-oppressive community practices. Whenever one makes an
argument about how something should be (a normative claim), one is still presupposing
that the something is, that it exists or is constructed in a certain way (a constitutive
claim). To make this argument about what constitutes a community, I draw on a variety
of ideas, most prominently Jean-Luc Nancy’s extension of Heidegger’s concept of
“being-with,” Todd May’s theory of practices, and Roberto Esposito’s theory of the
necessary relationship between community and immunity. Esposito’s theory, in contrast
to thinkers like Joseph Harris and Rosa Eberly (who each draw upon Raymond
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Williams), finds a positive opposing term to community—immunity. Community’s
relationship with this necessary oppositional term, I feel, more accurately describes
communal practices and processes than a model that sees community in absolute terms of
inclusivity as an ethical good and exclusivity as wrong. In other words I want to replace
notions of community that "[tend] to mean little more than a nicer, friendlier, fuzzier
version of what came before" individuality (Harris 13), with a conceptualization that sees
community (sharing) as always in a necessary reciprocal tension with immunity
(protection).
That said, my dissertation is most interested in making certain normative claims
about community; chapter 2 also sets the stage for these arguments. I argue that we
cannot escape arguing for some temporal forms of affirmative community practices, even
if these are only implied in critique of problematic communities. This should not be
confused with thinking that the term community is inherently a term that indicates an
ethical good; as I mention earlier in this introduction, in many cases we often presuppose
an ethical good in the meaning of the term community. Whether in theory or practice,
community is a thing that is often presupposed to be a good, or at minimum, especially
for rhetorics scholars, it leads us to privilege community over the individual, even if we
understand that the two phenomena co-constitute one another. This tension between
community and the individual is a major part of the crisis in rhetorics studies, which I
address in chapter 1, and one of the goals of chapter 2 is to begin acknowledging the
normativity implied in many of our arguments about community, and to—rather than fear
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making normative arguments about community—advocate making better normative
arguments for less oppressive community practices.
Understanding, producing, and taking part in such normatively-laden community
practices is no easy task. Nevertheless, it is the aim of chapters 3, 4, and 5 to address how
rhetoricians might engage in this project. My conjecture that there is still work to be done
with the notion of community is not an overstatement; there is much at stake for the fields
of rhetorics in establishing ethics of community that can deal with political problems of
exclusivity in theory, practice, and production. As I allude to above, the requirements for
doing so necessitate a reconfiguring of the familiar inclusion/exclusion tropes that
influence our ethics and politics to such a great degree, and that are so heavily employed
in rhetorical theories. In fact, it is within those three fields—ethics, politics, and
rhetorics—that these three chapters find their exigency. Comprised of three main stages
or movements, my dissertation begins developing an ethics of community (chapter 3), a
politics of community that advocates the given ethics with specific aims in political
contexts (chapter 4), and then considers these ethics and politics with rhetorics of
community, or symbols, forms, practices, and processes of social action that enable this
advocacy, particularly in the composition classroom (chapter 5). With and within each of
these three stages, and as I allude to above, I address Aristotle’s three topoi that classify
the human—knowing (theoretical knowledge), doing (practical and pedagogical
knowledge), and making (productive knowledge)—throughout the project.
In chapter 3, I continue to extend Esposito’s notions of community and immunity
by acknowledging that communal practices of sharing require some forms of immunity in

16

order to even practice sharing. In particular what is most often presupposed is the need to
protect or negate a life—from the social life of the community to the biological lives of
individuals inside and outside a community, and vice versa—so that there is a community
with which one might share, so that there is an individual with whom one might share. I
see Immunity, as I state above, as the “positive opposing term” to community for which
Raymond Williams is searching (see Keywords 76). However, though Esposito does
bring this insight, he does not provide an ethic of community, or set of values beyond the
recognition that communities require protection so that they may share, and that too much
emphasis on either sharing or protection will eventually negate the life of that
community, socially and/or biologically. Thus, to begin developing such an ethics of
community, I draw upon the works of Jacques Rancière and Adriana Cavarero.
Rancière adds to this ethics of community the recognition of a presupposition of
equality. He sees equality as something presupposed in everyday speech acts. I argue that
this presupposition of equality is persuasive enough to consider actions taken out of this
presupposition to be an ethical good. I acknowledge this valuing of equality to be
historically contingent but difficult to argue against. Cavarero posits that all communal
and singular lives are vulnerable, and that we can thus respond within a range of two
poles: caring and wounding. I argue that an affirmative community rhetoric should
privilege caring for such (social and/or or biological) lives over wounding them, though
such an ethic is by no means easy to put into practice, particularly when the care of one
life appears to require the wounding of another. Drawing upon Rancière, Cavarero, and
others, the ethics I begin to develop in this dissertation are neither built upon transcendent
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values nor do they take part in the tradition of moral arguments of building immovable
content or formal ethics. Rather than seeing ethics as hardline moral stances in which I
demand we must follow, I see my ethics as what Charles Scott might call “recoiling
ethics” (see the Question of Ethics) or ethics in constant need of questioning, revision,
and care, and are contingent upon historical circumstances, communal, and individual
needs.
In chapter 4 I also employ much of Rancière’s thought to begin developing a
politics of community that advocates and puts into practice the ethic of verifying equality
and care of human life. He argues that no ideology of equality can sustain itself
institutionally, since “the essence of equality is in fact not so much to unify as to
declassify, to undo the supposed naturalness of orders and replace it with the
controversial figures of division” (Shores 32-33). Thus, rather than focus on institutional
goals of equality through top-down consensus and distribution, Rancière argues that the
verification of equality more often occurs through acts of dissensus and decategorization.
Therefore, a politics of community which advocates the ethic I articulate is, in sum, as
follows: when a human being who has not been counted among the social order verifies
his or her own equality, or has it verified by others, such an act actually disrupts the
hierarchy of the social order, rather than solidifying it. In chapter 4, I explain political
dissensus through discussion of historical communities like Black Wall Street, which
have taken part in both the disruption and construction of solidarity in this way.
In chapter 5 I implement these ethics and politics into rhetoric and composition
pedagogy, particularly those emphasizing digital and multimodal practices. For 21st
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century students, learning multimodal composition practices has become a rite of passage
to citizenship. Following the lead of rhetoric and composition scholars like Jeff Rice and
Geoffrey Sirc, many composition journals, conferences, and instructors employ themes of
remixing and developing rhetorical pedagogies that engage in digital sampling as
alternatives to traditional formalist writing practices. Students are encouraged to digitally
sample from diverse cultures through collaborative ripping of images, audio, and video to
produce and analyze new media texts. With such a focus on relations with others, one
might argue that these are “community pedagogies.” Nevertheless, while such pedagogies
implicitly promote ethics that value autonomy, difference, inclusivity, and discovery,
they have neglected to consider how such “open” practices can also evoke wounds of
vulnerability (a concept from Adriana Cavarero I discuss in chapter 3 and develop further
in chapter 5). For example, In Digital Griots, Adam Banks recognizes how multimodal
pedagogies that emphasize digital sampling from other cultures can result in uncritical
and harmful cultural appropriation. Even sampling from one’s own culture (as if one can
own a culture) can be dangerous and uncritical when one’s culture or position in that
culture is blind to power dynamics within and between cultures and people. My aim in
chapter 5, then, is to supplement these powerful and creative multimodal rhetorics and
pedagogies focused on digital sampling with a heuristic for ethics based upon some of the
ethical and political considerations of community I develop in chapters 3 and 4. I
conclude, in particular, that supplementing multimodal pedagogies with an ethic of
community that recognizes equality and the vulnerability in human life does not restrict
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such pedagogies. Rather, it opens them to the invention of more nuanced multimodal
compositions that engage with ethical and political problems of digital media.
While some rhetoricians may not like that I am dividing ethics, politics, and
rhetorics so neatly, and might posit that I am limiting rhetorics, my reasons for these
separations are mainly argumentative and do have a purpose that serves rhetorical theory.
These reasons are not unlike Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s advocacy
for “retreating the political” (see Retreating the Political). By retreating the political,
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy do not mean suppressing or ignoring the political in the
sense of closing down political discussion. Rather, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue
that “the political” itself has been absorbed by the appeal of totalitarianism. This means
that “the political,” in subsuming all discourse today (as in the idea that “everything is
political”), actually erases all other discourse (philosophical, religious, scientific, etc.),
rather than enabling more critical discussion from various perspectives. Lacoue-Labarthe
and Nancy also argue that as a concept that includes all other discourses, the political has
actually limited political thought. Since this perspective claims to dominate all other
thought, the political paradoxically erases the specificities that differentiate it from other
discourses. Thus, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy actually recognize this domination of “the
political” as a closure—and I see similar problems with an absolute domination of “the
rhetorical.” By advocating a retreat from the political, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy
attempt to open the political by acknowledging how it draws on other epistemologies and
discourses, rather than think of those other lines of thought as solely contained by “the
political.”
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Similarly, I have no desire to be part of the closure the rhetorical. When the
question, “why these rhetorics?” is raised, I want ethical and political justifications that
extend beyond an unquestioned value in rhetorical invention and experimentation.
Though I present them in a certain order, this does not mean that the politics I discuss
inherently precede the rhetorics or that the ethics contain both; rather, I view these three
fields as always related. The rhetorics I articulate could potentially justify and found the
ethics and politics, as well as find justification in them. Perhaps the best way to
conceptualize my project is in terms of an ever-moving ratio of all three areas: rhetoricsethics-politics, ethics-politics-rhetorics, politics-rhetorics-ethics—or any of the various
combinations of the three. Any privileging of one term over the others in particular
moments will no doubt cause what Kenneth Burke calls (following Friedrich Nietzsche),
a “perspective by incongruity” (see Permanence and Change). I am aware that as I
privilege one term in one moment, and another somewhere else, the meaning of one term
will of course seep into the area of one of the others, ever so slightly or greatly shifting
the emphasis for different readers; however, I do not point out each time this occurs
unless I deem it absolute necessary. Such occasions to emphasize this slippage are when I
fear the reader may re-inscribe traditional or even clichéd notions of terms like
community or equality into the rhetorics, politics, and ethics of community I am
describing or advocating. Though I know some readers will find it difficult to depart from
those traditional and powerful significations (I am aware of the slippage of the signifier,
especially in a term like community), I work diligently to persuade the reader to depart
from (though not forget) those meanings. And while it is not solely traditional liberal
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political paradigms to which I make my appeals, I do hope that my project will still speak
to some of the same concerns usually found in liberal politics, in particular concerns of
equality.
Let me close by saying that human relationality—which is not the same thing as
community, I argue—may be an ethical good in and of itself, in other words something
we should value; however, I am neither arguing against that position nor explicitly for it,
as others have. That is not my project. I am arguing that being in a community is not
necessarily an inherent ethical good—something we often presuppose. Many
communities are destructive, and just because they may take part in practices that damage
or destroy relationships with others, or take part in practices we generally find to be
unethical, does not mean they are not communities and that we should label them “anticommunity” (such a labeling occurs in Diane Davis’s “Finitude’s Clamor,” for example).
In addition, there are non- and less-oppressive communities we can and should affirm,
learn from, and build upon.
Thus, past the project of understanding what constitutes community in order that
we might have a concept to presuppose when we use the term community, my positive
project is to work toward ethical, political, and rhetorical frameworks of community that
do embody and promote sets of values I think we should endorse, practice, and produce
contingently. These ethics, politics, and rhetorics should be continually re-questioned.
And though I reiterate that these are not transcendent values or foundationalist grounds
for rhetorical action, I attempt to problematize my own rhetorical constructs to encourage
how readers may respond to and supplement my own work. Overall, and broadly
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considered, my dissertation is interested in concerns that address the following normative
question, and others related to it: Since community itself is not an inherently good thing,
but it is necessary to who we are and what we do, what types of non-oppressive
communities and communal practices might we learn to recognize, advocate, teach, and
actively produce and practice for better ways of collective living?
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CHAPTER ONE
FROM IDENTIFICATION AND DIVISION TO SINGULARITY AND COMMUNITY
In pure identification there would be no strife. Likewise, there would be
no strife in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only
through a mediatory ground that makes this communication possible, thus
providing the first condition necessary for their interchange of blows. But
put identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot
know for certain where one ends and the other begins, and you have the
characteristic invitation to rhetoric.
Kenneth Burke
The unconditioned existentiality of each one is this: it cannot exist through
consisting by itself and in itself alone. Pure auto-nomy destroys itself of
itself. But this must not be understood in an absolutely originary mode. It
is not a matter of adding to a postulation of individuality or autonomy a
certain number of relations and interdependencies, no matter what
importance one may accord to such addenda. The “someone” does not
enter into a relation with other “someones,” nor is there a “community”
that precedes interrelated individuals: the singular is not the particular, not
a part of a group (species, gender, class, order). The relation is
contemporaneous with the singularities. “One” means: some ones and
some other ones, or some ones with other ones.
Jean-Luc Nancy

24

The problem of identification and division surrounds the issue of articulating what
the phenomenon of community is—a constitutive question—and/or what types of
community should be affirmed or produced—a normative question—in the fields of
rhetorics. In this chapter, I outline this problem, discuss where the term community has
been brought into play in rhetorical theory to deal with the problem (most often in
critique of identifications of community and “the self,” rather than in the articulation of
or advocacy of (a) community), and then situate the need for the remainder of this
dissertation on rhetorics of community within these contexts.
Most theorists interested in western rhetorical traditions will be familiar with the
problem of identification and division. It has been articulated in many ways, under many
pretexts and subtexts: in classical rhetorics it often goes under the theme of “the one and
the many,” with some of the most fertile battlegrounds being found within the
conversations of the Presocratics, Plato, and the Sophists. However, my interests lie more
with contemporary debates of community, and most of these are traced directly to
Kenneth Burke’s notions of identification and division, though he never articulated a
specific theory of community. Many rhetorical theorists, following Burkean
commentators like William Rueckert, who once referred to Burke’s main works as the
“sacred texts” (“Rereading Kenneth Burke” 240), have over-emphasized or oversimplified the place of identification in Burke’s rhetorical theory (see, for example,
Crusius (121); Hochmuth (136); and Wolin (17, 93). 1 No doubt this narrowing of
Burke’s thought to identification is also because the first half of A Rhetoric of Motives
focuses on the concept. Burke himself also once wrote that the “key term” for the “new”
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rhetoric is identification (“Rhetoric: Old and New” 62-3), rather than persuasion (see A
Rhetoric of Motives 19-46), and Burke does appear to claim that persuasion requires or is
preceded by identification: “a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic
identification” (46). Bryan Crable sums up this common reading as a result of the
dominant place Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives has in rhetorical theory: “Efforts to
characterize the text [A Rhetoric of Motives] often echo Rueckert’s formulation: the
Rhetoric “is built on the principle of identification” (Kenneth Burke and the Drama of
Human Relations 152, qtd. in Crable 215). However, Crable notes that while simplifying
Burke this way is seductive, it shortchanges much of Burke’s thought, not just as a whole,
but that contained in A Rhetoric of Motives alone: “the equation of Burkean rhetoric and
identification is functional—it neatly summarizes his contribution to rhetorical studies—
but discourages focus on the text as a whole” (215-16). Problematically, this oversimplification of identification, coupled with the popularity of Burke’s thought within the
fields of rhetorics,2 has led to the valorization of identification as a rhetorical practice to
be advocated.
One of the reasons I bring up this simplification of Burke’s notion of
identification as a rhetorical practice he advocates is because theorists of community, and
counter-rhetorics theorists in general (broadly considered, those who privilege difference
over identity), often use Burke as a point of departure for advocating alternative
rhetorical practices. Instead of criticizing other theorists for misreading Burke as
promoting identification, these counter-rhetorics theorists attack Burke directly, implying
that his rhetorical theories are practices he advocates, rather than theoretical descriptions
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of how rhetorics function. For example, Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin claim to be
countering Burke’s rhetorical theories with a highly normative “invitational rhetoric,” a
rhetorical practice that invites further understanding through the advocacy of multiple
perspectives and the creation of three conditions for rhetoric: “safety, value, and
freedom” (“Beyond Persuasion” 10; see also “A Feminist Perspective”). Another
prominent theorist who views the Burkean emphasis on identification normatively is
Krista Ratcliffe. A thinker I greatly admire, Ratcliffe claims that Burke, “in valorizing
commonalities,” normatively privileges identification over division and difference, and
thus “does not provide a sufficient recognition of differences as a place for rhetorical
exchanges and subsequent actions” (Rhetorical Listening 60). For Ratcliffe, this is
particularly important when it comes to the politics and rhetorics of gender and race.3
I would like to make an important claim here, consistent with Crable’s work,
which I mention above: neither the over-emphasis/simplification and accompanying
valorization of identification nor the critique of this position as “Burkean” gives a very
generous or particularly accurate reading of Burke’s rhetorical theory. These readings
also do a disservice for rhetorical theory when applied to problems of community writ
large. Like the problem of constitutive and normative theories of community I briefly
close with in the introduction of this dissertation, Burke’s interest in identification as a
key component of rhetoric is an argument about the constitution of rhetorics, or what
rhetorics are and how they work. By shifting the focus slightly from persuasion to
identification, the scope of understanding what rhetoric is and how it functions is much
broader, according to Burke. Nevertheless, when Burke’s name comes up at rhetorical
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theory conferences and classroom discussions, the notion of identification is often applied
and implied as a normative practice that enables an ethical good or has an ameliorating
function. Now, there is the potential for reading any argument as a normative argument,
and one could easily criticize Burke for claiming that we should see rhetoric through a
lens of identification, since it then may render the fields of rhetorics more important than
other scholarly fields. (This argument would be something akin to viewing Burke’s
descriptive project as having a hidden prescriptive agenda.) However, this is not how
Burke is usually read by thinkers who wish to apply a normative critique; unfortunately,
he is seen as taking up a normative argument that promotes identification for better uses
of rhetorics, how we should use rhetorics of identification to create political change
through the transcendence of division (for example, see Stob).
Now, it is not my goal to defend Burke, and he is not immune to criticism or from
making normative claims at times. In fact, there are moments when he does explicitly
advocate identification, but these moments are highly contingent upon the particular
political situations in which he finds himself. For example, during the events of World
War II, he is both critical of identification used to serve Fascist totalitarian attitudes (see
“Americanism” and “Where are We Now?”), as well as advocatory of its uses to counter
such attitudes: “in this solemn situation, our first duty to our nation and to ourselves is to
approach every problem, to conceive of every issue, in terms that will make for the
maximum of national unity, and so for the maximum of effectiveness against our Axis
enemies” (“When ‘Now’ Became ‘Then’” 5). Each of these political positions is highly
normative, though contingent upon particular circumstances; they are not absolute by any
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means or specifically about rhetorical theory. Regarding his rhetorical theories, most
consist of constitutive arguments about the phenomena of rhetorics, what rhetorics are
and how they function, not normative arguments about what we ought to do with
rhetorics, or what kind of rhetorics innately ameliorate.
Quickly, I would like to provide some further evidence for the two claims I have
made, and hopefully this will transition into more contemporary rhetorical thought on
community: (1) Burke does not privilege identification over division, and (2) Burke is
most often making constitutive rather than normative arguments about rhetorics of
identification. In A Rhetoric of Motives (the text most often referenced for seemingly
advocating identification), Burke clearly points out that “identification is compensatory
to division,” but that some identifications are in no way peaceful or ethical
compensations for division (22). Some of Burke’s most powerful writing occurs when he
discusses war (22), capitalistic exploitation (25), the perpetuation of status quo political
conservatism (28), and more as phenomena of cooperation and unity. Of course, the
notion of war as cooperation is not only seen in the identification of one or more groups
unifying to kill another group, but in the idea of war as a cooperative practice of
oppositions agreeing upon their intent to kill each other, of identifying a similar hatred
for the foreign “other” with the foreign “other.” For Burke, “modern war
characteristically requires a myriad of constructive acts for each destructive one; before
each culminating blast there must be a vast network of interlocking operations, directed
communally” (22).
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As further evidence that Burke does not see identifications of commonality as an
inherent ethical good, in his essay “The Rhetorical Situation,” he argues that
identification “takes on many dimensions,” three of the most prominent are common
sympathies (268), inaccuracies (269), and yes, identifications occurring by or with
antithesis, or a “union by some opposition held in common” (268). In this essay, Burke
famously refers to this latter rhetorical phenomenon as “congregation by segregation,” in
which “identity may involve identification not just with mankind [sic] or the world in
general, but by some kind of congregation that also implies some related norms of
differentiation or segregation” (268). In other words, and to begin extending this problem
even further, and transitioning more directly to the problem of community, the
identification and inclusion of some in one community occurs at the expense of, as well
as for the purpose of, the division and exclusion of others from that community, and vice
versa.
To put it another way, yes identification can work as an answer to the problem of
division; however, the use of identification also depends, employs, and even exploits
division for its purposes, and vice versa. Neither identification nor division can exist
without the presence of its antithesis. No doubt many grab onto Burke’s thought of
identification because it is readily recognizable (or identifiable) as being put into practice
in our everyday lives. However, there is even more evidence that Burke did not
necessarily privilege identification over division in rhetorics, normatively or
constitutively. In contrast to this commonly held position, Crable argues that Burke may
have actually privileged difference, or “distance” in his thought over identification, as a
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more dominant rhetorical motive. This motive of distance is part of a rhetoric Burke calls
“pure persuasion.” Crable’s “Distance as Ultimate Motive” is an excellent source for a
detailed exposition Burke’s notion of pure persuasion; however, a quick gloss of this
argument goes as follows: since the appeal of identification can only exist if there is a
distance of difference to bridge, rhetors actually desire this distance to be maintained to
some degree; otherwise, they could not participate in identification. A rhetoric of pure
persuasion, then, would be one where a rhetor does not actually desire complete
identification with his or her audience, but instead wishes to perpetuate the rhetorical
situation by maintaining some distance and difference. At most, I believe a careful reader
should be cautious in saying that Burke privileges either identification over division or
division over identification in his rhetorical theory.
Still, for some rhetoricians interested in the concept of community, whether
explicitly following Burke or not, the claim that identification is the key to rhetorics
means that one should privilege consensus and the identification of commonalities as a
norm to be advocated, the solution to violent confrontations of difference. As I have just
pointed out, I disagree with this reading of Burke, but it may be important to flesh out
this argument, briefly. If this logic is accurate, consensus is the key to persuasive, as well
as ethically good, rhetoric: if the audience discovers similarity with their own position
and that of the rhetor’s, they will be more readily convinced by the rhetoric from the
rhetor. Some rhetoricians have taken this “Burkean” focus on identification, or an
emphasis on consensus, and run with it to develop rhetorics of community. This has
occurred broadly in composition studies, as well as in communication studies.
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One prominent example of scholars interested in communal goals of identifying
common ground is Kenneth Bruffee. Bruffee argues for a social constructivist paradigm
within rhetoric and composition studies that places a heavy emphasis on consensus, and
views student groups in classrooms as communities of collaborative learning. While
Bruffee agrees that the practice of recognizing diversity, difference, and disagreement is
“consistent with the traditional goal[s] of college and university liberal education”
(“Taking the Common Ground” 11), he advocates identification and affirmation of “our
general commonality” as an answer to educational, and even societal problems that
emerge from the convergence of diverse cultural identities (12; see also “Social
Construction” and “Collaborative Learning”).
Bruffee is not alone in this thought. Other scholars also have employed a range of
rhetorical theories arguing for better political collective communication practices through
identifying similarities to achieve democratic consensus and other shared goals. Drawing
upon Burke’s notion of identification, John Dewey’s idea of the public, Jürgen
Habermas’s theories of consensus and understanding, and/or Etienne Wenger’s
communities of practice, where “mutual engagement,” “joint enterprise,” and “shared
repertoire” are emphasized, the general move is that for communities to have an impact,
they need to work with and toward an idealized deliberative rhetoric that “puts aside”
differences and builds on identifications of sameness, whether in language, ethical values,
or other common grounds.4 Hypothetically, this position argues, such a shared discourse
would solve the problems of democracy.
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In contrast to this thought, there are many counter-rhetorics thinkers, in both
composition and communication studies, who privilege difference, rather than place an
emphasis on identifications of commonalities. Drawing upon poststructuralist and critical
theories, many of these counter-rhetorics scholars are interested in critical race theory,
feminist rhetorics, political economy, and other projects concerned with oppression and
politics in communities and in the classroom. These theorists have criticized any position
that conceptualizes or even appears to conceptualize a culture, community, or individual
student (or a community’s or student’s goals, for that matter) with overarching or
universal identifications. They counter that such identifications, even if they are
identifications of democracy and equality, most often adopt or perpetuate the values and
practices of (and thus benefit those) in dominant positions of power relations, thus
excluding and oppressing those on the margins of the social order (see, for examples,
Banks; Bartholomae; Biesecker; Bizzell; Canagarajah; Crowley; Clark; Clifford; Gilyard;
hooks; Jarrett and Reynolds; Lyons; Olson; Nakayama and Krizek; Norton; Ratcliffe;
Villanueva; and Vitanza, just to name a few).
As Carrie Shively Leverenz writes, “knowledge-making communities ignore or
erase difference in order to maintain a single, authoritative, ‘normal’ discourse (168).
This problem is articulated beautifully by Xin Liu Gale, who draws on her personal
experiences to expose the contradictions and problems of identification, exclusion and
assimilation in a country like the United States, so dedicated to the power of
individualism, yet “so devoted to social ‘isms’ and community” (103). There are many
variations and layers to this reasoning, and I have no wish to conflate each of the cited
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above thinker’s arguments; however, I think it is noteworthy to understand that these
counter-rhetorics positions have made enough of a mark in the fields of rhetoric to
continually demand a recognition of difference from all scholars of rhetorics interested in
community. While extremely valuable, these criticisms have coincided with the call to
only use the term community in concrete and local material situations (e.g., Harris), and
even more drastically, for the dismissal of the term community in and of itself in
theoretical discussions of rhetoric (see Kent). One might speculate that these calls to limit
the use of the term community are a result of the influence of counter-rhetorics (for
example, see West’s “Beyond Dissensus”). As a response to these types of tensions,
Gregory Clark begins to argue for a normative redefinition of community by considering
“confronting differences” as the primary practice that should define community
engagement. Such a notion, Clark posits, “rescues the discourse of community from
domination and exclusion” (“Rescuing 73).5
Like Clark, but in contrast to thinkers like Harris or Kent, there are those who
accept this problem of difference in community as a point of study, and demand that it
require rigorous theoretical legwork. As William Covino states, “community remains an
elusive but crucial concept, shaping our thoughts” (163). Thus, in many fields, including
those not directly concerned with rhetorics, thinkers have tried to rehabilitate, form and
cultivate the subject of community and communication (see Anderson; Carey; Depew
and Peters), and others have attempted to understand how different communities’
communication practices produce cooperation and/or resistance (see Butchcart; Grewal;
Warner). However, two thinkers in the fields of rhetorics have received a significant
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amount of attention of late for their rhetorical theories applying the term community: Pat
Gehrke and Diane Davis. Both employ the thought of philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy to
theorize the concept. I mention this fact because this similarity connects Davis and
Gehrke, and because I also wish to draw upon and discuss Nancy’s thought to inform my
own rhetorics of community.
Gehrke, who wishes to affirm and extend the counter-rhetorics argument against
the focus on identifications of commonality, is very interested in how the notion of
community figures into democratic politics. Following Janice Norton’s claim that the
concept of identification has become rhetorics studies’ common “master trope” (42; qtd.
in Gehrke, “Being-for-the-Other” 6), Gehrke points out that positing the identification of
commonalities as the means for negotiating communal differences is not only historically
counter-factual to how politics have functioned, it also presupposes a stable foundation
that does not exist. “[L]ife and living together . . . no longer can be determined or guided
by any order or meaning or purpose that we might once have found in the world, in
philosophy, in ethics, or in community” (“Community at the End of the World” 121-22).
Gehrke argues that with the advent of post-structuralist thought, one would be naïve to
think that groups—while they must acknowledge they exist with each other—could ever
discover “a pregiven in-common substance or . . . balanced procedure for establishing
mutually beneficial agreements and intersubjective truths” (124-25). For Gehrke, and for
what might be broadly considered poststructuralist thought, since there is no foundational
or common substance from which to base our claims and bridge our differences, any
communicative practice used to establish common identifiable concepts to determine the
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meaning of individual being or of community will always contain a bias, whether of race,
class, gender, or other biases that are historically situated within institutions of power
(125). Instead of the focus on the individual or on communities, Gehrke advocates a turn
toward our relationality, or “the sheer fact of community, on face, and not to any
meaning, structure, or form that might be given to community or communities” (125).
Applying the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy, who builds upon Martin Heidegger’s
proposition that any and all being is always already “being-with,” Gehrke sees this focus
on the “sheer fact of community” as paying attention to the with of our existence. In other
words, he wishes to turn our focus toward the relationality that is a fact of our existence,
a phenomenon he sees as “not a precondition of being and not the ground of being, but
[as] the totality of the fact of being” (125).
Like Gehrke, as I mentioned above, Diane Davis (“Finitude’s Clamor”;
Inessential Solidarity) also draws upon Nancy’s thought of community. However, and
perhaps more radical than Gehrke, Davis worries that though most counter-rhetorics
theorists seemingly understand that the individual within a community is constituted by
difference and plurality, they still privilege identification over difference.6 In particular,
Davis argues that instead of privileging identification and consensus in community, these
counter-rhetorics theorists tend to privilege it in the individual by advocating for the
writer’s ability to present him- or herself as a single and stable identity, what Davis calls
the “self-present composing subject” (“Finitude’s Clamor” 121). From Davis: “Even
radical writing pedagogies . . . which presume that identity is constituted and plural, have
a tendency to reproduce the myth of immanence [oneness] by encouraging students to
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consider themselves presentable” (121, original emphasis). This identification of the self
as “presentable,” for Davis, is a betrayal of the exposure of the shared relational
difference (what she calls “community”) that actually constitutes a being. She will go so
far as to refer to some of these pedagogical and rhetorical practices as “anticommunitarian.” To counter these identifications of the presentable self in the
composition classroom, Davis suggests a “communitarian literacy” that sees “writers and
readers [as] in the world and exposed to others, a literacy that can read and write writing
as a function of this irreparable exposure, of this irrepressible community” (122, original
emphasis).
Interestingly enough, both Davis and Gehrke employ Continental philosopher
Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought on community to investigate phenomena that are not what are
traditionally considered communities. Davis’s point of critique is the self-sufficient
rhetor, or what often goes by the names of the autonomous subject, the free-willing agent,
or the liberal individual in other discourses. Gehrke argues that we cannot persuasively
discuss either the individual or communities without oppressing and excluding, and
therefore he theorizes the term community as the relational phenomenon that situates a
person’s seemingly singular existence. There are reasons for this use of the term
community to critique phenomena of singularity, but it is important to know that for these
two thinkers, as well as for others who use Nancy’s thought (see, for example, Hartelius
and Asenas; Pinchevksi; Rand; Reid; and Vitanza, Sexual Violence), the aim has been
almost always a critique of the self, the autonomous individual, the rhetorical agent, and
other terms concerned with subjectivity; however, his thought has not been used to
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describe actual community production and processes. This is the main exigency of my
dissertation: to work towards a rhetorical theory of community that acknowledges this
relational existence of singularities, but is also applicable to specific communities and
their practices.
To explain in more detail the exigency for this dissertation, and to begin to
understand what I mean by the move I wish to make toward rhetorics of community with
(though not away from) rhetorics of singularity, it is important to understand why
thinkers like Davis and Gehrke employ the concept of community the way they do. My
project is closely tied to theirs; I consider my project supplementary to theirs, so I think it
necessary to investigate some of the main thinkers upon whom they draw most heavily—
in particular, French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. As my own interest in the subject of
community is greatly indebted to Nancy’s work, I want to briefly summarize some of the
main arguments he makes about community. I will conclude that he does move us toward
a norm of inclusion, a norm we can see as a set of ethical values that enable and/or result
from what I will call rhetorics of community; however, my dissertation will argue that
this norm of inclusion (or I might more accurately say, anti-exclusion) is not enough to
withstand the actual pressures that everyday communities face to organize and sustain
themselves and to make their impact felt in political realms, especially those groups that
are on the margins—groups with which Nancy, Davis, and Gehrke are concerned. These
conclusions are really more the result of another discovery I have already alluded to with
the works of Davis and Gehrke: Nancy’s theory of community is really a theory of
singularity. While this may seem like a radical statement for some, I will point to
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evidence that Nancy himself (eventually) articulates this argument. If this is true, then it
should be easier to accept that his theory, while informing rhetorics of community, needs
some supplement to work as a theory of community that is relevant and real to people’s
actual experiences of community, and that still engages the problems with which Davis
and Gehrke are concerned.

Nancy’s Community of Being; Not the Being of Community
Nancy’s book The Inoperative Community, which developed out of an article of
the same title he wrote in the early 1980’s, has been a powerful influence on Continental
Philosophy and the many other fields that are directly invested in the thought of
community. Fields in addition to philosophy and rhetorics that have called upon his
thinking in this text and others include art, communication, composition, music, political
theory, and more. Nancy’s essay and book have led to a series of direct and indirect
responses engaged in a rethinking of community from other thinkers taking part in the
continental tradition, most notably Maurice Blanchot (The Unavowable Community) and
Giorgio Agamben (The Coming Community), and more recently Roberto Esposito
(Communitas) and Adriana Cavarero (For More Then One Voice).7 As I state in the
introduction of this dissertation, I will focus on the rethinking of community that has
been occurring within French and Italian thought for at least three decades now, starting
with Nancy’s essay, “The Inoperative Community.”8 Each of these thinkers’ re-thinking
has been in some way or another engaged with problems of totalitarianism. They do not
want a notion of community to be subsumed by totalitarian thought.
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No doubt Pat Gehrke, Diane Davis, and other rhetoricians applying Nancy’s work
have recognized a similar exigency. In almost every case Nancy and his responders
reference the horrors of European totalitarianism as a major point of investigation and
exigency to understand the problems of community better in the following context: if
community, a term that usually carries a positive connotation, is considered in terms of
unity and achieving oneness, then how do we reconcile the tensions between such an
affirmative connotation and many of the similar themes of unity and oneness that
motivated the exclusionary and violent actions of Nazi Germany and other fascist
regimes?
To engage this question, Nancy employs an implicit version of stasis theory in
The Inoperative Community in an attempt to separate the phenomenon of totalitarianism
from that of community.9 As rhetoricians, with regards to argumentative invention, we
often use stasis theory to discover or invent points of common ground or contrast in an
argument. Stasis theory usually considers at least four staseis—conjecture, definition,
quality, and policy.10 In most common usages of the term community and in much of the
scholarship today using the term, the first three questions of stasis regarding the concept
of community are usually presupposed, or are perceived as generally agreed upon as a
known or established fact: the general conjecture is that community exists, it is defined in
terms of inclusion or unity, and it is qualified as something that is good or beneficial,
something humans desire to work toward and produce. These “givens” leave us only with
policy, or the question of what courses of action should be taken to create such versions
of community. In other words, debates regarding the question of community often only
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surface at the point of policy, rarely being challenged at any of the other points of
stasis—this is especially true in political, religious, and technological discourse, where
we continually hear ethical and emotional appeals of unity in community building
through speech and social media. The argument adheres to the following logic: if we
already understand what community as oneness is and it is something we emotionally
value as an ethical good, then we only need to discover what actions are possible to
produce such a desired oneness. We therefore privilege community as a phenomenon that
should be undeniably affirmed. Nancy does not really challenge this claim—that
community should be affirmed. Rather, he challenges our conjecture and definition of the
term community by asserting that this version of community as oneness is actually closer
to a definition of totalitarianism, or what he calls “immanentism,” and that community is
or should be something very different.
I mention above that thinkers like Diane Davis and Pat Gehrke have employed
Nancy’s thought on community more in the service of rhetorics of singularity that
question individualism and the free-willing rhetorical agent, rather than for rhetorics that
might apply directly to community practices. One reason for this is because Nancy sees
the history of philosophy, considered broadly, as thinking of the essence of the individual
in a parallel manner to that of the essence of community. To explain this connection I
will begin with Nancy’s thought in The Inoperative Community, which is arguably the
foundation for much of Nancy’s later thought on community, singularity, and related
phenomena.
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The opening lines of The Inoperative Community are some of the most important
when considering Nancy’s work. He begins with the claim that “the gravest and most
painful testimony of the modern world…is the testimony of the dissolution, the
dislocation, or the conflagration of community” (1). Remembering this opening line is
crucial because he is signaling his focus to the reader early in the text: a worry for the
destruction or loss of community. However, this grievance is not a nostalgic lament for
some idealized notion of what community once was, a mourning Nancy will criticize two
thinker who influence him, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (9), and even Georges Bataille (17),
for doing.11 Rather, Nancy is pained by the recurring destruction of community, which he
argues, occurs in the name of community and through practices and processes we often
recognize as those of community. I will explain.
For Nancy, thinkers like Locke, Rousseau, Marx, and Sartre have regarded the
essences of the individual and of the community to be the same: to work toward
completion through work—a work and completion that is community itself.12 In other
words, from these thinkers’ perspectives the community is a unified body and its goal is
to work toward becoming a unified body. This is similar for these thinkers’ perspectives
of the individual: the individual is autonomous and his or her goal is to work toward
becoming autonomous. Nancy contends that even communist oppositions to capitalist
exploitation have not been exempt from this goal, “the goal of achieving a community of
beings producing in essence their own essence as their work, and furthermore producing
precisely this essence as community” (2, original emphasis).
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Nancy refers to this phenomenon—this goal to complete oneself, to complete the
community, to make of things a totality, a oneness—as “immanentism” or the will to
immanence. However, for Nancy, immanentism, rather than creating community, is
actually the “great stumbling block of thinking community” (2-3), and what betrays or
dislocates community. He argues that the will to oneness that underlies these common
characterizations of the individual and of community is nothing other than
totalitarianism; still, Nancy chooses the concept of “immanentism” over “totalitarianism”
because of the obvious ideological and political connotations of the latter term. This
distinction is important for Nancy, because this problem of immanentism as the thought
of community “besets the general horizon of our time…encompassing both democracies”
and their foundations, and not just what we typically consider to be totalitarian regimes
(3). In this way, Nancy sees immanentism manifest in politics from leftist communisms
to far-right capitalist individualisms. And while Nancy is sympathetic to leftist politics,
he recognizes this will to oneness in any human collectivity or individualistic ideology
where a rallying cry of unity or self-sufficiency is a common substance upon which the
purpose of the group or individual is identified (2).13
There are two ways in which Nancy criticizes the notion of community as defined
by immanentism: First, achieving this oneness appears to be logically, as a well as
ontologically, invalid. Second, attempting to achieve this oneness is politically
dangerous. Nancy’s problem with the logic of immanentism, or this will to oneness, is
that it follows what he calls the logic of the absolute:
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The absolute must be the absolute of its own absoluteness, or not be at all.
In other words: to be absolutely alone, it is not enough to be so; I must
also be alone being alone—and this of course is contradictory. The logic
of the absolute violates the absolute. (4)
The logic of the absolute is that something can exist on its own without any
relation to another entity taking part in its being. The absolute must contain its outside or
borders inside of itself. It must somehow suppose it is completely free of exposure to any
sort of relation to another thing that exists with it or might potentially influence it to some
degree, including that which it is not. That, or it must be able to enclose that relation as
solely within itself. In its rhetorical form the logic of the absolute is simply begging the
question. For absoluteness to be shown, it must already be assumed in its premise.
(Rhetoricians will recognize a similar line of thought in Kenneth Burke’s discussion of
the paradox of substance in A Grammar of Motives, though Burke is not speculating on
ontology; rather, he is theorizing how we think and communicate ontology.)14 In other
words, if some entity were truly to be or become one, according to this logic, it must be
the only one, in relation to nothing else. It must be the only thing that participates in its
existence—metaphysically or materially. Nancy sees this as an impossible logic, or at
least, if some entity did follow this logic, it could not be known or signified in language,
for to be so it would have to take part in relation to the existence of linguistic
representation, at minimum. Thus, for Nancy, all existence is co-existence; any being’s
appearance is always a co-appearance with another being (Inoperative 57-8). No being
exists of and by itself, including human beings, of course. Here Nancy is extending
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Martin Heidegger’s line of thinking that all being is always already “being-with.” As I
soon explain, this is Nancy’s larger project: to expose and expound upon the ontological
phenomenon of “being-with,” or the relationality inherent in the constitution of all
singular beings. Initially, he calls this phenomenon “community.”15
The second problem Nancy has with community being defined by oneness is that
even if such a completion of oneness is impossible, he still sees the motive to become one
as leading to violent actions and ends. Thus, it is not only a problem of conjecture and
definition; it is a problem of quality and policy, a “should we or shouldn’t we?” problem
of normativity. For Nancy, any community motivated by this will to oneness—in as
much as the community sees achieving oneness with its members as its aim and
essence—would have to eliminate all the elements that prevented the community from
achieving this oneness, were it to fulfill its aim. Nancy warns that all “political or
collective enterprise[s] dominated by a will to absolute immanence have as their truth the
truth of death. Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than that of the
suicide of the community that is governed by it” (12). Any extraneous, contradictory, or
just relational elements that take part in that community’s existence, but that do not fit the
criteria that define this oneness, would need to be eliminated for this goal to be achieved.
Thus, for Nancy, since all beings are already beings-with, which makes such absolute
oneness impossible, any community motivated by oneness is a community that seeks its
own end, even if it does not know it. Of course, for Nancy, this is the logic of Nazi
Germany, and he makes this assertion directly. If the logic were actually carried out to its
logical end by the German state, it would have been nothing other than the German
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state’s suicide, for a “criteria of pure [Aryan] immanence” would eventually negate all
but whatever single being was left who determined and satisfied the pure criteria in the
first place (12, original emphasis). Thus we now understand Nancy’s opening line in The
Inoperative Community, and his argument that “the dissolution, the dislocation, or the
conflagration of community” (1) at large is seemingly an ironic result of the rhetorical
appeal and practice of oneness in communities.
So at this point in my discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of community, he
has given us a few things to consider with regards to the concept—and remember it is his
notion of community which rhetoricians like Diane Davis, Pat Gehrke, Victor Vitanza,
Johanna Hartelius and Jennifer Asenas, and others concerned with rhetorics have
employed to critique what Davis has called the “self-composed subject”: First, Nancy has
argued that community cannot ontologically be or logically mean oneness. Second, even
if we should choose to define community as oneness, or have oneness as a goal of a
community, such a goal will be problematic if we are to presuppose any value in the life
of that community, the lives of it members, or the lives of in relation to the community.
So he has made a constitutional argument, as well as a normative one, and both are
negative arguments at this point: what community is not—an absolute or immanent
being, and what its aims should not be—oneness. There are points in his work where he
blurs the line between the constitutive and the normative, but the two claims above are
generally consistent. In the following paragraphs I delineate some elements of Nancy’s
concept of community that I will apply to my larger project of rhetorics of community. I
also attempt to show some of the limitations to his thought on community, from which

46

my own rhetorical exigency is established, and to push the conversation on constitutive
(what community is) and normative theories of community (what types of communities
and community practices should be advocated) further.
Nancy’s first claim about the logic and ontology of community may be
reconcilable with constitutive arguments about community: No community is absolute; it
is at least partly constituted by what it is not. If we think back on my brief example of the
Mormon community, it should be clear how the Mormon community is constituted as
much by its own ideologies and practices as by those community values and practices
from which it differs and by which it excludes others. Therefore, I think that generally, I
can move forward with this claim about what community is—communities are at least
partially constituted by their exposed relation to difference. I say partially, however,
because this cannot be the totality of what constitutes communities. I have made
reference to practices throughout this essay, and believe that they must also be considered
as constitutive of communities. I explain this in chapter 2.
However, Nancy’s normative claim that communities should not be united under
a common goal, which would be a version of an attempt at oneness, is more difficult to
reconcile with how actual communities function. This argument about community leaves
us with some questions, namely, is there such a community that does not fall under this
problem? It is important to note that for Nancy this aim of oneness can be metaphysical.
In other words, he is critical of any community that seeks oneness under any heading,
figure, term, or theme. The most obvious are those that seek it under figures of
nationalism, racism, sexism, or heterosexism, like the Nazis or the Westboro Baptist
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Church. These communities are easy to critique under this condemnation of oneness.
Because these communities are united under certain hateful absolutes, such as antiSemitism and anti-homosexuality, they violently exclude others to the detriment of the
social and physical lives of those they exclude and include. However, what if we apply
this criterion to communities we might wish to affirm, such as communities involved in
civil rights movements—groups that unite under themes of equality and non-violence?
Under Nancy’s normative argument, the ends of these communities would be death, as
well. Of course, his claim becomes even more difficult to reconcile with how actual
communities function, if we consider the theme of conflict (as Gregory Clark suggests),
or difference itself (i.e., non-oneness) as a common substance under which a community
might unite.
Now the goal of this dissertation is not to show the faults of Jean-Luc Nancy’s
theory of community. In fact, as seen in chapters 2, 3, and 4, I continually incorporate
Nancy’s thought into the rhetorics of community I advocate and seek to produce, as well
as the ethics and politics of community I see informing and being produced by those
rhetorics. Still—and this is a point I wish to make with regards to how rhetoricians have
used Nancy’s work—we must be very careful about how we use Nancy’s theory of
community. Simply put, Nancy’s argument about what constitutes community is not
about actual communities as humans experience them, at least not in totality. Rather, it is
a theory about ontology, and how relational difference is one of the conditions of being—
thus the term being-with; it is a theory of existence, whether of humans or communities.
Nancy himself provides plenty of evidence for this claim.
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In two of his later essays, “The Confronted Community,” and “Of Being-inCommon,” Nancy actually explains his project by articulating his move away from the
concept of community and toward that of being-with as the driving theme. In the
“Confronted Community” Nancy argues he has “preferred to substitute [for community],
little by little, the graceless expressions, ‘being-together’, ‘being-in-common’, and finally
‘being-with’” (31). His reasons include the inability to avoid the weight of religious
connotation carried in the word “community” that any reader might possibly take away
from his work, as well as an acknowledgment that the renewed emphasis on the term has
appeared to parallel the revival of the very same communities of oneness he was
critiquing and warning against in The Inoperative Community (“Confronted” 31-2).
While this explanation of the move away from the term “community” makes it
seem a purely rhetorical choice, in “Being-in-Common,” Nancy gives us even greater
evidence that his focus has always been on constructing an ontology that the term
community helps inform. Rather than provide a normative alternative to those
communities he saw as destructive, Nancy’s project is one of ontology: “the question
should be the community of being, and not the being of community” (1). In this pithy
observational critique (a seemingly simple anasemic substitution16), Nancy has explained
his whole project as one predominantly governed by the purpose of writing a
singular/plural ontology. This ontology—with the term “community” as a once
convenient and explanatory trope, as well as a point of departure and critique—enables
the continual deconstruction of totalitarianism motive in the individualisms and
communisms of modernity, yet still allows for a notion of singularity to co-exist with the
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plural. Take note, however, that Jean-Luc Nancy himself has been hesitant to use the
term “community” since The Inoperative Community. Miranda Joseph argues that
Nancy’s departure from using the term is actually a sign of his abandonment of the
project of community (xxix). In contrast, I think notions of community still have much to
learn from Nancy; however, we should be careful in how freely and in totality we apply
his thought on community to the actual construction of political communities,
organizations, and associations, especially when projects meant to overturn inequalities
and injustices against oppressed groups are at stake.
As rhetoricians like Davis and Gehrke have pointed out, such terms like “beingwith,” “begin-in-common,” “being-together,” “being-singular-plural” and others (again,
see “The Confronted Community,” “Being-in-common,” as well as Being Singular
Plural) apply more aptly to an understanding of the existence of singularity. This
demonstrates how all beings are produced by their contemporaneous exposure to other
singular beings, thus problematizing any claim to a notion of a self-sufficient subject that
we see in capitalist individualisms and other paradigms that see the self as an autonomous
being. Is this phenomenon of relational exposure to difference important to a conception
of community? Yes. However, saying that this relationality that constitutes singular
beings is community in totality would be a grave mistake, I believe. If this were the main
criterion that defined community, we would only be able to differentiate communities by
the various relations to which they are exposed. What about those communities we find
intolerable? What about those we wish to affirm? Is the only difference between the two
a matter of their varying exposures to relations of difference? I am confident in
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exclaiming that this is not enough. It does not reflect my experiences of community, and I
think one would be hard-pressed to find someone who does find the phenomenon of
experiencing relationality as exhaustive of the experience of community.
Thus, one of the goals of this dissertation is to supplement the critique of the
autonomous subject that counter-history rhetoricians have employed for some time
now—and I think Jean-Luc Nancy’s work is definitely applicable to this criticism. In
addition, I also want to differentiate my focus from these rhetorical inquiries. These
rhetoricians have concerned themselves with questions regarding the thought of the
subject with regards to relational exposure to difference (what has been called
community), and have attempted to write rhetorics that subvert a notion of the individual
as a self-composed, self-enclosed being. My project is specifically interested in taking
what they have to offer and writing rhetorics of community, of human collectivity. As I
state in the introduction, I make arguments in this dissertation about how communities
are constituted beyond relationality (chapter 2), but my main project is to work toward
normative community practices which rhetoricians concerned with equality, justice, and a
concern for human dignity might advocate and put into practice, practices that would
enable the building of communities which rhetoricians would be motivated to produce in
particular contexts. To begin developing these better rhetorical practices, I deem it
necessary to consider ethical and political implications, justifications, and aims.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNITY OR NORMATIVE COMMUNITY?
In the previous chapter, I demonstrate how some counter-rhetorics theorists
employ the term community in their scholarship—which is that they often use the term
community to critique notions of the autonomous subject, or what also goes by the names
of the self-composing rhetor, the capitalist individual, free-willing rhetorical agent and
other terms that designate a human with absolute individuality and self-sufficiency. These
counter-rhetorics theorists critique this subject by showing the many relations of
difference that help constitute the subject’s being, his or her existence, and thus expose
myths of notions like those of individualism.1 In employing the term community to make
this critique, many of these theorists, including Diane Davis, Pat Gehrke, Victor Vitanza,
Johanna Hartelius and Jennifer Asenas, and others have drawn upon French philosopher
Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of community. In the previous chapter I argue how while
Nancy’s thought does work well in criticisms of the individual and gives us a starting
point for theorizing community, it is not sufficient for discussing how communities are
formed, how they function, or for advocating better community practices and action.
In this chapter, I supplement Nancy’s thought on community, and the counterrhetorics thinkers who have drawn upon it, by arguing for a constitutive model of
community—what community is, or what makes a community a community. I want a
model that rhetoricians can presuppose in their discussions of communities. Of course, as
soon as they begin to make critiques of community or advocate for a given community,
rhetoricians must then rely on normative arguments as well—how communities should
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be, or what types of community practices one would advocate—from which to make
these critiques and from which to advocate for better community practices. However,
normativity in itself is often criticized or resisted by leftist politics and counter-rhetorics
theorists. Thus, I end this chapter by arguing that normativity, while neither inherently
good nor evil, is necessary to any community practice. As part of this argument for
certain forms of normativity, I look ahead to the following chapters on ethics, politics,
and rhetorics of community, in which I make particular normative arguments about
community practices.
One of the problems I address at the end of this chapter is that I believe
normativity is often confused for or conflated with normalization in rhetorical theory, as
well as some leftist politics, in general. In brief, I define normativity as the element
within any practice that advocates at least one value over another value—simply put, the
“betterness” or “worseness” of what happens in the practice. Normalization is a process
in practices that creates and/or perpetuates conditions for unwitting conformity to a value.
For this definition of normalization, I am working out of Michel Foucault’s thought.
While I argue broadly against normalizing rhetorical practices, I am aware that one
cannot help but participate in normative rhetorics whenever one practices critique or
advocacy. Even the critique of normalization is a normative act, in which I am valuing
some standard over normalization; the advocacy of democracy is a normative stance, in
which one would be valuing democracy over other political systems or practices. If
normative arguments are necessary to ethical and political stances, particularly when it
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comes to knowing, doing, and making community, why not make the best normative
arguments possible?

A Constitutive Model of Community
My goal is not to map out what might be called an “explicative” model of
community, or a model that exposes all that is contained in the term community or within
actual communities and their practices. In other words, I am not discussing a model of
community that “leaves no stone unturned.” I am making no claims to such totality of
thought. In fact, I will admit right here that the constitutive model of community I will
adhere to is an insufficient model for a project of such explicative nature. My model of
what constitutes community will not recognize everything; however, I believe it should
be a model of community that will be recognized by most readers. In addition, it should
inform the reader of things he or she might not have thought of when employing the
concept or when participating in his or her own community practices. Think of my model
of what constitutes community in much the same way that Aristotle uses the phrase, “in
general, and for the most part . . . .”
To make normative arguments about community (which I do in the next three
chapters), or make arguments about the types of community practices that should be
endorsed, one still has to presuppose what a community is. I see at least three elements
necessary to this presupposed constitutive model of community, all of which overlap and
are related in theory, practice, and production: (1) the exposure to relations of difference
between members of the community, as well as exposure to the relations of difference
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between a community and other communities and individuals; (2) members of a
community must share at least one practice, though most will share many, and there will
be overlap with other communities; and (3) these relations of exposure to difference and
these practices, to be communal, must dually and contemporaneously contain elements of
sharing and protection, or preservation, of a community’s existence—including the social
and biological lives of its members. Such practices of sharing and protection include
practices of inclusivity and exclusivity, and might be better understood as a combination
of these binaries in what Roberto Esposito will see as practices and processes of
communitas (communal sharing with others) and immunitas (immunization from sharing
with others).
None of these elements alone are enough to sustain a constitutive model of
community. For example, though one might differentiate communities solely by each
community’s unique exposures to relations of difference, such a differentiation would
seem to be arbitrarily motivated. Besides the creation of categories, there would be no
other reason to designate a group or for a group to designate themselves a “community”;
that is, unless the group was differentiated by the communities’ practices (which might
include the discursive practice of how the members of the community protect and
differentiate their communal identity from others). Thus, I see all three elements as
always existing and functioning in any community. If there are exceptions, I think they
are rare, and thus exceptions. There may be other elements to add to a constitutive model
of community (such as space and place, or, perhaps a “sense of community,” which I
reference at some points in this chapter), but for the time being, I see any normative
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argument about community contingent upon an awareness of the three elements above
existing or at least contingent upon a presupposition of these elements. Below I give an
explanation for each element, including evidence as to why each should be included in
this flexible constitutive model of community. A brief caveat: when I get into discussions
of inclusion and exclusion, protection and sharing, it may be difficult not to think that I
am making normative arguments, in other words, what types of community practices
should be advocated. However, I do my best to stay within discussions of what a
community is, and when I go into normative arguments, I make the distinction as clear as
I can. The difference is that if the three above elements of my constitutive model of
community are not met, then one does not necessarily have an unethical or problematic
community; rather, one does not have a community at all.
The first element of this constitutive model of community is the exposure to
relations of difference. Just as singular beings are partially constituted by exposure to
difference with other singular beings, so too are communities partially constituted by this
relationality. In other words, the concept of being-with, to which Jean-Luc Nancy has
dedicated a significant portion of his scholarship, also applies to what a community is.
This is a constitutive argument. I mention being-with in the previous chapter in the
discussion of Nancy’s notion of community, but there are multiple layers to this
phenomenon, and some further explication, even some reiteration of being-with may help
support the claim that communities are partially constituted in this way. To do so, I will
continue to draw on Nancy’s thought. One of the clearest examples of his extension of
Heidegger’s notion of being-with is in Nancy’s essay, “Of Being-In-Common.”
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Nancy’s description and extension of Heidegger’s concept being-with, in his
essay “Of Being-In-Common,” is one of the few times he employs an analogy to provide
a clearer example of the relationality that is the condition for singular existence, of which
I would include a singular community’s existence. For Nancy, singular beings are not
necessarily human individuals, though a human being is a singular being.2 Nancy uses the
term singularity, rather than individual, generally to avoid the confusion of equating his
notion to individualism, in other words, to avoid mistaking his concept for that of the
autonomous individual. As should be clear to this point, for Nancy, singularities are not
enclosed in a fixed or self-sufficient structure (Inoperative 27-8), as the concept of the
individual is. The exposure of singularity precedes identification, and is therefore “not
[the same as] an identity,” though any collective or individual identity is a singularity and
comes from the phenomenon of singularity (“Being-In-Common” 7). The analogy:
The logic of being-with corresponds to nothing other than what we could
call the banal phenomenology of unorganized groups of people.
Passengers in the same train compartment are simply seated next to each
other in an accidental, arbitrary, and completely exterior manner. They are
not linked. But they are also quite together inasmuch as they are travelers
on this train, in this same space and for this same period of time. (7)
In this way, a singular being is “with” the group, part of the whole yet still retaining its
singularity.3 For Nancy, this analogy shows that these singularities are both together and
apart, “both extremes [are] possible, virtual, and near at every moment” (7). The
singularity may be exposed as with the group or as the separate single traveler in
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distinction to the other singularities of the group. Again, this exposure precedes
identification of the person as an individual or the group as a collective. Therefore, beingwith, for Nancy, is continually relational, with no relation fixed, because a singular being
is infinitely exposed to the relation of other singularities.
Another term Nancy originally uses, which may help the reader understand this
phenomenon, is co-appearance. Co-appearance, (the French term is compearance (see
Inoperative 28-9), is the phenomenon of singular beings that are or become “in-common”
through co-appearing simultaneously as singular beings in the same space and time, as in
the train example.4 We do not become individuals through some act of separation from
others, for this separation that is an “I” and relationality that makes the “I” part of a “we”
are contemporaneous and co-dependent upon each other, they already are. I can only
appear as an “I” if I appear before, and therefore with some other singular being, who
would be contemporaneously appearing with me. My singularity relies upon my “already
always” relation, or co-appearance with others. Thus, neither singularity nor plurality
precede the other, but they are with each other. Nancy argues, in fact, that rather than the
erasure of exposure to others freeing a singular being—an argument capitalist
individualism presumes—such an erasure actually would be “a privation of being”
(Inoperative 57), because for Nancy singularity always already signifies plurality. And
being-with is both the exposure, and thus sharing of singularities coupled with their
separation and resistance to each other that allows them to be exposed and to share the
their limits in the same space and time in the first place.5 In brief, a “one” necessarily
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requires another, including its resistance to and difference from that other (a “two” or a
“three”), to be a “one.”
Again, in Nancy’s earlier writings, this phenomenon of being-with is a synonym
for the phenomenon of community. However, as I articulate in chapter 1, this is not
enough for a constitutive model of community. Communities are neither free from the
phenomenon of being-with nor are they solely defined by it. If being-with is a grounding
phenomenon of existence,6 then communities are obviously at least partially constituted
by it. Being-with is the condition that allows recognition of the relations that make a
community, or that give that community a “sense of community,” a sense of the “we”;
however, it is also the condition for the “I,” and a sense of individuality. As Nancy puts
it, “the totality of community . . . is a whole of articulated singularities” (Inoperative 76).
I agree with Nancy to this point, but I feel it safe to say that most people would not
consider the experience of relational difference in the same place (like a train) with others
to be a totalizing criterion for being in a community. Though we often hear popular
rhetorics that consider all human relations as part of a global community, most people’s
sense of a “we” requires the sharing or overlapping of practices—whether that “we” is a
group of people that call themselves a community on a daily basis, whether they are
disposed to call themselves a community in times of crisis (when they “co-appear” with
or against another community), or whether they do not use the term community at all to
describe the group.
Accordingly, the second element I think necessary for a constitutive model of
community, and that I will be presupposing throughout the remainder of this dissertation,
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is the sharing of practices. In other words, for two people to be in a community, they
must not only be exposed to each other’s difference, they must also share a practice. To
make this argument, I will draw upon philosopher Todd May’s conception of practices.
In Our Practices, Our Selves; Or, What It Means To Be Human, May argues that
practices are comprised of goal-directedness, social normative governance, and the
regularity of behavior. Mays’ conception of practices draws upon the works of Theodore
Schatzki, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, and others, and allows me to develop a
constitutive model of community that considers the phenomenon with, but beyond, the
experience or recognition of the relational difference that constitutes being a singular
human.7 Practices are not disconnected from the relational differences that also constitute
communities and singular beings. These phenomena go together. However, I see
understanding practices as partially constitutive of community enabling me to make a
shift in focus: To ask, What does this group of people do that makes them a community?
What are the community’s aims? How do they carry out these aims? And, in particular
for my purposes, what explicit and implicit practices of sharing and protection do they
participate in? Employing the notion of practices in a definition of what constitutes
communities also enables rhetoricians not only to differentiate what constitutes
communities beyond their networks of relations; it allows (though does not require)
rhetoricians to start developing a flexible value system for the types of communities and
community practices we would affirm.
As I stated above, May argues that practices are comprised of three elements:
goal-directedness, social normative governance, and the regularity of behavior.
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Regarding goal-directedness, May argues that practices have a purpose, an aim in mind.
He gives many examples, three of which include teaching, cleaning, and playing baseball
(Our Practices 8-9). Each of these practices does have ends in view, even if these ends
are very different. Pedagogies are designed to impart or create knowledge, the goals of
cleaning are sanitary and/or aesthetic, and playing baseball is a practice where the ends
are related to entertainment, winning, and exercise. These are very pedestrian examples,
but we might also look toward specific communities of practice like the Occupy
Movements of 2011 and 2012. Their shared practice was protesting; the aims were to
create awareness of social and economic inequalities, at minimum, ultimately in the
hopes of changing government policies that disproportionately privilege large
corporations—or the “one percent”—over marginalized groups of people, which in this
case is actually the other 99%. Thus goal-directedness is an important element in defining
practices, even if a practice’s goals are layered and diverse.
Concerning social normative governance, May explains, “a practice must, in order
to be a practice, be socially and normatively governed” (9). May differentiates such dual
element governing from “rule governed”: normative governance does not necessarily
imply obedience to actual explicit rules; instead, such governance means that participants
in the practice will know how to carry out the practice, and that there will be norms
determining (often multiple) correct and incorrect ways of doing the practice:
There are right ways and wrong ways of engaging in the practice; though
not all of the participants may be able to articulate exactly what it is that
makes the right way right, they know it when they see it. (The people who
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can articulate what is right and wrong about various aspects of a practice
are often thought of as the experts in that practice.) (9-10)
May goes on: “The normative governance of practices must also be a social one. In other
words, there is no such thing as a practice that can only be for one specific person” (10).
This does not mean that a practice cannot be carried out by one person individually, or
that the practice must be a simultaneous engagement with another. Rather, the norm that
designates how to carry out the activity is social. Though I may practice riding a bike,
doing yoga alone in my living room, or reading a book by myself, each of these activities
is socially and normatively governed. There are norms, or right and wrong, better or
worse ways of performing these practices. These norms, which have been socially
constructed in each of these activities, are socially recognizable, can be carried out
correctly and incorrectly, and can be learned and arguably mastered (9-11). The specific
social and normative characteristics of practices can and obviously do change—for
example, what was once an incorrect practice of reading the last page first in a novel may
normatively become the right way of reading—but that does not negate the fact that
practices are still socially and normatively governed. In fact, such a socially accepted
change would be a result of this governance. Take one of the practices of the Occupy
Movements I mention above, the protest. Though one can protest alone, it will not be a
practice of protesting unless it has some norms governing the act that are socially
recognized as part of the practice of protesting: in particular, the public expression of
objection to political or corporate policies is a socially recognized norm of the practice of
protesting. For example, a person may think he or she is protesting, but if they are not
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following this norm of objection, others will probably consider his or her actions
something other than a protest. That is, unless what this person is doing is adopted
socially as a norm of protesting. The Occupy Movements are particularly interesting
because advocates and detractors continually critiqued the movements on how well they
were protesting. Such a critique cannot be made unless there are norms of protesting that
are socially recognizable, from which one could make that critique.
The third element of practices is the regularity of behavior. For May, “In order for
something to be a practice, the various people engaged in it must be able to be said to be
‘doing the same thing’ under some reasonable description of their behavior” (12). Of
course, discerning what a “reasonable description” means, May acknowledges, obviously
will depend on the perspectives of those doing the describing, as well as the larger
context, and thus will always be up for debate (12-13). For example, even within the
various Occupy Movements’ protests, there were arguably different practices situated
within the larger practice of protesting. There is the University of California, Davis
incident made famous by Internet memes, in which students, to peacefully protest tuition
hikes, sat in a line forming a human wall of sorts. As part of the larger police response a
police officer walked along the line and pepper-sprayed the protesters. In contrast to this
practice of protesting, the most prominent Occupy Movement, Occupy Wall Street
consisted of thousands of protesters staying overnight in tents, playing music, carrying
signs, and many other practices within the larger practice of protesting. While these
instances differ from each other and people in these protests were not all doing the same
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thing, there was enough regularity of behavior in each to be largely recognized as a
practice of protesting.
This is because, as May explains, “practices can be composed of other practices”
and they have “fuzzy borders.” For example, protesting is composed of many other
practices, such as sign making, organizing, or boycotting. Even variations in those
behaviors can be considered part of the regularity of behavior that constitutes a practice.
In May’s own words, “the regularities that different people are engaged in [in a practice]
may not be identical but complementary . . . what makes up the regularities of the
practice is usually not that people perform the same acts but that they perform different,
complementary acts that mesh into a whole” (13, original emphasis).
In sum, a shared practice, which I am seeing as a necessary elements of any
community, requires goal-directedness, social and normative governance, and regularities
of behavior. May uses the practice of playing baseball to show how all three components
of a practice are at work. As I played baseball in high school and college, this example
resonates well with me; hopefully it resonates with the reader, too, enough to understand
the larger argument about practices.
In baseball there are often at least ten people on the field at the same time
(not including managers, umpires, people in the dugout, and others). They
are all engaged in the practice of playing baseball, and indeed are all
engaged in the same instance of that practice. However, they are not all
“doing the same thing” in the sense of displaying the same regularity.
Each of the roles assumed by the players is socially and normatively
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governed, and each involves its own regularities. Taken together, those
regularities are complementary; they constitute that instance of the
practice of playing baseball. Thus, we need to understand the regularities
of practice as being either regularities of identity or regularities of
complementarity. (12-13)
Even though the goals within this example could be many things, whether winning or just
having fun, few of the players on a team are participating in an identical act
contemporaneously, though they are arguably all practicing baseball when they hit,
throw, or catch the baseball. Even within seemingly identical acts there is
complementarity. Players will all throw the ball at some point in the game, for example;
however, the kind of throwing will be different, depending on the norms of the game,
which will help create the specific context and aims of the throw. Whether it is a pitcher
pitching or an outfielder throwing the ball to the second baseman after catching a fly ball,
such behaviors, while both can be identified as “throwing,” are actually complementary
in character.
Now the particular practices I am most interested in for this dissertation are those
practices that take part in sharing and protection. This is the third element I believe
constitutive of community, which in some ways is just tying together exposure to
relations of difference with practices. Arguably all practices can be exclusionary, even if
the goals of the practice are not designed to exclude. For example, if someone doesn’t
“know how” to do something that is integral to a community (for example, they may not
speak the same language or understand the discursive norms8), they may feel excluded
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from that community. I am interested in both implicit and more explicit practices of
inclusion and exclusion; however, as I state above, I want to subtly shift the terms—As I
state above, I am more interested in how community practices enable and employ both
sharing and protection as integral aims and means of those practices. I see these
practices as necessary for any community building and action. To develop the idea
further, I will draw on the work of Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito.
Unlike so many other continental philosophy investigations of community, rather
than focus on the relation of the individual to community, or vice versa, Esposito
etymologizes the term community. In doing so, he finds various binary oppositions not
unrelated to singularity and plurality, two of the terms in which Nancy is invested.
However, the most interesting opposition to community Esposito discovers in the
etymology of community, and from which I receive the most traction, is the term
immunity. Going back to the Latin forms of community and immunity (communitas and
immunitas, respectively) Esposito argues that both terms are connected by the root word
munus. While this term munus has multiple meanings, Esposito will find the most tension
in its definition as an “obligatory gift.” Following this definition, a person who is “in
common” (or communis, an adjectival form of community) is someone who shares or is
with “the obligation to give.” A person who is “immune” (or immunis, an adjectival form
of immunity) would be protected or free from “the obligation to give.” Put another way,
in terms of practices, if I were to practice an act of community, I would be sharing with
others an obligation to give. If I were to practice an act of immunity, I would be protected
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from that obligation (see Communitas 3-19 for the complete etymology, also Immunitas
5-6).
At this point, the difference between community and immunity seems only to
mean the difference between sharing and protection from sharing. In other words, this is
not much different than including and excluding, except perhaps with an emphasis on
freedom and preservation rather than a deliberate “othering” so often articulated in
critiques of problematic communities. I believe this shift explains communal formation
and difference better than just exclusive in-group/out-group models. With this
knowledge, and looking ahead to my normative arguments of chapters 3, 4, and 5, I ask
the hypothetical question, why would I not privilege practices of community over
practices of immunity? Is not sharing a better practice than protecting oneself from
sharing? This seems to be a rhetorical question. However, the answer is not so obvious.
As Esposito argues, we currently live in a paradigm that actually privileges
immunity (see Bios 45-77). This is relatively easy to see when we consider popular
economic philosophies like libertarianism, which posits a concern for preserving oneself
as being the best for the rest of society. The notion of the self-enclosed, self-sufficient,
capitalist individual (which Nancy and many theorists have critiqued, including Diane
Davis, Sharon Crowley, Pat Gehrke, Victor Vitanza, Victor Villanueva, and others)
comes from a paradigm privileging immunity over community. Nationalisms, antiimmigration, certain gun rights arguments, preemptive warfare, laws like Florida’s “stand
your ground,” which ultimately acquitted George Zimmerman of shooting and killing
unarmed teenager Trayvon Martin, and other fear-mongering political stances that many
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scholars of community find troubling all stem from an over-emphasized interest in the
preservation and protection of something, usually conceptualized in terms of a life,
whether the life of an individual or the life of a community. My interest for this chapter is
not in explaining the reason for this dominant privileging9 or to argue for better practices
of community and/or immunity—the latter is the aim of chapters 3, 4, and 5. Rather, I am
interested in showing how, even if immunity has been overemphasized, the tension
between sharing and protection is a constitutive element of all communities. In other
words, not only do the terms immunity and community presuppose each other, the
practices of protective immunization and communal sharing actually require each other.
This requirement is not just in the sense of Derridean différance, or the Burkean paradox
of purity, where one term’s meaning depends on the play of the presence and absence of
its opposite, as well as any other terms that may find themselves in euphonic or other
relations to a term.10 Community and immunity need each other materially, as well as
semantically. The practices and processes of sharing cannot occur, cannot exist, without
processes of protection or preservation; contemporaneously, practices and processes of
protection cannot occur without sharing. There is no inclusivity without some exclusivity,
and vice versa. This tension is seen most easily when discussing these terms as practices.
Following Esposito’s etymology, a totalizing practice of community, or absolute
sharing, in terms of one’s self would be nothing other than the complete sacrifice of the
self. (In immunology this would equate to something like complete immunosuppression,
where the self is rid of any protective measures against pathogens and thus more likely to
contract deadly diseases.11) This sacrifice can be seen as metaphysical, in terms of an
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identity, where such a sacrifice would mean that I am not counted as an “I” (a singular
being, a citizen, a person, etc.), but am only an appendage of the community. It can also
be seen corporeally. The person who is sharing the obligation to give must
simultaneously practice some preservation of his or her self or there would be no person
that can give, and therefore no one and nothing to share. For example, in pregnancy, an
example Esposito draws upon, we can see a complex and ever-changing balance of
giving and exemption that takes care not to allow too much excess of either sharing or
protection, while at the same time employing each. If the mother’s body were to be too
“communal” in the sense of communitas, implicating the mother into giving all her
sustenance to the fetus, neither she nor the fetus would survive the pregnancy. To
complete a full term pregnancy her body must perform functions of community with and
immunity from the fetus. As Esposito says, “The immunity mechanism in pregnancy
“immunizes itself from an excess of immunization” (Immunitas 169-170).12 Thus, for
practices of sharing to occur, a body that is capable of giving (whether a human body
within a community or a communal body) must be protected so that it can continue to
share. And of course, for a community to exist, it not only needs to protect those singular
humans within it that constitute it through the sharing of practices, it needs to practice
protection from and with elements with which it shares relations, in particular those
people or things that pose some risk to the life of the community (which might include
elements within the community).
In contrast, Esposito explains, a totalizing practice of immunity, or protection, in
terms of one’s self would be complete self-preservation and absolute exclusion from
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others. However, as I argue in chapter 1 and the beginning of this chapter (by drawing
upon Jean-Luc Nancy), this is impossible at least in totality, except in death: all singular
beings are themselves constituted by relationality. Thus, the practice of protecting a
being’s singularity requires a shared negotiation with the relations of others, from which
it is being protected. “Too much” protection of the singular being may actually work
counterproductively, leading to the demise of the protective being. (A more extreme
example would be in medical cases of autoimmunity when the immune system sees itself
as a threat and begins to hurt itself in the attempts to protect itself.13) In productive
practices of medically produced immunization, the body actually shares with an element
of the danger from which it wants protection (in the form of a vaccine) in order to protect
itself from that danger. If it did not share with this danger, it would not survive. This
works in terms of a community, as well: for a community to retain a sense of a “we,” it
must preserve the singularity of the people that share in making that “we”; otherwise,
there would be no act of singular beings identifying with that sense of “we.” However,
the community must also protect itself (again, this may just be political or social
differentiation, though also biological survival) from singularities that do not share the
sense of “we,” but with whom the community shares a relation—a relation of difference
that takes part in later defining that certain group of people as a community. Thus,
immunization functions through practices of sharing and exposure, and no communal
sharing can continually take place without practices of protection (for more on this logic,
see also Bios 50-52).14
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In sum, Esposito theorizes a more productive conception of collectivity, in which
we move beyond conceptions of community as in-groups and out-groups, inclusion and
exclusion, and move toward conceptualizing communities as collectives functioning
through practices of immunizing life in concert with practices and processes of sharing
and exposing life (Immunitas 165-77).15 Thus, we should no longer look at exclusivities
as a solely repressive and negative; neither should we consider inclusion as an absolutely
affirmative and positive practice. Both practices can and often do have a normative
function, and are open to criticism; however, together they are also necessary to the
existence of a community, and to the existence of singular beings. In other words, they
perform a constitutive function. No community exists without contemporaneous practices
of protection and sharing.
In conclusion of this section on a constitutive model of community, I want to list
the three elements I see as necessary to any community. This I do to help clarify my
argument, and to give the reader a reference to presuppose when I use the term
community throughout the rest of the dissertation. Though this bulleted list below may
look neat and cleanly defined, I hope that the reader will see in my articulation above
how the delineation of each of these elements (and each of their constitutive elements) is
not so clear. The borders between the elements are blurry. Each element and the elements
that make up that element share borders with each other, cross over into each other, and
depend upon one another.
In short, a constitutive model of community must at minimum contain these
elements:
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1. Exposure to relations of difference
a. Within the community: singular beings will differ from other singular beings
and with communities as a whole, even as the singularity of each is partially dependent
upon the shared exposure to this difference.
b. Alongside other communities: part of what constitutes a community is that it
differs from other communities. A group of communities may be part of a larger
community, but the differences between the communities (most easily determined by a
differentiation of practices—see below) allow each community to retain its singularity.
2. Shared practices
a. Goal-directed: practices must have an aim or multiple aims to be a practice.
b. Social and normative governance: the norms, or correct way of carrying out a
practice is governed socially. There are right and a wrong ways of carrying out a practice,
and these determinations are social in character. These norms of right and wrong can and
often change, but such changes occur socially, not individually within a vacuum.
c. Regularity of behavior: practices are constituted by identical and/or
complementary behaviors, which, taken together, can be recognized as part of a larger
practice. Apart, they may be seen as practices in their own right. For example, the
practice of playing baseball is partially constituted by complementary behaviors of
throwing and hitting, two complementary behaviors that have been practices regularly
enough to be socially identified as part of the larger practice of baseball.
3. Communities are simultaneously composed of practices of sharing and protection: For
a group of people to be a community, the members of the group must practice sharing
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with each other, whether this is a sharing of an identity (e.g., “we are community of
English teachers”), a sharing of ideas (e.g., an online knitting community, like
Ravelry.com shares methods of knitting), or a sharing of materials (e.g., communities
may share living space, food, or member’s of the community’s talents and labor).
However, such practices of sharing contemporaneously take part in practices of
protection, whether this is a protection of identity (“we are different from them,” and
within the community “I” am different than “you”), a protection or preservation of ideas
(such as archiving), or practices of the protection of materials, whether food, space, or
biological life. The latter protection is especially important: for any community or
persons to take part in sharing food, shelter, or one’s life, they also must protect or
preserve their lives or they could not practice sharing them.

Reconsidering Normativity
I hope the beginnings of the constitutive model of community I provide above
give rhetoricians something constant, though flexible, to rely upon in the construction of
communities we may analyze, assemble, or produce for certain courses of action, and
which we may presuppose when we use the term community. When we designate or
recognize others designating a group of people as a community, I believe that it will be
difficult not to see that such a community is a community, at least in part, because of its
exposure to relations of difference, its shared practices, and in particular its practices of
sharing and protection with those relations of difference (inside and outside of the
community). This moves me in the direction of the larger arguments of my dissertation,
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the normative ones. As I outline in the introduction to this dissertation, I argue for an
ethics of community in chapter 3, a politics of community in chapter 4, and certain
rhetorics of community for pedagogical application in chapter 5. These are normative
arguments. I argue for types of values, advocacies, and available means of persuasion that
one can and even should or should not use (in some cases) for particular community
practices. Before the reader gets to that section of my larger argument, I think it is
important that I explain the difference between normativity and normalization so that I
might establish a justification for the remainder of the dissertation, and clarify that my
project is not one of normalization. The remainder of this chapter will work toward that
goal of justifying the need for some normative arguments and differentiating normativity
from normalization. My hopes are that we, as rhetoricians, will not fear making
normative arguments, but make the best arguments we can, while being open to adjusting
and changing those arguments when certain ethical, political, and rhetorical
circumstances call for such adjustments and changes.
I recently went to a rhetorical theory colloquium where a graduate student
expressed concern about advocating any values in scholarship. She felt that anytime she
did advocate a value, she was or would be accused of being normative, and that as
scholars (she felt) we should therefore avoid normative arguments completely, and rely
only on critique. Of course, and I will develop this thought further, the critical accusation
she feared is itself value-laden—accusing normativity as unethical is an act of
normativity, from my perspective. Nevertheless, this is how she felt. I did not ask her
specifically why she felt this way, though many in the colloquium nodded in agreement.
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Based upon the discussion that followed, I can speculate on some reasons why she came
to this conclusion, including the pressures of scholarly objectivity and detachment
(themselves normative requirements), leftist politics’ view of morality, and/or the
influence of continental philosophy in general.
The first two reasons are simple enough to understand. Objectivity and
detachment appear to go hand in hand with traditional expectations of academic
discourse: even though queer theory, various feminisms, critical race theory, work in
science rhetorics, and post-structural thought have exposed the systemic white, male, and
heterosexual values and valuations that have historically founded academic discourse,
appeals of objectivity and detachment from one’s topic still remain and hold sway. I
believe I can generally say this is true based upon my own experiences teaching science
and writing courses to third- and fourth-year college students. While the proliferation of
fear mongering right-wing radio and conservative news outlets has convinced many of
my students that academic discourse is neither objective nor detached from its subjects,
my students still hold to the ideal that it should be objective and detached. However,
though these reasons may have influenced the graduate student’s fear of making
normative arguments, I do not think they are the main reasons.
The third and fourth reasons I believe the graduate student in the colloquium felt
pressure not to make normative arguments have to do with the values of leftist politics
and their relationship to continental thought. I believe these are the dominant reasons this
graduate student felt fear of taking part in normativity. While the discussion that follows
could easily be a dissertation in its own right, I address these latter two reasons by briefly
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drawing upon a few thinkers that have used the term normativity recently in very
different ways—Lauren Berlant and Todd May. Both are interested in leftist politics,
considered broadly, and both draw upon continental philosophy in their work. Berlant’s
view appears to find any normative practice to be wrong or troubling, and therefore
advises against it. The graduate student’s fears are obviously reflective of this
perspective, and I think this is consistent with some thought in rhetorics studies as well,
including thought on community, which I also discuss. Without attempting to discern
Berlant’s motives or intents, I conclude that it appears her view is confusing or conflating
normativity with normalization. That, or she sees normativity as a substitute for
something like “dominant ideology.” The second view I reference, Todd May’s view,
discusses normativity not as an inherently ethical or unethical thing, but as a necessary
part of any politics and ethics, and finally, as irreducible to normalization. I draw again
upon May, in particular, since it is his notion of practices I argue are constitutive of
community. To remind the reader, one of the elements of a practice is social and
normative governance. If May is right, and I think here he is, then community practices
cannot avoid being normative; however, they can practice less oppressive and more
ethical normativity.
The first view, that normativity is an inherent wrong and should be resisted, can
be found in Lauren Berlant’s article, “Starved.” I do not wish to pick on Berlant by any
means, as I largely support her feminist and queer politics. However, her writing is a
strong example of criticizing normativity without clearly indicating what the term means.
She is an accomplished scholar that many readers will recognize. In other words, I do not
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want my readers to think that this problem is one solely of rhetoric studies. Following a
short reading of her work I show how it is prevalent in the fields of rhetorics too. Lastly,
“Starved” is the text we were reading in the rhetorical theory colloquium; it is the text
that led to the discussion of the graduate student’s fear of making normative arguments.
In “Starved,” Berlant worries that Western society has moved “beyond” sex. In
particular her argument is that Western society has moved beyond “non-normative
sexuality” politics (441, fn. 3). Such a movement beyond concerns for sex and “nonnormative” sexuality appears to be the result of “political depression” (433). Berlant
argues that there are many reasons this political depression is occurring, including the
fact that “sex complicates the ordinary,” and the ordinary is appealing and has recently
become more accessible for groups historically marginalized by sexuality (433). In her
words, politics advocating “non-normative sexuality . . . as a condition of invigorating
possibility for multiplying viable ways of living,” is now considered a “threat to the
normal” by the very people who were once proponents of that position. This threat has
become a catalyst for bowing down to the pressures of “claims for inclusion, better
biopower, and cheerfulness about the inevitably queered excitements and entitlements
wrought by or alongside of the capitalist fantasy machine” (441, fn.3). No doubt Berlant
is right that many of the more radical political stances of queer theory and feminism have
become less radical and found less exigency once the dominant social orders—influenced
by capitalism—began appropriating, exploiting, or at least appearing to move towards
acceptance of some sexual practices that are less and less being thought of as deviant.
The reasons for such acceptance are no doubt complicated, and perhaps more influenced
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by the assimilation of those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender
(LGBT) than the actual acceptance of such identifications by the society at large. Thus, I
think her argument about political depression is warranted. But I do not wish to get
sidetracked on her larger argument, important as it may be. I am more interested in how
she uses the term normativity to make her argument—for I think her work in this article is
symptomatic of a larger problem of confusing, conflating, or unnecessarily
problematizing the concept of normativity with that of normalization in critical inquiries,
including rhetorical theories.
In “Starved,” though it is prevalent in her other works,16 when Berlant uses the
word normativity it is always with a negative connotation. Now a common definition of
the word normative is an adjective that modifies a noun, such as an act or an idea, in
relation to a societal or group standard. Whether the act or idea is deriving from that
standard, establishing it, or just relating to it, it may be considered a normative act or
idea. In other words, a normative practice is a practice that (1) establishes a value as a
standard, (2) is in relation to a standard, (3) is derived from a standard, or (4) is a
combination of all three.17 Such a standard may be related to quality judgments like right
or wrong, good or evil, better or worse, permitted or forbidden, tolerable or intolerable.
Upon first reading Berlant’s work, the terms normative and normativity appear to take on
this same meaning. From Berlant:
Normativity is a vote for disavowing, drowning out, delegitimating, or
distracting from all that’s ill-fitting in humans: it can never drown out,
though, the threat posed by sex’s weird tastes . . . . In the 1990s I felt that I
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needed to write openly, undefensively, and with explicit narrative pleasure
about sexuality and sex, to convince people—students, really—to be
willing to unlearn their attachments to normativity, with its compulsive
formalism and unimaginative be-gooderness. My favorite verb was to
lubricate: as in, I want my intellectual performance to lubricate a
discussion about the centrality of sex, sexuality, and subjectivity to being
ordinary in the normative political, juridical, and intimate domains of the
social. (“Starved” 435, my emphasis)
While Berlant seems to understand normative acts as those related to a group or
social standard, she does not appear to think that her own attempts to “lubricate a
discussion” and to “unlearn [her student’s] attachments to normativity,” while against the
dominant standard, each imply a better standard to follow, a better normative practice to
advocate. The difference is that the standards, or norms, she finds preferable (“sex’s
weird tastes”) are not currently the dominant standards. It is not clear what her position
would be if her values were dominant. Nevertheless, by advocating these norms, she
simultaneously demonizes normative practices while taking part in a normative
practice—namely, the arguing for practices she believes embody sex’s “irrational
exuberance” (436-7). And, of course, she apparently does this in the name of nonnormativity. In other words, if normative takes on the definition I explain above, Berlant
is advocating a standard of having no standard. This begs the question, is pushing for
non-normative practices a normative practice? Though Berlant and others may not see it
this way, and though I largely agree with some her arguments about sexual politics, I
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think the answer is yes. That, or she has completely redefined normativity without
providing that definition for her readers.
For example, I do not think she is arguing that irrational exuberance ought to be
the dominant norm. In these discussions, though, it is often thought that a norm must be
dominant in order to be a norm. However, there are several positions one might take: (a)
that norm x ought not to be dominant; (b) that norm y is better than norm x, but that that
does not mean that people are obliged to follow norm y (this form of norm is implicit in
Foucault and often in Gilles Deleuze, for example; or (c) that norm y ought to be
dominant, etc. Normativity is about the better and the worse, which does not necessarily
mean that it is about imperatives, though Berlant may be using it this way.
As I mention above, Berlant is by no means alone in her problematic use of
normativity. Many rhetoricians also conflate normativity and normalization, or at least do
not make it clear how they are using the terms, which also may lead to some confusion
for their audiences. Whether this is a result of a similar fear as that which the graduate
student projected, or normativity has somehow become a word synonymous with
oppression and dominant ideologies, is not clear, though it is most prevalent in rhetorical
scholarship that is engaged in resisting dominant ideologies.18 However, in much
rhetorical scholarship normative or normativity simply take on broadly negative
connotations without definition, usually modifying a practice that is contested by the
practice the scholar is advocating. There are many examples of this confusing language
usage, though some of these contestations and uses of normativity are subtler than others.
Some brief examples follow.
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Against the exclusive universalism of Western philosophy and rhetoric, which has
historically contributed to identifying certain people as not “fully” human, Wendy S.
Hesford (“Human Rights Rhetoric of Recognition”) argues for “contingent identities”
rather then “normative identity categories,” in human rights discourse. She views the
latter as being an example of “symbolic mechanisms that have functioned as modalities
of subordination” (283). It is unclear how her argument for using contingent identities in
human rights discourse is not an argument for a better norm. In “the Rhetoric of Normal
Surgical Solutions,’” John W. Jordan makes a strong argument that, “definitions of health
and illness, of normality and deformity, are ideas we create rather than facts we
reference, and are continually redefined to accommodate our understanding of the world
and the actions we perform in it” (23). He argues throughout the essay that normality is
socially constructed, both by those in the general public and the medical profession.
Throughout the article, Jordan appears to use the term normative as in relation to a
standard. For example, he argues for “redefining the normative relationship between
medicine and the patient’s body in [this] age of plasticity” (22). Nevertheless, Jordan also
broadly separates “normative body rhetorics” from “traditional medical perspectives”
(20), implying without explanation that the latter are not normative. In “Recovering
Hyperbole: Rethinking the Limits of Rhetoric for an Age of Excess,” Joshua R. Ritter
advocates for the use of hyperbole to disrupt “hermeneutical boundaries” (408) as an
alternative to “normative frameworks of knowledge” (420). Though normative in this
context seems to mean related to a standard, in this case a standard of rhetorical theory,
it is not clear how he views his advocacy of hyperbole usage to “communicate the
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ineffable or transgress the expressible” (425) as not also normative, as not a better or
additionally needed standard for rhetorical theory. Lastly, Michelle Smith, in
“Containment Rhetoric and the Public Sphere,” posits the nineteenth century Amana
Society as a “non-normative community” because its communist lifestyle was resistant to
American capitalist norms (140-41). Of course, it is unclear how a group that followed a
norm of communism is considered “non-normative.” Each of these scholars, to a varying
degree, unclearly uses the term normative with a negative connotation19 in his or her
work, and these are only a small sample of the confusing resistance to the term normative
in rhetorical studies—a resistance that seems to go hand-in-hand with the
unacknowledged advocacy for alternative normative practices.
Most of the scholars above are doing strong descriptive analyses and are
contesting (or analyzing the contestation of) political and cultural norms that should be
contested. However, in each of the examples I cite above, the scholars—rather than just
contest the specific cultural or political norms discussed in each article—also confusingly
imply advocacy for a resistance to normativity in and of itself. At times they appear to
use normativity as the advocacy of a standard, and other times they use it to indicate the
creation of conditions where that standard (or norm) has become naturalized to the point
of being considered “normal.” This latter connotation I consider to be, following Foucault
(as I explain later in the section), normalization and not normativity. While at first glance
this may appear to be a simple problem of definition, the conflation of these two terms,
even if unstated, is not only confusing to readers, but it can potentially lead readers to
paths of fear like that of the graduate student I mention above. At worst, such a fear of
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normativity might lead to apoliticality, for it creates the question, “how do I argue against
normativity without being normative?”
Now Berlant’s argument (as well as the arguments of those just cited) works
better, for me at least, if what she means by non-normativity is closer to nonnormalization. She may mean something else completely, such as “the perpetuation of
dominant ideology,” but normalization would work for her argument, as well. I will
explain the difference. Please note, that I am not arguing for a foundationalist definition
of the two terms, but for a recognition and for better uses of the different determinations
they might make. Scholars like Janet Jakobsen have also seen the need in differentiating
the terms. Jakobsen, whose is writing for a queer studies audience, argues that “the
reduction of resistance to the mere act of ‘resisting the norm’ has serious and unwelcome
consequences,” noting that “resistance is not necessarily progressive” (“Queer is? Queer
does?” 513). Though she goes in a different direction in this article and delineates the
terms differently than I do in this section of my dissertation,20 she does think it is
important to disarticulate norms, normativity, and normalization so that queer politics
might better understand what it is doing when it is resisting. I have very similar concerns
for the fields of rhetorics.
It should be noted that my differentiation of the terms does not make normativity
an inherently ethical good or evil, but it does understand normativity as unavoidable in
community practices, and understands arguing against normativity, in absolute, a highly
problematic rhetorical practice. Not only is such a practice problematically normative
itself, such a political stance may lead to the inability to take political action for a fear of
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being normative. I note above how the graduate student’s fears of making normative
arguments were in part because of leftist politics and its relationship to continental
thought. This is not an argument I want to spend a great deal of time on; however, I also
note this because both Berlant and May (whom I will discuss again, shortly) draw upon
continental thought to support their arguments and advocate more progressive or leftist
politics, even though they have very different views of normativity.
In “The Normative Framework of Democratic Politics” (chapter 4 of Political
Thought) May notes that in United States politics in particular, the politics of the right has
laid claim to morality. In contrast, the politics of the left has criticized these moral
stances because the right’s views of morality are opposed to the equal rights of various
marginalized groups, such as those who identify with the LGBT community. Because of
the right’s claim to morality, the left (and May includes progressive theorists and political
activists) sees the term morality as containing “dictatorial and provincial” connotations.
“The argument runs roughly like this: since there are no universal moral values, no set of
values can claim ultimate superiority over any other; therefore, people should be exposed
to a diversity of moral views” (Political Thought 102).21 May explains how for some
progressives and activists, this political stance is connected to continental thought, in
particular the works of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and
Emmanuel Levinas. However, according to May (and I am in agreement with him on this
point), none of the above thinkers is against morality itself, but against transcendent
moral values and the history of moral discourse, a history that attempts to draw upon
transcendent values often through religious or other foundational texts to establish fixed
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and oppressive rules of behavior. Not only do these continental thinkers agree that
transcendent values do not exist, they argue that the enforcement of such values is
intolerable (103). Note, however, how such a stance of intolerability is itself the advocacy
of a value and related to a standard that would determine such intolerableness. Thus, for
May, “at issue here is not the term morality. We may call these matters what we like.
However, we are inescapably entrenched in an arena of normative judgment, of
judgments of the better and the worse that are supposed, in one way or another, either to
bind people to or discourage them from something” (104).
Similarly, what is at issue here is not the term normativity; however, if we are
“entrenched in an arena of normative judgment” (my emphasis), as May argues, then why
the constant criticism of and negative connotation of normativity without a clear
definition or alternative term to designate the meaning of inescapable normative
practices? Though there is no doubt a complicated historical precedence for this criticism
and negative connotation, two of the things I do see at issue are the conflation of
normalization and normativity, and accepting the idea that normative judgments need not
be based upon transcendent values. I will close this section and chapter addressing both
issues.
In brief, normativity in practices is, again, establishing, drawing from, or simply
relating to a societal or group standard, whether this standard is dominant or not. It can be
a straightforward “field of power,” as Jakobsen states, or a more complex “set of relations
that can be thought of as a network of norms” (517). For example, equality may be a
norm that many advocate, it may even be the dominant normative argument, in other
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words, the one we hear most often; however, it is not the dominant norm, or the standard
we actually live by, especially in capitalistic societies, which place values of economic
gain and economic freedoms over equality. Though not in complete contrast, for they do
overlap, normativity is irreducible to normalization. I define normalization via Michel
Foucault’s thought in Discipline and Punish, in particular his section on “The Means of
Correct Training” (170-194). Foucault sees normalization as the focal point of
discipline.22 Following Foucault, I see normalization as, like normativity, relating to a
standard; however, normalization differs from normativity in that it focuses on
establishing this standard as the dominant standard. Normalization establishes this
standard through the creation and perpetuation of conditions (economic, architectural,
linguistic, and others) in such a way as to make people conform unwittingly to that
standard, and to view that standard not as a standard, but as what it means to be “normal”
in their group or society. Of course, for Foucault what is considered “normal” is rarely
the statistical norm. In fact, in normalizing judgment it is often impossible for most
people to actually meet the standards of the norm, whether it is a norm of beauty, sanity,
sexuality, or financial stability. By creating the conditions for people to unwittingly
conform to that standard, normalization moves people toward an “ideal” but often
unreachable point of normalcy. As this point of normalcy gets finer, less and less people
can reach it and are thus defined by how far they deviate from that point. In sum,
normalization works by making something socially constructed appear natural; in other
words, it works by making what should be considered a resistible normative argument
appear as something indisputable (see 177-179, in particular). Though this unachievable
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ideal is not a requirement of normalization, per se, it occurs when normalization is most
oppressive.
I would like to give a personal example of a rhetorical practice in terms of
normativity and normalization to better support my claim that normativity should not be
conflated with normalization. In the introduction of this dissertation I briefly relate my
relationship with the LDS Church and the larger Mormon community. Though I no
longer take part in the Church, and disagree with many of its normative and normalizing
practices, my goal in this section is not to demonize the Church, but to describe one of its
practices. I want to draw upon my experience in the Mormon community one last time to
help explain a major difference between normative and normalizing practices. In
particular I want to analyze the Mormon community practice of encouraging young
members of the Church to go on a proselytizing mission.
The practice of encouraging young members of the LDS Church to serve a
proselytizing mission is as old as the Church itself (established in 1830). As a normative
argument, the standard claim is “every young man should fill a mission” (Kimball),
meaning that every young Mormon man between the age of 18 and 25 should go on a
proselytizing mission. Though more and more women are going on missions, and are
being encouraged to go, the adage is still very gendered, privileging men. The simple
normative argument goes as such: members of the Church believe they belong to the only
true church on the earth, and thus should share their beliefs. The leaders of the Church
have designated young men between 18 and 25 to be those missionaries; therefore, every
worthy young man should go on a mission. However, as one can imagine, this argument
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advocating that young men going on a mission should be the standard, the norm, by itself
is not very convincing argument to young, questioning teenage minds, especially when
going on a mission means suspending their everyday lives as they know them for two
years.
To steer away from such questioning the Church and larger Mormon community
relies on practices of normalization to “encourage” young men to serve their Church. In
other words, rather than rely on the merits of the argument and the beliefs of the Church,
the Church creates and continually perpetuates the conditions whereby the members of
the Church feel that going on a mission is a natural part of the young man’s life, not up
for questioning unless the young man is not considered worthy to participate. To explain
this practice of normalization, I will now draw upon my own knowledge of and
experiences in the LDS Church and larger Mormon community. In my writing style, I
differentiate the sections more reflective of my experiences from memory and journals
with italics (I grew up in the Church and served a two-year mission from 1997 to 1999 in
Sydney, Australia). I admit these sections contain some later reflection, but they do stem
from my memories and journals from that time in my life. I hope that the depth to which I
discuss this example will not sidetrack my larger argument, but make a more convincing
argument toward differentiating normativity from normalization.
The construction of the Mormon mission, though it may appear unique in
comparison to other proselytizing practices of other religious organizations (two years for
men, ages 18-25; eighteen months for women, ages 19+), exhibits features and
characteristics parallel to those observed in other institutional analyses and discourse

88

theories, such as Michel Foucault's examination of the prison, the hospital, and the school
in Discipline and Punish; the education system in Ian Hunter's Rethinking the School;
Antonio Gramsci's work on cultural hegemony and the state; Jay Lemke's theories of
discourse; and Richard Miller's analysis of bureaucracy in higher education. As I analyze
some of the practices and processes of normalization in the Mormon community, I will
draw upon a few of these thinkers, as well.
The practices and processes of normalization that each Mormon member must
participate in before going on a mission are carried out in a series of stages. The types of
disciplinary exercises one is normalized to perform to progress from each of these stages
would be called "graduated," by Foucault. The individual (particularly the male member
of the Church) is always being disciplined in relation to the next possible position or state
within a hierarchy of privilege, accountability, and power. From Foucault:
By bending behaviour towards a terminal state, exercise makes possible a
perpetual characterization of the individual either in relation to this term,
in relation to other individuals, or in relation to a type of itinerary. It thus
assures, in the form of continuity and constraint, a growth, an observation,
a qualification. (Discipline and Punish 161)
After baptism at the age of eight (for those born into the Church) male members’
behaviors are held in a constant condition of identification with all three of the elements
exhibited in the above quote: a categorical term based on a terminal state, other
individuals, and a type of itinerary. At the age of twelve, for example, one is expected to
become a deacon (term) and receive the Aaronic Priesthood, become a teacher at
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fourteen, a priest at sixteen, and receive the Melchizedek Priesthood23 at the age of
eighteen. To make this progression from stage to stage one is expected to perform a
number of responsibilities defined in the doctrines of the Church pertaining to each
position.
Along with this progression is the continual comparison to other young men, and
returning missionaries. Brad, Trent, Jeremy, and I weren't really best friends or anything,
but we liked each other well enough. Each of us could hold his own with the ability to
whisper about sports or girls and break mid-sentence into answering a question from our
Sunday school teacher. Brad was not only the oldest of our group; he was also the most
righteous. We always figured he'd grow up to be an apostle or something. I never felt that
I consciously compared myself to him and the returned missionaries we saw coming
home, but I did. We all did. From age twelve to eighteen Brad was the first to become a
deacon, a priest, and so on. These progressions were contingent upon age of course, but
his preceding us in callings and other responsibilities seemed the natural order of things
as well. President or First Assistant Brad Crosby had a nice ring to it, and I quickly
became accustomed to performing symbolic obeisance to his lordliness. No, really Brad
was a nice guy who just learned the system quicker than everyone else. We had all heard
our parents and leaders whisper about some "fallen" youth here or there. None of us
wanted the burden of being referred to like that, and whether all of my group truly
believed in the absolute truthfulness of the Church or not, we discovered early on that
Brad was really good at pleasing those in authority. This made him well liked, so we just
followed his lead.
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The itinerary these young men are perpetually characterized by (and I am still
referring to the Foucault passage above) is the plan to progress from each of these
positions in the hierarchical order, through obedience to the Church laws and ordinances,
toward the goal of being worthy of going on a mission by the age of eighteen. Adult and
peer leaders observe the young men in their progression and report on these observations
to the local bishop at monthly leadership meetings. At each terminal state in this
progression each young man is interviewed and evaluated by his bishop to be considered
worthy or not of advancement depending on how thoroughly he has performed his
obligations and obeyed the commandments of the Church.
The most prominent terminal state in these series of advancements, the state that
is also perceived and explicitly purveyed as the primary goal for continuing to discipline
oneself from position to position, is that of achieving the status of elder in the church and
getting a call to serve a mission somewhere in the world (according to LDS doctrine,
women may receive mission calls, but cannot receive the priesthood). Yet it is not the
figure of the missionary that is the focal production of this process of normalization, but
the figure of the returned missionary. From birth (for those who are born into the Church)
one of the dominant narratives in Mormon discourse is that of the returned missionary, or
"RM," as hero returned home from battle. Throughout each year most churches will hold
at least one or two services in which an RM speaks to the congregation about the
uplifting spiritual experiences he or she had during the eighteen-month or two-year
mission. This exciting moment, often termed a "homecoming" within conversations of
the missionary and his or her family, is seen as a rite of passage to adulthood in the
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Mormon culture. Though this conceptualization has recently been discouraged by LDS
leadership ("New Mission") because of the negative implications on the identities of
those who do not go on missions, the process of normalization remains. When one
becomes an RM one simultaneously becomes "marriage material" and is more likely to
be called to leadership positions in the Church. Phrases such as "When you go on your
mission . . ." and "every young man should serve a mission" and later, “on my mission”
are commonly repeated in Mormon discourse, whether from the pulpit or the pews. These
discursive practices rhetorically perpetuate this rite of passage as a right to normal
interaction because leadership continually reiterates that "a mission is a privilege, not a
right."
Farewells and homecoming meetings were my favorite. Not only was I free from
listening to some boring prepared-the-night-before or the morning-of talk, I felt
privileged to hear from someone about to go on a mission or from an RM—either way, a
person I was supposed to grow up to become. Oh, and I wanted to become them. Except
for the weird ones, most farewell and homecoming meetings were graced with the
presence of a lot of pretty young women—each sending a missionary out, or anticipating
one's return. This, alongside the admiration of the entire congregation, made them
appear god-like and infallible to me. I was definitely going to become a returned
missionary. I learned the song, "I hope they call me on a mission" from an early age and
as I became older it held more and more meaning for the person I would attempt to
become.
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There is a large set of normalizing criteria that must be met for a young person to
be deemed worthy to go on a mission. Just as “a whole set of assessing, diagnostic,
prognostic, normative judgments concerning the criminal have become lodged in the
framework of penal judgment” (Foucault 19), so too is the prospective LDS missionary
led through a similar normalizing process. This process includes an interview of
worthiness, including a judgment of physical and mental health ("Statement") from a
local physician in collaboration with the missionary's local bishop and the stake president
(a lay position that presides over five to twelve wards). This is where the disciplining
power is exercised to its fullest and becomes an "economy of suspended rights" (Foucault
11), for unless the prospective missionary deceives his or her interviewers, his or her
right to be a missionary and then a returned missionary is contingent upon a life of
obeisance and obedience to the commandments of the Church, including abstinence from
drinking alcohol, coffee, using any tobacco product, and engaging in sexual intercourse
or a serious crime. If any of these actions has occurred, the candidate must provide
evidence of completing the repentance process, though more recently even the repentance
process now will not "save" a candidate from mission forfeiture if the number of
occurrences of some of the "greater sins" is too many. The candidate must also convey
complete devotion to the Church and its leaders, including making a declaration that he
or she believes the Church to be the "only true and living church upon the face of the
whole Earth" (Doctrine and Covenants 1:30). If the prospective missionary is deemed
worthy, the bishop and stake president will sign a set of evaluative (which are sent on to
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Church headquarters in Salt Lake City) to officially determine and confirm that
worthiness.
Those interviews with Church authorities were the worst. I still remember how
nervous I was, thinking that my bishop or stake president, much more righteous than me,
could probably detect any of the sins I was hiding and revoke the possibility of my going
on a mission and becoming a returned missionary. I had never done anything too
serious—hadn't drank, gone "all the way" with a girl, or even dreamed of questioning the
Church—so I didn't really have anything to worry about. Nevertheless, yesterday's little
white lie seems like tomorrow's road to apostasy when looking into the eyes of one's
judge, especially since this judge often observed us outside of “official” Church
functions.
While this perpetual compliance of behavior toward various terminal states may
appear totalitarian in its design to an outlier, most members of the Church do not
recognize or believe they experience the repressive nature of such an apparatus. By the
time most members are of an age to "participate" in the community, these processes have
become naturalized. For LDS Church government is a Gramscian "government with the
consent of the governed," a consent that is "organized and not generic and vague as it is
expressed in the instant of [democratic] elections." It "does have and request consent, but
it also 'educates' this consent" (Gramsci 259). In seeming irony, the Church educates this
consent of the members through a discourse from birth that encourages, persuades, and
eventually requires an individual to make a habit of continually petitioning for the
consent of Church authorities: “Am I worthy to be a deacon?” "A priest?" “Am I worthy
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to go on a mission?” “Am I worthy to get married in the temple?” "Am I worthy of a
particular position in the Church?" In other words, the Church gains consent of the
governed by educating the members to seek the consent of the Church government
throughout their lives.
In this way the Church's discourse of consent "functions ideologically . . . to
support and legitimate the exercise of power, and to naturalize unjust social relations,
making them seem the inevitable consequence of common sense” (Lemke 20). Of
course, the Church does not make any claims of being just, at least not in an egalitarian
sense. But the members, nevertheless, refrain from discussing any feelings of repression
or dissension—concepts identified with sin and apostasy in this discourse. Because of
Mormonism's discursive formations' normalizing functions, the greatest motive for the
member of the Church is the obtainment of normalcy as defined by those formations,
whether officially decreed or not. Symbolic entry into the Church's dominant normalizing
discursive formations is attained when one becomes a "card-carrying" member—when
one holds a temple recommend, which allows a member to perform higher ordinances of
salvation. Seeking and retaining this temple recommend becomes a habitual goal and a
part of everyday life for members steeped in the normalizing formations of the Church
community, and is a requirement for going on a mission.
My whole life seemed to have been designed for this purpose: to go on a mission.
My group of friends had daydreamed about the “exotic” places we would go—South
Africa, Hawaii, the Philippines, Australia—the latter being my personal choice ever since
I could talk about going on a mission. When I finally received my call I felt more than
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ever that it was from God. I was going to Sydney, Australia. The place I had dreamed
about going for as long as I could remember. The restrictions of not being able to touch a
girl, play sports more than once a week, and communicate with anyone outside of the
mission boundaries (except for my parents on holidays) for the next two years were the
furthest things from my mind at that moment. This was the path for me to become a
returned missionary.
If my example of normalization above does not convince the reader of the
difference between normative and normalizing rhetorical practices; or, if it does not
resonate with the reader, I hope this last, brief example will: the practice of marriage. As
a note, even though the LDS Church had a substantial influence on California’s
Proposition 8, a state constitutional amendment that defined marriage as only between a
man and a woman, I refrain from continuing to discuss the Church or the Mormon
community in this dissertation. Below, I briefly discuss marriage as a practice, simply in
terms of normativity and normalization. In this I will be much more brief than my
example of sending young adults on Mormon missions, though marriage equality is of
great importance to many people, including myself.
As a normative act, I have personally advocated for the standard that same-sex
marriage should be considered and recognized as equal to what conservatives have
deemed “traditional marriage between a man and a woman.” I believe that if marriage is
going to be a social institution in a society or community, considering same-sex marriage
equal to traditional marriage practices is a better way of practicing it.24 “Traditional
marriage” is also advocated normatively, in other words, there are those who think it

96

should be the standard for practicing marriage. However, unlike the argument for samesex marriage, there has been a whole history of the creation of cultural values through the
institutionalization of marriage practices in elementary education, religion, and law (just
to name a few), which has normalized opposite-sex marriage as the standard and
demonized and criminalized behavior that deviated from that standard. Because of the
various institutional conditionings of the conservative argument that same-sex marriage
was wrong, “traditional marriage” advocates did not have to make a normative argument
about the definition of marriage; rather, such a definition, though it was socially
constructed, was thought of as natural, as a given, as something that could and should not
be questioned, because this standard had been normalized.
I also use the example of marriage because it indirectly relates to Berlant’s
argument about the politics of sex I reference earlier in this chapter. While I agree with
Berlant that traditional views of sex should not be normalized, I disagree that her political
arguments are themselves non-normative. I would argue that arguments like Berlant’s,
which view normativity antagonistically, and call for diverse views and practices, are
equally normative acts. As May argues, normative judgments are inescapable; however,
this does not mean that normative arguments must stem from transcendent values of
certainty, or that their foundation must be absolute. Rather they can be built upon flexible
values, values that have built into them the possibility of being adjusted and changed
according to the contexts of our lives.
Nevertheless, such a commitment to even these types of values is a problem in
thought on community in the fields of rhetorics. I mention earlier in this chapter how this

97

fear of normativity is consistently perpetuated in the fields of rhetorics. This fear does not
exclude thought on community. For example, Pat Gehrke’s work potentially perpetuates
this fear. I discuss some of Gehrke’s thought in chapter 1 in context of the Jean-Luc
Nancy’s theory of community, and largely hope that my project supplements Gehrke’s
work; however, I do not agree with some of the conclusions he makes—in particular his
attempt to appear as if he is avoiding all normative commitments. Though he does not use
the term normativity in the following passage, his argument amounts to the same caution
of it. Gehrke argues, “we must believe in the possibility of everything but retract from
commitment to any particular thing. If one can believe without commitment, then one can
be open to all belief, open to a democratic exchange and transformation of belief”
(“Community at the End of the World” 135).
Of course the reader should conclude by now that I see his “must” as being a
normative argument that is laden with commitments to certain values, in particular those
values of “democratic exchange and transformation of belief.” He obviously values these
things and is committed to them (and I am glad he is); however, his argument, that “being
open to all belief” leads to democratic practices, is not a sound argument—some beliefs
may be beliefs against democracy, and therefore work to prevent such democratic
practices. In addition, his avoidance of commitments implies that we should not be
committed to certain values. In contrast, a perspective that sees normativity as
inescapable and as different from normalization can believe in all things, while
simultaneously make certain commitments. For example, such a perspective could be
committed to the prevention of rape, racism, sexism, heterosexism, and other -isms and
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practices that are the result of oppressive power relations. I personally find these things
intolerable and violent to the practice of democracy, and am committed to preventing
them from occurring. Such commitments do not stop me from being open to democratic
exchange and the transformation of belief. In addition, being open to all beliefs, in and of
itself, does not by any means automatically lead to a commitment in democratic
principles. I may be open to all beliefs, as in, I believe they exist and will consider and
question them; however, after considering and questioning them, I should make informed
decisions and quite possibly argue for one belief over another because of its ethical,
political, or rhetorical implications.
Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote, "nothing we do can be defended definitively.
But only by reference to something else that is established. I.e. no reason can be given
why you should act (or should have acted) like this, except that by doing so you bring
about such and such a situation, which again you have to accept as an aim" (23 Culture
and Value, original emphasis).25 In the following chapter and for the remainder of this
dissertation I argue for bringing about “such and such” situations, namely those that
verify equality and enable the sharing and protection of human life. In particular, my goal
is to make better normative arguments for specific politics and rhetorics of community
that bring about these norms. This is not to be confused with stating that all normative
arguments are good or that these norms are based upon transcendent values—in absolute
terms, normative arguments are neither ethically nor effectively good.
Normative arguments can and have resulted in violence, and normalization often
starts from normativity. There are times when the line between normativity and
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normalization is blurry. For example, when a normative argument through no intentions
of the rhetor becomes normalized through institutional conditioning, we may view
advocacy of that normative argument as advocating normalization. No doubt this is why
some rhetoricians do not differentiate the terms. Thus, in the following chapters, I make
the best normative arguments I can and allow for some flexibility so that these arguments
are open to change, when needed. However, confusing my project with one of
normalization, in which one would attempt to create or perpetuate the conditions for
unwitting conformity to such ethics, politics, and rhetorics would be a mistake, one that
the argument made in this current chapter will hopefully help the reader avoid making.
Many norms in normative arguments and normalizing judgments should be contested;
however, we must also rely on normative arguments to resist these norms.
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CHAPTER THREE
SOME INCLUSIVITIES ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: AN ETHICS OF
COMMUNITY
Care, rather than interest, lies at the basis of community.
Roberto Esposito
Man [sic] is first of all a creature who speaks: it is essentially as a
speaking being that he discovers his equality with all other human beings.
Jacques Rancière
In every word that is pronounced or exchanged, no matter the language,
there is the irremediably singular—yet already modulated through an echo
that calls the other’s voice—sonorous vibration of this song.
Adriana Cavarero
In chapter 1, I posit that recent rhetorical theorists have used Jean-Luc Nancy’s
concept of community to critique notions of subjectivity found in rhetorical theory and
popular discourse, specifically those notions of the subject that understand personhood in
terms of individualism and that perpetuate autonomy, self-composition, and selfsufficiency without recognizing the necessary relations to others that constitute a person.
While these thinkers are successful in making this critique, my conjecture is that how
they use the term community and define the concept of community is insufficient for
rhetorics intended to produce better community practices in terms of actual collective
action—whether in terms of knowing, doing, or making community. One of these
insufficiencies revolves around the tendency to draw absolute or predetermined
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normative conclusions from constitutive theories of community. Thus, in chapter 2, I
demonstrate how constitutive theories and normative theories do not always tie together
so neatly, and I argue for what I see as a better constitutive version of community than
just the idea of recognizing relations with others.
In sum, I posit that for a community to be a community, it must contain at least
three elements, which I derive from the thought of three theorists: Nancy’s thought that
communities are constituted by the internal exposure of difference to individuals and
their communities to one another, as well as the exposure to the difference of “outside”
individuals and communities; Todd May’s theory that communities are constituted by
socially and normatively governed practices; and Roberto Esposito’s assertion that
communities always contain a sense of internal and external community (the experience
of sharing) in concert with a sense of internal and external immunity (the experience of
protection). While all communities have these characteristics, they can and do differ in
how they norm the practices that help define each community, practices that also enable
the members’ senses of community and immunity.
In this chapter, I argue for and articulate an ethics of community that might serve
rhetorics of community better so that rhetoricians may develop, practice, and critique
community with an eye toward less- or even non-oppressive community formation and
collective action. Though I draw on my constitutive theory of community articulated in
chapter 2, one might argue that I am now (and for the rest of this dissertation) in highly
normative territory. In other words, and not to be confused with or reduced to
normalization (see chapter 2), I am arguing for certain standards to work with in
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community practice, production, and critique. The ethics of community I advocate are not
transcendent or deontological ethics; rather, they are flexible and contingent ways of
collective being and doing I view as better than other ways of collective being and doing.
As I state in the introduction, even if the “contagious” themes of inclusion and
sharing—which have been romanticized with regards to rhetorics of community—are not
representative of what constitutes a community in totality and have problematic
normative consequences, the rhetorical appeal of understanding a sense of community—
and one’s ethics of community—as absolute inclusion is seductive. Rhetorics of
community that employ such appeals are often effective in persuading others toward
various ends, from financial gain and political agendas to very pedestrian purposes.
Before I begin to articulate what I see as a better ethics of community that works
toward less- or non-oppressive communities than one based upon presupposing an
inherent value in absolute inclusion, I want to give a more in-depth example that
demonstrates why the practice of basing rhetorical appeals of community on an ethics of
inclusion is a problem. One contemporary and seemingly affirmative example of the
exploitation of these appeals can be seen in the art world community, particularly in the
fairly recent phenomenon of the emergence of various international mega art
exhibitions—a practice that has been called “biennialism.” Once I articulate
biennialism’s rhetorical ethics of inclusion and the problems this rhetorical ethic presents,
I articulate my own ethics of community, looking ahead to chapter 4 in which I develop a
politics of community that advocates the given ethics within any social order.
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As a caveat, I should note that I am not an art historian or expert art critic (though
I refer to and draw from people who are one or both of these things), neither is my goal to
tell the art world “what to do” with biennialism. Rather, I am merely an observer of a
phenomenon I find fascinating and that I see having much to teach rhetorical theories of
community. If I were to make any contribution to art criticism, it would be by chance and
the mere fact that “socially engaged [art] practices are extremely difficult to discuss
within conventional frameworks of art criticism” (Bishop, Artificial Hells 18), and thus,
perhaps my alternative rhetorical framework perhaps can contribute something and help
further the discussion. Nevertheless, my goal for this chapter is neither to show how to
make people more ethical nor to make some concession that ethics precedes rhetorics or
vice versa; rather, my goal is to provide a more accurate and productive vocabulary for
the ethical presuppositions we might put forward for better community production,
political action, and rhetorical criticism.

Biennialism’s Rhetorical Ethics of Inclusion
Though not all of the mega art exhibitions labeled “biennialist” occur biannually,
the term biennialism generally refers to the phenomenon of curating art exhibitions that
cater to various international audiences, incorporate hundreds of artists from all over the
world, and expect thousands of visitors per week. In 2012, art historian and theorist Terry
Smith records over 200 biennials in existence (94). Most of these exhibitions occur less
than once a year because of logistics: the time, labor, and financial support required to
make such large events happen. A selection of such exhibitions includes the São Paulo
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Biennial, Biennial of Sydney, Documenta, Istanbul Biennial, Prospect New Orleans,
Gwangju Biennial in South Korea, and more. Perhaps the most prominent example of this
phenomenon is the Venice Biennial, which was established in 1895. I was fortunate
enough to visit this exhibition in 2011, a year in which the Venice Biennial exceeded the
375,000 visitors of the summer of 2009 (see “Venice Biennale Hits Record”).1
Most of these biennials reach out to their art aficionados, connoisseurs, and of
course tourists, with public relations statements and communications emphasizing
seemingly positive notions of community, such as inclusivity, sharing, participation, and
togetherness. Such branding has contributed to the worldwide popularity and success of
biennialism—a success that has a reciprocal relationship to its product: the appeal of
recognizing different cultural identities all coming together as a “global community,” as
artists and tourists to break the borders of national artistic conventions. This appeal, as
Claire Bishop notes, once seemingly confirmed
that the biennial, with its global reach and its comparative freedom from
institutional red tape and historical baggage, provided a unique
opportunity to experiment freely with curatorial arrangements. . . .
constituting an alternative public sphere, one in which visual culture
offered compelling propositions for a world in disarray. (Bishop, “Safety
in Numbers,” 276-77)2
Yet, while the idea of bringing together a global community of artists and lovers
of art at exhibitions may appear radical to the casual observer and is heavily discussed at
art and curatorial conferences (see Fowle 7), the idea of incorporating rhetorics of
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community as inclusion with art exhibitions is not new. Sociologist Tony Bennett, in
“The Exhibitionary Complex,” states that one of the original and principal functions of
museums (art or otherwise) as public spaces was to give the appearance that the state was
interested in including the general populace with state concerns. In other words,
exhibitionary inclusion enabled states to simulate democracy for their constituents:
“Museums were . . . typically located at the centre of cities where they stood as
embodiments, both material and symbolic, of a power to ‘show and tell’ which, in being
deployed in a newly constituted open and public space, sought rhetorically to incorporate
the people within the processes of the state” (109). With globalization and art tourism
extending the various scopes of power and what “the people” means in contemporary
times, the mega art exhibition appears to be the culmination of, as well as the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries’ answers to, the motive for and appeal of exhibitions to
rhetorically “include everyone.”
Even if this re-emphasis on inclusion is not new and only a change in degree
rather than in kind, many artists, as well as art historians and theorists, arguably have
benefited from this re-emphasis, whether it goes by the name of community,
participation, or the recognition of human and other relations. People have built their
careers on this subject, such as contemporary art historian, Grant Kester (see
Conversation Pieces or The One and the Many); curators and theorists have coined new
movements, such as Nicolas Bourriaud’s “relational aesthetics”; and artists such as
Rirkrit Tiravanija—whose work often includes sharing meals with the “audience” or
having the viewers participate in the creation of the art—have often celebrated, and have
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been celebrated for, the exploitation of this appeal of inclusion in their artistic and
theoretical practices.
One recent example of this rhetorical appeal of inclusion made explicit is the
Emscherkunst triennial art festival in western Germany, which took place between June
22 and October 6 of 2013. Prominent Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was commissioned to
create 1,000 tents for Emscherkunst as an artistic work titled, “Out of Enlightenment”
(see figure 1). Prior to the opening of the festival, curator Florian Matzner told The Art

Figure 1. Photograph of Ai Weiwei's "Out of Enlightenment," at Emscherkunst 2013; “Ai Weiwei’s Tents for
Emscherkunst.2013”; Photo by Ai Weiwei; Emscherkunst.2013; Emscherkunst.de; Web; 17 Feb. 2014.

Newspaper that Weiwei’s tents would be created so that, rather than pay the expensive
prices of a nearby hotel, “visitors to the festival will be able to rent the tents for a night
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for "a low, symbolic price." Manzter goes on, saying that, "the idea is to let normal [sic]
people participate, and their activities will give the . . . work its sense" (Rivetti and
Michalska). Thus, the appeal of inclusion in biennialism can function on multiple levels:
the appeal is not only representative of curators’ branding and political ideologies or
simply a theme of the art, it functions in and serves each realm simultaneously.3
However, some artists and theorists have been skeptical of these “communal,”
“relational,” “global,” or “participatory” rhetorics in contemporary art, including those of
biennialism. Such criticism includes the ideas that forms of cultural imperialism are
already implicit in the discourses of museums and exhibitions (Bal 203-14), that avantegarde art is not really avante-garde if its “canonical” inclusion is predetermined
(Ferguson 186), and that such rhetorics of inclusion in biennial art exhibitions can be
naïve at best and manipulative at worst, using such rhetorics merely as masks for
imperialist or corporate agendas. One of the more prominent voices of this latter position
is curator Okwui Enwezor. Often noted for his directorship of Documenta 11, Enwezor,
rather than simply criticize the mega exhibition as a problematic medium, has organized,
driven, and implemented his own mega art exhibitions with concerns and themes critical
of postcolonialism and with a particular determination to recognize artists forgotten or
devalued by “Westernism.”4
A persuasive example of this criticism comes from art historian Claire Bishop, in
particular her critique of relational aesthetics, an art practice first written about by
Nicolas Bourriaud (Relational Aesthetics), whom I mention above. I will briefly explain
this movement before getting to Bishop’s critique. Though art’s interest with communal
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relations goes back much further than the work Bourriaud is commenting on,5 in the
1990s he considers relational aesthetics a new movement, which he defines as "a set of
artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole
of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space"
(113). In short, relational aesthetics art is art that produces human relationality, and
exposes or highlights this relationality as an important condition of human existence.
Seen in the works of artists such as Rirkrit Tiravanija, Thomas Hirschhorn, and
Santiago Sierra, relational aesthetic art can perform a political critique in a culture like
the United States, which is based upon notions of the liberal, autonomous individual and
the general promotion of individualism and self-sufficiency. However, Bishop rightly
criticizes relational aesthetics for promoting relationality for the sake of relationality
itself, and for projecting a naiveté of any institutional, site-specific critique or political
context in which the art itself is situated: "if relational art produces human relations, then
the next logical question to ask is what types of relations are being produced, for whom,
and why?" (“Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” 65). She continues: "the relations set
up by relational aesthetics are not intrinsically democratic” (67).
Lastly, at least for my purposes, political art collectives such as Manifest.AR are
also highly critical of the appeal to include everyone, whether in the name of
participation or recognizing relations. Their work helps expose the problem of imagining
and critiquing communal practices through an ethics built upon inclusion. Though much
of Manifest.AR’s art critiques various exhibitions and museums, biennialism has been a
major target. According to the collective’s manifesto, Manifest.AR uses digital
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augmented reality art to “[break] down the mysterious Doors of the Impossible!” and to
“install, revise, permeate, simulate, expose, decorate, crack, infest and unmask Public
Institutions, Identities and Objects previously held by Elite Purveyors of Public and
Artistic Policy in the so-called Physical Real” (“The AR Art Manifesto”). Through
augmented reality art, Manifest.AR infiltrates biennialist and other art exhibitions that
brand their exhibition as inclusive (particularly those, of course, that do not invite
Manifest.AR artists) in order to expose the exclusivities and hidden agendas of these
exhibitions. I was introduced to the collective’s work in the 2011 Venice Biennial, where
Manifest.AR artists found the exigency to display their work in the lack of their
invitation. From their website:
As “one of the world’s most important forums for the dissemination and
‘illumination’ about the current developments in international art” the 54th
Biennial of Venice could not justify its reputation without an uninvited
Augmented Reality infiltration. In order to “challenge the conventions
through which contemporary art is viewed” we will construct the virtual
AR pavilions directly amongst the national pavilions . . . . In accordance
with the “ILLUMInations” theme [of the Venice Biennial]. . . our
uninvited participation will not be bound by nation-state borders, by
physical boundaries or by conventional art world structures. The AR
pavilions at the 54th Biennial reflect on a rapidly expanding and
developing new realm of Augmented Reality Art that radically crosses
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dimensional, physical and hierarchical boundaries. (“Manifest.AR Venice
Biennial 2011 AR Intervention”)
Manifest.AR made enough of an impact at the Venice Biennial that people who
appeared to be Biennial representatives were handing out pamphlets stating: “STOP the
‘virtual’ infiltration of the 54th Biennial by unauthorized so called Augmented Reality
Pavilions. Art should be real” (see fig. 2). I saw many visitors viewing the augmented

Figure 2. Unofficial flyer encouraging Venice Biennial visitors not to participate in augmented reality art.
"Unofficlal Flyer"; Manifest.AR; Manifestarblog.wordpress.com, 2011; Web; 18 Feb. 2014.

reality art through their smartphones—so often that at times I questioned whether people
were taking photos of the “real” pavilion or viewing the Manifest.AR art. One key point
is that Manifest.AR’s provocative infiltration of biennialist and other exhibitions seems to
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expose the problems of how exhibitions include, rather than point to the obvious
pragmatics of exclusivities taking place. Even an exhibition like the Venice Biennial
cannot possibly include every artist in the world in its exhibition. Yet, when I viewed a
particular nation’s pavilion through a smartphone and saw the pavilion covered by a
Manifest.AR image of a monster truck flying over a volcano, I did begin to look at some
of the excesses and spectacle of many of the more prominent national art pavilions. For
example, the pavilions of the United States and Russia—which paid for prominent
pavilion spots that could only be seen with the price of a ticket—were like a large
centerpiece in the Biennial in comparison to the small and hidden away pavilions on the
margins of the exhibition, such as Haiti’s exhibit, which was located completely outside
the Venice Biennial, and which could be seen for free.
To appropriate George Orwell’s phrase from Animal Farm, I started noticing that
some inclusivities were “more equal than others.” To reiterate: Manifest.AR did not
reveal unethical problems of exclusivity in the Venice Biennial, but rather unethical
problems of biennialist inclusivity. While both the United States and Haiti were
“included” in the exhibition, the Venice Biennial obviously valued one as greater, more
important, and more deserving of a prominent place than the other. Of course, this
valuation obviously coincided with the United States’ ability to financially support a
prominent place in the 54th Biennial.
I would be remiss if I did not mention that even those artists “officially”
participating in biennials are often critical of biennialism’s rhetorics of global inclusivity
and participation. Their art is not ignorant of the problems of inequality, political
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agendas, and the loss of specificity that such inclusive “community” rhetorics can
endorse, enable, and perpetuate. Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla, a collaborative
art duo whose work inhabited the United States Pavilion at the Venice Biennial in 2011,
are just such artists. Known for art that exposes otherwise hidden systemic political
tensions of nationalism, environmentalism, and material problems of war and cultural
politics, Allora and Calzadilla’s exhibit in Venice critiqued, among other things, the
questionable rhetorical ethics of inclusion in art world. Their piece, “Track and Field”
(see fig. 3), metaphorically paralleled and inverted the United State’s military might and
sports prowess by literally flipping an American tank upside-down and having 1996 U.S.
Olympian medalist Dan O’Brien run on a treadmill that caused the treads of the upsidedown tank to move in perpetual motion. This piece questions the lack of

Figure 3. Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla’s “Track and Field” at the 2011 Venice Biennial; “Allora
and Calzadilla”; Photograph by Andrew Bordwin; Lisson Gallery; Lissongallery.com; Web; 18 Feb. 2014.
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“progress” such military strength achieves; however, by placing the tank in front of the
Palladian-style U.S. Pavilion, as one spectacle blocking another spectacle, Allora and
Calzadilla also implicitly critique the perpetuation of inequality being carried out in any
biennial that allows powerful nations to “buy” and perpetuate artistic influence.

Figure 4. Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla’s “Half Mast/Full Mast” at the 2011 Venice Biennial;
“Allora and Calzadilla”; Lisson Gallery; Lissongallery.com; Web; 18 Feb. 2014.
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Inside the U.S. Pavilion, Allora and Calzadilla made an even more poignant
critique of what I see as rhetorics of inclusion in biennialism. In “Half Mast/Full Mast”
(see fig. 4), the duo incorporated a movie screen and split-channel video projector that
appeared to divide the screen in half with a horizontal line. Each half of the screen,
however, was unified by video of a seemingly seamless vertical flagpole running through
the left-hand side of the screen. A gymnast would then enter either the top or bottom
screen one-at-a-time and raises his body to a 90-degree angle, depicting a half- or fullmast flag, symbolizing how victory and defeat are apparently changes in position and
perspective. The image outlined by the gymnast is also strikingly similar to the Puerto
Rico flag (see fig. 5), the country in which Allora and Calzadilla work and reside.

Figure 5. Open source depiction of the Puerto Rico flag; “Flag of Puerto Rico”; Wikimedia Commons;
commons.wikimedia.org, 29 Mar. 2007; Web; 18 Feb. 2014.
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Of course, while Puerto Rico is included as an unincorporated territory of the United
States, the citizens of Puerto Rico are arguably second-class citizens of the U.S. in that
they do not enjoy the same voting and other rights. Thus, placed in an exhibit like the
biennial, this work performs a broader critique not unlike Manifest.AR’s art—that
inclusivity does not equal equality or democracy; however, it also performs a very sitespecific critique not unrelated to the broader critique. By Allora and Calzadilla choosing
such an image to represent United States art, the viewer sees the parallel tensions in the
nationalistic inclusivities of the Biennial with the United States’ inclusion of Puerto Rico.
Similarly, but perhaps more explicit in their intentions, the Romanian artists Lucia
Tkáčová & Anetta Mona Chisa, literally wrote about the problems of being included in
the Venice Biennial on the outer wall of the Romanian Pavilian in “80:20” (see fig. 6).

Figure 6. Anetta Mona Chisa & Lucia Tkácová’s “80/20” at the 2011 Venice Biennial; VVORK; vvork.com;
Web; 18 Feb. 2014.

Because the images are difficult to read, I will quote them here:
80% OF REASONS TO BE HERE:
-

SALAMI TACTICS WITHIN THE ART CONCERN

-

TO FIGHT THE WAY THE WORLD MAP IS FOLDED
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-

CONFRONTATION, VERIFICATION, GRATIFICATION

-

TO HIKE UP OUR PRICE

-

TO BE SCENE AND HERD

-

ROMANCE IN THE AIR

-

TO SPRITZ THE DAYS OFF

-

GOOD EXCUSE FOR MASSIVE OUTFIT SHOPPING

-

+ ON ARTFACTS

-

TO HIT ALL THE COOL PARTIES

-

PERFORMING HISTORY

-

TO PUSSIFY THE BIENNALE

-

TO HAVE A CHANCE TO SAY ALL OF THIS OUT

20% OF REASONS NOT TO BE HERE:
-

INVISIBILITY IS RESISTANCE

-

NOT TO DECORATE THE GARDENS OF THE WHITE MALE

-

BECAUSE JAN VERWOERT SAID: “FORGET THE NATIONAL”
AND WE LIKE HIM

-

VENICE BIENNALE = SHOWROOM OF WESTERN HEGEMONY

-

GUILT

-

NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OUR PLACE ON THE BARRICADES

-

ART = REVOLUTION = SPECTACLE = CAPITAL

-

BECAUSE WE ARE 1 COMMUNIST + 1 SOCIALIST FEMINIST
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-

ANTINOMADISM

-

VENICE BIENNALE IS A CHOKING-ON-MONEY
MERCANTILIST FOSSIL

-

THE ZOO EFFECT

-

WE HAVE NOTHING TO WEAR FOR THE OPENING

-

IT’S EASIER TO CRITICIZE A SHOW WHEN YOU’RE NOT IN IT

-

THE CURSE OF BOOSTED EXPECTATIONS (2ND NOVEL
SYNDROME)

-

TO KEEP OFF WHO’S HOT AND WHO’S NOT

-

TOURIST MENU SUCKS

-

TO MAKE ART THE WAY WE FEEL, WITHOUT CONSIDERING
ITS POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED (Chisa and Tkácová, “80/20”)

There is a lot one could comment on regarding the various statements Chisa and
Tkáčová are making in “80/20,” but front and center is the fact that being included in the
Venice Biennial actually presented a host of ethical problems for the art duo. While
participating gave Chisa and Tkáčová the opportunity to expose the inequalities of the
Biennial’s inclusivities (i.e., “TO PUSSIFY THE BIENNALE”), the duo also
demonstrated that their inclusion potentially makes them complicit with the perpetuation
of Western colonialism and misogyny.
As I state in my introduction and in the beginning of this chapter, I see a larger
societal and scholarly problem of basing our notions of community upon ethics that value
inclusivity and sharing for their own sake, distinct from exclusivity and protection,
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whether in production, practice, or critique. While defining community in this manner
carries a more romantic appeal, inclusion is an insufficient term for defining how
communities actually function, and inclusion is also a problematic value upon which to
base an ethics of community, as the examples above show. Such a definition situates
community ethics, politics, and rhetorics with false presuppositions: that inclusion for its
own sake is an inherent and totalizing, ethical good and should be advocated politically
and represented rhetorically for that reason alone.
In other words, and to stay with the biennialism example, if there is an ethical
problem with the phenomenon of biennialism, it is not the inability of mega art
exhibitions like the Venice Biennial to include all. Rather, there are two ethical problems
that carry a greater weight and exigency than a community’s inability to include
everyone: (1) a community purporting to be able to include all, and (2) the justifications
and manner in which the community carries out its practices of inclusivity, i.e., the values
and norms that are actually informing such practices. In the case of biennialism, the
problem is the terminologies in which they situate their existence and purpose and the
method in which they carry out that purpose that should draw criticism, not the fact that
they exclude, as, in the end, they must take part in some sort of exclusivity.
As Kenneth Burke argues, in Language as Symbolic Action, all observations and
accompanying interpretations one makes regarding any aspect of existence are dependent
upon—or at least implicated by—the terminologies in “which the observations are made”
(46). In other words, one’s rationale for comprehending any given situation or
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observation is shaped within a linguistic filter, framework, or what Burke calls a
“terministic screen.”
To continue to draw upon Burke for a moment, I see “inclusion” as having been
named the “god-term” for understanding community and community practices. Burke
defines the notion of god-term as a word or phrase given the philosophic power to
function as (a) god within any given ideology—in other words, a god-term is a term that
gives a viewpoint (or terministic screen) within an ideology its weight and power, its
foundation. It is the ideology’s dominant determiner of meaning. Now the establishing of
such a god-term does not need to be intentional; however, Burke points out that it is part
and parcel to the larger problem of defining what something is: “All thought tends to
name things not because they are precisely as named, but because they are not quite as
named, and the name is designated as a somewhat hortatory device, to take up the slack”
(Grammar of Motives 54). He goes on—and this is one of the key points I am making or
at least questioning with regards to community and inclusion (and related to the critique
of biennialism), that the continual affirmation of a god-term like inclusion often does not
even serve its own meaning or original purpose—“for the affirming of the term as their
god-term enables men [sic] to go far afield without sensing a loss of orientation. And by
the time the extent of their departure is enough to become obvious, the stability of the
new order they have built in the name of the old order gives them the strength to abandon
their old god-term and adopt another” (54).
If Tony Bennett is correct in positing that one of the original intents of the
exhibition was to rhetorically include the general populace, then the current criticism of
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the explosion of biennialism and its rhetorics of inclusion—particularly in relation to
ideas of participation, relationality, and other appealing phrases such as “human” and
“global community”—has appeared, just as Burke states, to have allowed communal
phenomena such as biennialism to “go far afield without sensing a loss of orientation.”
This enables those in power to maintain their ability to “show and tell,” as Bennett says,
in the name of inclusivity, even if they are motivated by very different aims. For
example, Terry Smith argues that the “primogenitor of all biennials,” the Venice Biennial
has ceased being an exhibition empowering alternative curatorial practices. He points out
that “the past three [Venice] Biennales have been laid out in zones” echoing more
traditional, conservative exhibitionary practices, noting that biennials in general, rather
than being more inclusive of various global perspectives, are instead emphasizing the
ideological viewpoints of the regions in which they occur (87-88).
Thus, this rhetoric of inclusion in the “global art community” continues to appeal
to its audience, even if the appeal functions more as a mask to privilege and showcase
certain groups, nations, and ideologies over others in the name of inclusion. As Carlos
Basualdo recognizes, “nearly all [biennials] rely on the official financial support of their
respective countries or cities,” and therefore “diplomacy, politics, and commerce
converge in a powerful movement, the purpose of which seems to be the appropriation
and instrumentalization of the symbolic value of art” (56). Thus, communal phenomena
such as the biennial might appear to enable, as art historian Grant Kester would say, the
kind of “aesthetic experience [that] prepares . . . for entry into an idealized community,”
but biennialism might very well function as the epitome of capitalist culture’s ability to
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simulate such idealized and impossible communality: “Far from overcoming our
narcissistic isolation, consumer culture feeds on it, transforming the redemptive power of
an aesthetic communion into the banal transactions of the shopping mall and the eBay
auction” (Conversation Pieces 29).
In brief, if one wished to critique the Venice Biennial, for example, through an
ethic of inclusion, there would not be much of a critique to make beyond an
acknowledgment of the fact that no group can include all and that inclusion in some cases
would look less like “global community” and more like cultural appropriation serving
only economic and nationalistic propaganda. An ethic of inclusion provides very little
traction for critiquing or producing community, unless we are simply critiquing
inclusivity as a particular means to a different ethical end. If one’s goal is to enact an
absolute ethic of inclusion, the end result will not only be that one cannot do it but that
perhaps one should not do it. Instead, I believe (and argue below) that a better ethic of
community finds its basis in valuing the equality and care of communal and singular
socio-political and biological life. Inclusion may just be one of many means to verify or
enact this ethic.

The Spectrum of Ethical Rhetorics of Community: The Affirmation of a Higher
Quality of Life through the Equality of Intelligences and the Singularity of Voice
As I mention in the Introduction, Raymond Williams posits that the term
community has never been “given any positive opposing or distinguishing term”
(Keywords 76). This neglect allows the term community either to function as an empty
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word or to deceive through appeals of false sentimentality, particularly when it is
associated with positive terms like inclusion, participation, and sharing. Perhaps a
potentially positive opposing term, then, is just what is needed to temper community’s
unopposed, absolute, and yet problematic, moral “goodness.” Such a tempering might
enable community to be a concept from which to extract more workable ethical content. I
propose that the term for this task is immunity, a term I discuss in chapter 2 through the
work of Roberto Esposito.
In chapter 2, I applied Esposito’s thought to make the argument that along with
other elements a sense of community is composed of contemporaneous practices of
communitas (sharing) and immunitas (protection). Thus, community requires the
interplay of identity and difference, inclusivity and exclusivity. Let me briefly bring back
that discussion and place it within the context of this chapter. “To survive,” Esposito
writes, “a community, every community, is forced to introject the negativity of its own
opposite, even if that opposite remains a contrastive and lacking mode of the community
itself” (Bios 49). In other words, for any community to survive, then, it not only must
exclude what it is not for its survival (whether in terms of discourse, socio-political
identity, or physical being); it also exists in itself, through, by, and because of this
protective exclusivity. This latter part is important: Esposito explains that protective
immunity does not precede or follow the affirmative notion of sharing so often associated
with community, but the two phenomena co-constitute one another. There can be no
community without immunity and vice versa. The community/immunity relation is not a
“relation of simple opposition,” but rather “a more complex dialectic in which neither
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term is limited to negating the other but instead implicates the other . . . as its necessary
presupposition” (Immunitas 5). Each term presupposes the other in meaning as well as in
practice, even while seemingly moving away from the other term in meaning and in
practice. So, while in chapter 2 I use Esposito’s understanding of the term immunity to
create a constitutive theory of community, to better understand what a community is,
presupposing this dichotomy as constitutive of community also helps formulate better
normative rhetorical theories of community, or theories designed to help rhetoricians
work toward more affirmative practices carried out in the name of and with a sense of
community.
Understanding community through a sharing/protection dichotomy rather than an
inclusion/exclusion dichotomy is not only more accurate of how a community functions,
this understanding also enables a more flexible, subtle, and nuanced normative theory of
community practices. Understanding community through an inclusion/exclusion
dichotomy implies an absolute ethical “good” on one end of the dichotomy (inclusion)
and an absolute unethical “evil” on the other end (exclusion). However, as I have shown
with my example of biennialism above, as well as my earlier examples of the Democratic
National Party convention and Mormonism (see the Introduction and chapter 2), the
inclusion/exclusion dichotomy by no means informs normative judgment very well when
practices of inclusion can have problematic, even unethical purposes and results.
However, understanding community as practices and processes of sharing that require
and presuppose practices and processes of immunity, or protection, carries more complex
and workable ethical content. When one wishes to make a normative judgment—whether

124

in producing, practicing, or critiquing a community—one cannot simply ask, “does the
community include or exclude?” and retrieve an ethical critique from the answer to that
question, because all communities include and exclude, even if we tend to privilege and
associate the former with ethical community practices. Rather, one can and should begin
to ask, “how and why does the community practice sharing?” and “how and why does the
community practice protection?” To put it another way, one can begin to ask, “what are
the justifications, the aims, and the values that inform how a community shares and
protects?” And of course, “what is being shared, and what is being protected?” Not unlike
the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy, all communities take part in sharing and protection.
The difference is that practices of community and immunity can each be seen to function
positively or negatively to affirm or negate life. There is no absolute ethical good found
in one or the other.
Now Esposito acknowledges that others have thought of community in similar
terms and that others’ thought on community has shaped how we have come to
understand it. In his book Communitas, he traces understandings of community through a
communitas/immunitas dichotomy throughout modernity in the works of Thomas
Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Georges
Bataille. In a sense, each of these thinkers understands community’s constitution in terms
of a community/immunity dichotomy, but each thinker privileges one term over the other
when the discussion moves to normative territory. For Esposito, Bataille is the thinker
who values community most closely in terms of communitas, or sharing, and Thomas
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Hobbes is the thinker who values social relations most closely in terms of immunitas, or
protection.6
While Bataille senses the positive and even noble connotation of community, he
privileges it to such excess as to see a necessary ridding of the self to truly experience
community. For Bataille, the experience of community is such that “the common” travels
through a being and permeates that being until individual subjectivity no longer exists. In
this sense one cannot fully experience community without being completely dissolved
into it, sharing one’s existence until there is no longer an individual who can share that
existence. As I point out in chapter 2, this complete experience would result in the death
of one’s sense of singular being, as well as the death of one’s actual being. This is not an
inaccurate thinking of community with regards to Esposito’s etymology of communitas;
however, Esposito, unlike Bataille, does not privilege this experience of excess
community, or at least he finds it troubling (in Communitas), and (later in Immunitas and
Bios) he argues that too much excess communitas is not productive for any community
interested in the protection of its life or the lives of its members (Communitas 112-34).
On the other hand, immunitas, or immunity, is the condition of being protected
from this obligation to give, from sharing one’s sustenance with others. As Esposito puts
it, the person who is immune is exonerated or “safe from the obligations or dangers that
concern the community” especially in the case when “that giving something in and of
itself implies a diminishment of one’s goods and in the ultimate analysis also of oneself”
(Campbell, "Interview: Roberto Esposito" 50-1). As I explain above, this diminishment
of oneself means everything from the symbolic loss of identity or self-awareness to the
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material loss of biological life (see also Immunitas, 1-21). So, while communitas carries
with it a more positive connotation associated with generosity, friendship, and
togetherness, when past a certain threshold of excess it also constitutes the permanent
loss of singularity. So too, while immunitas has a negative connotation, especially in
terms of the exclusion of others, the appeal of immunity is necessary for the protection of
life, including the life of a community. Still, like community, when immunity is fully
realized, it also ends in the death of singularity and community. If a communal or
singular being were capable of creating such stringent protective borders that sharing and
inclusion never occurred, the result would be no sense of being, as well as the loss of
physical existence, as he or she would cease to be exposed to the relations required for
identity formation and physical sustenance to occur. Thus, community and immunity are
reciprocal in their presupposition of each other’s etymological meaning—where one is
necessary for the determination of the other—and in actuality, in practice, communities
need mechanisms of immunity to survive. Similarly, individuals and communities, if too
immune, will negate the necessary relations that compose and sustain any singularity of
being, also ending in the death of identity and physical being, whether communal or
singular.
This complex interdependence of community and immunity exposes that, to
develop an ethic of community, one cannot find much justification in simply privileging
inclusion over exclusion or sharing over protection; rather, the community/immunity
dichotomy has interweaving normative implications. However, there is a common strand
found in both the privileging of sharing—found most prominently in thinkers such as
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Bataille—and the privileging of protection—found most prominently in a thinker such as
Hobbes.
Both Hobbes’s and Bataille’s positions, opposites though they may be,
presuppose a value in the affirmation of a higher quality of human life, but each argues
for this higher quality of life occurring through different means—one through communal
sharing, the other through immunity and protection. Bataille argues that life is more fully
experienced in the loss of the individual self—many of his examples are those interested
in pushing this notion to its excess, excesses he saw occurring in erotic relations to bodily
suffering.7 Hobbes saw life being valued through its sustenance and saw the protection of
people’s quality of life best carried out through the absolutism of a sovereign power.
A more contemporary version of this conversation seemingly has taken place
between Donna Haraway and Jacques Derrida. Derrida discusses problems with
immunity mainly in Philosophy in a Time of Terror and in Rogues. In these texts, he
arguably demonizes immunity by conflating it with or reducing it to autoimmunity, or the
process in which an individual or communal body over-protects itself from the danger of
exposure to foreign bodies to such an extent that it misrecognizes parts of itself as
dangerous to itself, eventually destroying itself in the act of protecting itself. Haraway, in
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (see “The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies”), warns not
to dismiss immunity so easily and that protection can also be productive and life
affirming. Inspired by a friend of hers who died of AIDS because of immunosuppression, Haraway counters Derrida by pointing out how tragedy can occur when a
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body is too inclusive and its ability to protect itself from dangerous diseases becomes
compromised.
Thus, from the pole of community to the pole of immunity there is a value in the
affirmation of a higher quality of life that is being presupposed, whether in an act
emphasizing sharing or protection. How one values this better life is what informs
practices of sharing and protection, and thus inclusion and exclusion. Our ability to
discern ethical and unethical exclusivities or protections as well as our ability to
determine ethical and unethical inclusions or sharing is the productive result of the effect
those acts of inclusivity or exclusivity have on a life we value. For example, one might
see an act of exclusivity negate the quality of life of a person he or she values; as a result,
that person often sees wrong in and wants to negate exclusion itself. However, a higher
quality of life is being valued affirmatively first, and exclusivity is not inherently valued
negatively.
So how might one better determine this valuing of the affirmation of life in a way
that best negotiates the necessary combinations of sharing and protection? How does one
determine what kinds of rhetorical invention, practices, and critiques are affirmations of
sociopolitical and biological life? What should be shared? And what should be protected?
These are difficult questions. Nevertheless, a better answer, while no doubt contingent, is
through a lens that acknowledges presuppositions in the care for the singularity of being
via the recognition of the equality of intelligences. While composed in one sentence this
is a mouthful, I am alluding to the work of Adriana Cavarero and Jacques Rancière.
Cavarero and Rancière each is concerned with the idea of community; however, rather
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than attempt to develop ethical and political thought that somehow is able to subvert
exclusivities in totality, each thinker advocates a different kind of ethical value that
informs very practice-able community practices.
Below, I argue that taking equality and singularity seriously within rhetorics of
community promotes a higher quality of human life, of human existence. Please note that
by a higher quality of life, I do not mean a higher quantity of life, as seen in populist or
pro-life arguments. While biological life-ness would seemingly be a necessary
presupposition, a higher quality of life is as much or more concerned with how
meaningful one’s life is to him- or herself and to others. In terms of an ethics of
community, this affirmation of a higher quality of life through the values of equality and
singularity promotes community practices that would enable the members of the
community to live what the members themselves help determine to be a meaningful life.
Thus, this includes the ability to have some control over one’s life. This, rather than a life
in which meaning is solely determined by another’s control. I consider this to be
intolerable. Valuing life through concern for one’s and others’ singularity and equality
implies, of course, that domination and control over others are practices that lack a
concern for the quality of human lives. In other words, these destructive practices disable
one’s ability to have some control over the meaning of one’s existence. It seems to me
that Rancière and Cavarero, though they have other agendas within the fields of
philosophy, are very concerned with ethical values that create better modes of living, that
enable humans to share and protect each other as singular and equal beings.
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First, Rancière’s political thought provides a more persuasive argument—than
one for absolute or radical inclusivity—for how one might affirm a higher quality of
human life, even if he is not directly concerned with the same terms as Esposito. Rather
than valuing life through its complete loss to others or through its complete protection
from others, an ethics of community is better served through the knowledge of the
presupposition of the equality of human intelligences and the verification of this
knowledge through what Rancière calls an emergent “community of equals” or
“subjectification.”
No doubt when many readers view or hear the term equality or related terms, such
as democracy or freedom, they roll their eyes to terms that mean so much that they have
potentially ceased to mean anything—not unlike community, perhaps. This, or they may
read the term with skepticism, thinking a writer using such terminology has a naïve hope
for a utopian society. This is not the case for Rancière. For Rancière, democratic politics
not only “doesn't always happen—it actually happens very little or rarely” (Disagreement
17). In fact, if only received in sound bites, Rancière may appear to be as skeptical as
anyone: “Democracy does not exist simply because the law declares individuals equal
and the collectivity master of itself” (Shores of Politics 32). And finally, “social reality is
a reality of inequality” (48, my emphasis). So what is this emergent community of equals,
this equality of intelligences? I spend time on both in this section; however, I will spend a
greater deal of attention to the former, a community of equals, in the next chapter.
Again, a community of equals must not be mistaken for a utopian structure of
peace and prosperity. In his essay “The Community of Equals,” Rancière posits that at
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least since Aristotle there has been a concern for equality in the idea of community.
Nevertheless, Rancière’s point of departure for talking about equality in relation to
community is Pierre Leroux, a 19th century philosopher and economist who attempted to
conceptualize a community without hierarchy and with an equal distribution of property.
Obviously influenced by the proliferation of socialist thought during his life, Leroux
attempts to found his community of equality upon romanticized versions of historic
communities of equality. According to Rancière, the two models Leroux uses to
conceptualize this community of equality are the Greek Spartan community and the
Christian communities espoused by the apostle Paul. However, Rancière shows Leroux’s
task to be a difficult:
By taking a closer look at the accounts presented by equality to
community we . . . see the image of the single great body crumble, and
encounter all the deficit and discord which ensure that the community of
equals can never materialize without some cement plugging the cracks in
the image, without some obligation to keep tallying members and ranks
and retranslating the terms. (65)
The first of Leroux’s examples, the Spartan fraternity, while “founded” upon equality,
was only an equality of the few—men and those with property (66); the other example,
the Christian community, attempting to be “one in Christ,” was only realized by
communities of monks, who, not unlike Esposito’s notion of communitas, only found this
equality in the renunciation of each of the community members’ own quality of life,
becoming, in essence, slaves (68-72). Because Leroux’s two models of communal
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equality could not achieve such a feat without completely ignoring exclusivity (a
“community of masters”) or erasing the members’ subjectivities (a “community of
slaves,”) it is no wonder that Leroux could not construct such a united community of
equality to any greater success than the monks and the Spartans.
Of course, this is comes as no surprise to Rancière, whose scholarship is deeply
informed by another 19th century thinker, French educator Joseph Jacotot. Rancière reads
Jacotot as in contrast to Leroux: Jacotot argued that no politics or pedagogy of equality
can sustain itself institutionally. Summing up Jacotot’s recognition succinctly, Rancière
argues, “the essence of equality is in fact not so much to unify as to declassify, to undo
the supposed naturalness of orders and replace it with the controversial figures of
division” (32-33). Rather than equality occurring through the distribution of goods, as we
might see in liberalism (and other political systems—see my discussion of Rancière’s
politics in Chapter 4), Jacotot’s equality via Rancière is enacted though momentary
speech acts. In fact, it is through speech acts that humans are able to discover their
equality with other beings (51) through the presupposition of the equality of intelligences.
According to Rancière, Jacotot taught that equality “was a belief implied by the
very idea of intelligence.” And therefore, “belief in [equality], acquired or reacquired, [is]
the basis of a community of equals” (81). This claim for the equality of intelligence found
in speech acts is drawn from two premises: First, “every spoken or written sentence takes
on meaning only if it assumes a subject whose corresponding venture permits the
discernment of a meaning” (81). Thus, even though meaning is always over- and underdetermined because of the play of the signifier and the arbitrariness of language, this does
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not take away from the fact that the speaking subject must at some point presuppose
equality in his or her listener to even believe that the listener(s) will comprehend some
meaning from the speaker; otherwise, the speaking subject would not attempt to
communicate. Second, “there are no two ways of being intelligent” (82). This latter
premise seems to attempt to appeal to us as a simple and timeless truth, almost to the
point of cliché; however, if we consider the endless amounts of ways one might measure
intelligence, it is no doubt difficult to disprove. And this is all Rancière asks of us, to
believe in this presupposition of the equality of intelligences and let others attempt to
dissuade us of it.
If all speech acts presuppose the equality of human intelligences (and Rancière
will eventually include or at least allude to writing and other composition practices as
acts that presuppose this equality (see Shores of Politics 81-3)), then “it is always
possible to make a show of equality” (Disagreement 34), or almost always possible.
Material conditions can prevent one from doing so. One of these conditional constraints
for such acts is, of course, time. Even though in the actual moment of speaking and
listening, equality is being presupposed, as soon as any identifying of social status or
hierarchies takes place, that equality is gone. When such an identification takes place, any
act presupposing equality “turns into the opposite the moment it aspires to a place in the
social or state organization” (Disagreement 34). (I discuss this in greater depth in chapter
4 on politics of community.) For while any person must presuppose equality just in the
attempt to use language, whose meaning is arbitrary, there is no inherent equality in
social order. In fact, just the opposite, and this is the tension that will eventually lead to a
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democratic politics for Rancière, or how this ethic of equality is advocated (again, see
chapter 4).
As I mention above, with Rancière, the presupposition of equality can occur in
both writing and speech, comprising both the visual and aural spectrum of intentional
symbol use. However, just because one has engaged in a communicative act that
presupposes the equality of intelligences does not mean that one has produced or verified
that equality. In other words, just communicating would not constitute an ethics or
politics for Rancière, but rather the communicative act is the condition of possibility for
an ethics of community—an ethics valuing the equality of human intelligences. Just
because we have the capacity to presuppose equality does not mean that we should
validate that presupposition. That “should” can only come from a connection to other
presupposed values, such as a value in the quality of human life, which this
presupposition in equality can inform and be informed by. (See my argument about the
difference between constitutive and normative arguments in chapter 2.) An ethics valuing
equality must continually make contingent arguments for this valuation within many
contexts. Others have argued that humans also have “the capacity to create and destroy
their own communities, along with the values that govern their development and the
environment in which they survive” (Donnison 221). The fact that we have this capacity
does not justify the advocacy of putting it into action.
Still, the conditions for this presupposition to occur are important—they do not
stem from law or institutional structures but rather a repeated practice: “[a] community of
equals is [a] . . . community of individuals engaged in the ongoing creation of equality”
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(Rancière, Shore of Politics 84). And even though such a community of equals might be
as small in number as two, and as large as events of mass protest, do not mistake
institutions with good intentions as communities of equality. In fact, there are actually
two conditions to recognizing such a community: First, it will not have “a goal to be
reached but a [pre]supposition to be posited from the outset and endlessly reposited” (84).
And second, a “community of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social
institution . . . no matter how many individuals become emancipated, society can never
be emancipated” (84). Any political strategy or pedagogy that attempts to create a
structure to sustain such a community will only find itself over-relying on practices of
immunity, to use Esposito’s terminology, to protect the structure rather than verify the
equality of the members of the community. “Anything else paraded under this banner [of
equality] is either a trick, a school, or a military unit” (84). This does not necessarily
mean one should completely avoid implementing institutions, but one must realize that as
soon as a community has become institutionalized, it will take continual mechanisms and
practices of sharing and protection, and thus inclusion and exclusion, to maintain it. In
such situations, our communities of equality turn into perpetual acts of justification to
meet the institution’s goals rather than work in the service of equality. Therefore, we
must be careful not to mistake a community with good intentions as always falling under
(though it can fall under) the category of a “community of equals.”8
To this point, the ethics of community I have articulated includes an affirmation
of a higher quality of human life. I have argued that one condition for recognizing and
enabling this higher quality of life (whether in terms of the social, the political, or the
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biological) is through the presupposition of the equality of intelligences that occurs
through communication with others. In chapter 4, I explain how this presupposition can
be verified and advocated politically. However, before I get there, I want to add another
“recognition” element that I think is important but may seem contrary to what we might
deem an ethic of “community,” and that is a valuing of the care for singular beings. To
articulate this third but important element, I refer to the thought of another contemporary
Italian thinker, Adriana Cavarero.
Just as Rancière’s project articulates communication as the condition that enables
humans to value and verify the equality of intelligences, Cavarero’s larger project is to
expose another condition of possibility—the condition that enables us to speak, to even
communicate. Cavarero contends that prior to and as the condition for speech is the
vocalic—the voice—and that this phenomenon, this ontological condition, is a greater
and more originary indicator of singularity than one achieved through semantic meaning
and identity formation. She argues that the voice is “the condition of every
communication. . . . the communicability of the communicable, or the significance of the
signification” (For More Than One Voice 29). Because no two voices are identical, a
person’s physical phonic qualities, prior to any signifying content, communicate his or
her singular uniqueness. “When the human voice vibrates, there is someone in flesh and
body who emits it” (4). Cavarero sees the vocalic as reaffirming “what Hannah Arendt
calls the human condition: namely, the uniqueness that makes of everyone a being that is
different from all the others” (3). Thus, recognition of this uniqueness is a simultaneous
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recognition of relationality, because to communicate this uniqueness is to communicate
difference—the voice must be heard by another:9
The voice is always for the ear, it is always relational; but it is never as
relational as it is in the first cry of the infant—an invoking life that
unknowingly entrusts itself to a voice that responds. . . . There is nothing
yet to be communicated, if not communication itself in its pure vocality.
The voice first of all signifies itself, nothing other than the relationality of
the vocalic, which is already implicit in the first invoking cry of the infant.
(169, emphasis in the original)
Therefore, the voice is simultaneously an expression of uniqueness and a recognition of
relationality, an expression that finds its origins in “the first crucial months of life,”
where it “takes its time and its pleasure before handing itself over to the system of
language” (170).
Now, significant for Cavarero is that the voice is the most important political
category and that the primacy of the voice to signification enables her to critique the
history of Western Metaphysics’ dependency on language, and universal terms such as
“man.” Though I agree with much of her critique, in this dissertation I am less concerned
with that history. With the advent of new media technology and the realization that not
every person can hear—I am thinking of someone in the American Sign Language
community, for example—I am not yet convinced of Cavarero’s conclusions that the best
politics is a radically local politics where the voice is the most important political topoi,
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that is, unless the idea of voice is broadened metaphorically beyond its actual phonic
qualities.
Rather, I am more interested in how Cavarero’s thought enables the discovery of
topoi that might better inform how we develop ethics of community—i.e., rather than
terms such as inclusion and exclusion—in order to give us an indication of what values
should inform how we engage in protection and sharing toward a higher quality of human
life. I have already argued, through Roberto Esposito, that practices of sharing and
protection better inform how communities are constituted and will help rhetoricians
better discover ethical content in collective action and communal formation to affirm
human life. However, how does one best negotiate what is too much sharing and too
much protection, too much communitas or immunitas, as Esposito would have it? I
believe one way to begin making these determinations is through a more robust concept
of singularity.
Cavarero’s thought helps recognize that singular uniqueness is something that
should be a concern for community. Let me explain. While Cavarero’s ontology of the
voice does not automatically determine how one should or might normatively affirm the
singularity of the voice (something I discuss in chapter 5 with Cavarero’s later work), it
does provide the knowledge that there is a singular, unique being one can affirm—a
being that is neither simply a myth of capitalist or liberal ideology nor a byproduct of
some originary community (though relationality is a crucial element to that singularity).
Taking singularity seriously means understanding that when a communal practice of
sharing or protection goes so far as to negate someone’s singularity, then that community
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has likely surpassed a limit of tolerability. From this content one can better determine
ethical norms for sharing and protecting singularity in connection to community without
falling back into individualistic, over-protective paradigms, such as that of Thomas
Hobbes or American Capitalism; however, this ontology simultaneously provides a basis
for ethics that do not fall too far in the other direction either, into a paradigm that sees
any representation of singular personhood as a false consciousness or a potential betrayal
of communal relations.
From the maternal scene onward, the voice manifests the unique being of
each human being, and his or her spontaneous self-communication
according to the rhythms of a sonorous relation. In this sense . . . a vocal
ontology of uniqueness—stands in contrast to the various ontologies of
fictitious entities that the philosophical tradition . . . designates with names
like “man,” “subject,” “individual.” For what these universal categories
share is the neglect of the “uniqueness” of those human beings.” (173,
original emphasis)
In correlation yet in response to works like Jean-Luc Nancy’s Inoperative Community
and other works that also critique the subject, works in which one can perhaps too easily
surmise that any privileging of the individual is a betrayal of community (this can be seen
in the works of rhetoricians such as Diane Davis and Pat Gehrke, as I discuss in chapter
1), Cavarero’s work refreshingly brings our attention back to a value in singularity,
without disregarding the importance of community and its interdependent relation to
singularity.
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An Ethics of Community Beyond Absolute Inclusivity
In sum, the ethics of community I have argued for in this chapter is comprised of the
following:
First, this ethics recognizes that placing absolute positive value in inclusivity and
negative value in exclusivity as a basis for community is not only unfeasible but too
easily masks economic, nationalist, and corporate motives that perpetuate inequality, as
the example of biennialism illustrates. In fact, rather than viewing a sense of community
through a dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion, I argue—following Roberto Esposito’s
thought—that one’s sense of community is more accurately described through a
dichotomy of community/immunity, or sharing/protection. Beyond being more accurate
than inclusion/exclusion, the community/immunity dichotomy enables a more complex
ethical extraction, per se, because the ethical content found in community is not solely
tied to one pole of the dichotomy. One can find ethical affirmation in practices of
community and immunity.
And what is being affirmed? Simply put, a higher quality of life. Not just heartbeating, biological life (though that is obviously part of it), but the idea of “lifeness”
itself, found in its many varieties—including social identity formation and political
subjectivities of individuals and communities—in other words, what is being affirmed is
a higher quality of life. How one defines this quality of “lifeness” will be highly
contextual and shift greatly, depending on the specific application and larger ideological
assumptions. I am not arguing for a specific, explicative, and absolute definition of a
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quality of life here; however, I am arguing that without a value in the equality of human
intelligences and singularity of being, such a higher quality of life for each member of a
community cannot be obtained.
Drawing on the work of Jacques Rancière, I contend that one way in which this
ethics of community might determine affirmation of these quality lives is through a
valuing the equality of human intelligences. In other words, I would argue that a human
life is being affirmed, if his or her equality of intelligence is being valued. Rancière posits
that in everyday speech, in everyday communication humans already presuppose this
equality, otherwise we would refrain from speaking. Nevertheless, this condition for the
possibility of ethics, the condition for equality, requires, at some point, a leap of sorts, a
belief that verifying the equality of humans is an ethical good for singular and communal
being. For without such a value, the community implicitly will perpetuate the domination
of some over others. Of course, in addition to a value in the equality of humans, I argue,
by drawing upon Adriana Cavarero’s ontology of the voice, that an ethics of community
that wishes to value the equality of intelligences to affirm human life, should also value
the uniqueness of each member of that community.
Applying this ethics of community is not easy. This ethics of community by no
means explains how the problems of biennialism, for example, or any community will be
solved. It is an ethics that acknowledges its deficits, that knows it cannot be
institutionalized in totality. Yet, this ethics of community helps to clarify the problems of
communal phenomenon such as biennialism by showing the various ethical complexities
beyond inclusion and exclusion of communal formation, practice, and critique,
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simultaneously buoying the ability to critique, produce, and practice communal
phenomenon through a lens concerned with equality and singularity. In other words, I see
this ethics of community changing how we know, do, and make collective action,
whether in the name of biennialism or some other communal formation.
While Biennialism is a good example of the difficulties and problems with ethics
of community rhetorically built upon inclusion, arguably, such an ethics does its most
damage when used to critique communities that require (sometimes exclusive)
protections, for it condemns those who need the most protection—those on the margins.
And it is this point for which I do not want to be misread. Out of all the things my readers
could take away from this chapter, I would have them note that an ethics of community
built on an unopposed notion of inclusion is not simply a problem of logic and logistics.
Rather, such an ethic is completely unsympathetic to oppressed communities requiring
forms of exclusivity to protect members of the group. Therefore, I want to close with the
description of a recent event that exposes just how problematic an ethic of community
based upon inclusion is when applied to an actual community practice of protecting a
member’s equality and singularity. This example also leads nicely, I think, into chapter 4,
in which I discuss how these ethics of community I have developed—based on the
affirmation of the quality of life through the valuing of equality and singularity—can be
advocated politically.
On February 9, 2014, University of Missouri and future professional football
player Michael Sam announced he was gay during an interview on ESPN’s Outside the
Lines. While this act in itself is what I see as a practice verifying equality—a political act
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I discuss in chapter 4—for the purposes of this chapter, I am interested in a particular
event that occurred as a result of Sam making this announcement. Less than a week later,
on February 15, Sam, along with the rest of his Missouri Tigers teammates, was invited
to take part in a ceremony honoring the football team during a Missouri basketball game.
The football team was to accept the trophy for winning the Cotton Bowl, an NCAA bowl
game that took place a little over a month earlier.
What is significant about this event is that because of Sam’s announcement
regarding his sexuality, the Westboro Baptist Church decided to stage a protest outside
the basketball arena, carrying signs with sayings such as, “Death Penalty 4 Fags,” and
more (see fig. 7). In response to this protest, thousands of students created a human wall
to block the members of the Westboro Baptist Church from visibly picketing the game in
which Michael Sam and the rest of the Missouri Tigers were honored. In essence, the
students’ collective act was an act protecting Michael Sam from hate speech—an act of
community in which the group cared for a singular being they saw as their equal, even in
his difference from many of them.
This event, while lasting less than a day, speaks volumes regarding the kinds of
values that ethics of community should be informed by. If one were to make a critique of
the University of Missouri academic community through an ethic based upon absolute
inclusion, then one would find the actions of the students to be in the wrong, to be
intolerable. The students excluded the members of the Westboro Baptist Church.
However, the ethics of community I have articulated in this chapter find verification in
this protective act, this human “wall of love” (see Sieczkowski; fig. 8). The students,
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seeing Michael Sam as unique but also as equal to themselves, affirmed Michael Sam’s
life by protecting it from the protesters of the Westboro Baptist Church.

Figure 7. A member of the Westboro Baptist Church protests Michael Sam’s sexuality at a Missouri Tigers
basketball game; The Huffington Post; huffingtonpost.com; 16 Feb. 2014; Web; 24 Feb. 2014

While inclusion can be a tactic to enact equality, to affirm life, it is impractical
and even unethical as a basis for ethics of community. That is not to say that a politics
attempting to advocate the ethics of community I have articulated will not have their
difficulties being put into action. As I discuss in chapter 4, these are neither easy nor
institutionally sustainable tasks. Nevertheless, how one views community, how one views
ethical community practices needs to be more than a terministic screen in which
community is only associated with positive terms, such as inclusivity, participation, and
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togetherness. Rather, such an ethic must also consider how humans care for others in
their communities, how they treat others as equals in their communities. Sometimes this
care may just involve some protective exclusivity.

.
Figure 8. To protect Michael Sam from Westboro Baptist protesters, StandWithSam counterprotesters form a
human wall outside a Missouri Tigers basketball game; Photograph by Mark Schierbecker; Wikimedia
Commons; commons.wikimedia.org; 15 Feb. 2014; Web; 24 Feb. 2014.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A POLITICS OF COMMUNITY
Perhaps after all there is no need for the workers to own their own factory
and run it themselves in order to be equal. Perhaps it is enough for them to
show, when appropriate, that they can do so. Not to found a counterpower
susceptible of governing a future society, but simply to effect a
demonstration of capacity which is also a demonstration of community.
Jacques Rancière
The articulation of the ethics of community I advocate in chapter 3 was no easy
task. It is perhaps even more difficult to put into practice politically. However, this is a
good thing. Unlike the normative models of community that draw on an
inclusion/exclusion dichotomy, an ethics informed by a sharing/protection dichotomy—
or as I might say, an ethics where values are found along the range of both the poles of
community and immunity—requires more specificity, and is therefore more difficult to
simulate, mask, or institutionalize. Nevertheless, even with this difficulty, advocating this
ethics politically and putting it into practice is actually possible, unlike practices
purporting to enable absolute, radical inclusivity. In brief, this ethics—which, I argue,
finds value in the affirmation of a higher quality of life through taking seriously
communicative presuppositions of equality and singularity—can be practiced politically
whenever and wherever one is able to verify the presupposition of equality.
The goals of this chapter are to explicate this politics, for which I rely heavily on
the thought of Jacques Rancière (see chapter 5 for further application of Cavarero’s
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ethical thought applied to the composition classroom). After I explain this politics, I
apply this political lens to analyze a historical community: Black Wall Street, a thriving
African American community in the early part of the twentieth century that found roots in
Tulsa, Oklahoma. Black Wall Street was a community whose growth and prosperity—
and whose verifications of equality, as I view them in certain instances—created
dissensus among the larger white community in Tulsa, thus becoming a catalyst for the
infamous 1921 race riots. Rancière’s politics, in concert with the constitutive model of
community I articulate in chapter 2, provides a particularly valuable explanation for
communal phenomenon such as Black Wall Street, where protection and sharing went
hand-in-hand with verifying the equality of a marginalized group of people.

Verifying the Presupposition of Equality: Dissensus, Subjectification, Emancipation
As I allude to in chapter 3, Rancière’s political thought is by no means a
philosophy articulating a system for how to better distribute “who gets what” in a
government. In other words, it is not a political model or mode that encapsulates the
design of a more perfect social structure or a better way of governing. Nevertheless, it
does inform rhetorics of community, and, in fact, it changes how one can critique,
produce, and practice such rhetorics. While top-down political and community-building
models can learn from Rancière’s political philosophy, they can never institutionalize
what he calls subjectification and emancipation, or an emergent community of people
engaged in the practice of verifying the presupposition of equality. Rather than a political
thought whose emphasis is on the capabilities and responsibilities of people in power,
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Rancière’s theory works for those invisible to a social order, those who are unheard in the
public sphere, whose equality is unrecognized. As the reader of this chapter will see,
Rancière’s political thought enables anyone to practice politics actively rather than
passively await the distribution of equality from those in positions of power—for it needs
no policies to be put into action, and it requires neither a perfect system of distribution
nor mechanisms from which to perpetuate order; it only requires the existence of beings
who can communicate, and thus presuppose and verify each other’s equality of
intelligence.
As a reminder (see chapter 3), Rancière argues that existing in any speech act is a
presupposition of equality, and this claim is built upon two premises. First, for any
communicative meaning to take place between two individuals, even with the constant
play of the signifier and arbitrariness of language, the rhetor must presuppose equality
with his or her listener on a level of intelligence to expect any understanding from the
listener. Without this presupposition of equal intelligence at work, the rhetor would have
no exigency to attempt communication. The second premise is that there is no one correct
manner of being intelligent: there are innumerable ways of being intelligent, and thus
gauging an absolute measure is impossible. As a caveat, however, just because one
presupposes equality in daily communication does not mean that such communication is
automatically a political act of verifying equality. Nevertheless, this condition is still a
powerful thing that enables such a politics of equality to occur:
A word has all the power originally given it. This power is in the first
place the power to create a space where equality can state its own claim:
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equality exists somewhere; it is spoken of and written about. It must
therefore be verifiable. Here is the basis for a practice that sets itself the
task of verifying equality. (Shores of Politics 47)
Thus, this presupposition, while not an automatic political act in itself is the basis for
political action. For a community of equals to be realized politically, further action is
required (47), but two conditions must be understood: (1) equality is not a goal that can
be achieved institutionally but a practice to be verified repeatedly, and (2) such a
verification—which Rancière calls “subjectification”—is temporal, never permanent,
though its trace can have a residual effect. Unlike prominent rhetoric and composition
scholar James Berlin and others who view almost any act as being political (understood
in the phrase “everything is political”), in the sense that all acts either perpetuate a status
quo or resist it, Rancière sees politics as occurring very rarely. “Nothing is political in
itself for the political only happens by means of a principle that does not belong to it:
equality” (Disagreement 33). One of my goals in this chapter is to articulate how that
presupposition of equality becomes political, how it enables change, and how it
rhetorically affects the social order: “a verification [of equality] becomes ‘social’, [and]
causes equality to have a real social effect, only when it mobilizes an obligation to hear”
(Shores of Politics 86, original emphasis).
Perhaps the best way to understand Rancière’s political thought, to understand
what it means to “mobilize an obligation to hear,” is to place it in context with those
ideas, systems, and practices that are not “politics.” For, as Rancière argues, politics
occurs through dissensus (rather than consensus), subjectification (the verification of
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equality), and emancipation. However, these terms and processes are very different from
the terms and practices we normally associate with politics, such as order, law,
consensus, and the distribution of rights.

Police or Politics?
‘Social’ reality is a reality of inequality.
Jacques Rancière
Because “no divine law regulates human society” (Disagreement 16), order
appears to be a necessity for mainstream political thought and action. For groups of
people to co-exist, authority is mandated, rules are created, and roles are assigned—at
least, this is the narrative in which we are led to believe. Generally, this structuring of the
social, this “set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is
achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems
of legitimizing this distribution” is called “politics” (Disagreement 33). Whether
discussing acts of law-making, taxing, distributing wealth, establishing a party platform,
structuring a government, or organizing a military—actions that are all characterized as
“politics” or “political” according to popular news media—an idea of order is at work to
categorize, classify, and, as a result, hierarchize people, places, and materials. Even if the
ethical values motivating these “political” acts range from personal liberty and economic
freedom to democracy and protective rights, this structural ordering implies that someone
has control over another person, even if that control is motivated by valid concerns for
that other person. For this reason, Rancière refuses to call such actions “politics.” Rather,
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he “propose[s] to give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. . . . the
police” (28, original emphasis).
Not to be confused with law enforcement officials, though they obviously play a
role,
the police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of
ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those
bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of
the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and
another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as
noise. (29)
There are multiple elements to this short passage, which I will parse out. First, if the
police is defined by any “order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing,
ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a
particular place and task,” then regimes we normally think of as democratic, such as the
United States, and practices we consider processes of democracy, such as voting for
consensus, are actually regimes and practices that can enable and take part in, if they are
not themselves, policing. In other words, by the phrase “police regime,” Rancière is not
just designating what mainstream politics would recognize as totalitarian regimes, such as
North Korea; rather, policing is occurring “whenever someone thinks about establishing
the theoretical rules of a city’s [literal and figurative] proportions.” And when this
happens, “it means that democracy has already passed that way” (16).
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Continuing with the above passage, the police is also “an order of the visible and
the sayable,” or what Rancière elsewhere calls the “distribution of the sensible.” In other
words, this distribution of the sensible is an order of what and who counts, and what
makes discernible meaning, whether in terms of defining citizenship or more
inconspicuous means of legitimation. This is beyond acts of lawmaking and also refers to
“implicit law governing,” those presuppositions a social body perceives as “self-evident
facts” of “what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done”
(The Politics of Aesthetics 85). Thus, policing can and does occur even when there are no
explicit, written rules or laws that enforce people to abide by them. Broadly conceived,
the police is the process of the general distribution of powers—whether through
lawmaking or normalization (see chapter 2)—and the legitimation of these powers into
hierarchical patterns of relationships among people. Some obvious, explicit forms of
policing include English-only education and “traditional” marriage laws. These laws
legitimate certain people and groups (e.g., English speakers and couples who are
identified as heterosexual), and these laws distribute powers across various social
institutions and practices, influencing who qualifies for medical insurance benefits and
whom a company can discriminate when hiring new employees, to name a few. However,
policing also occurs in what may, upon first glance, appear to be less oppressive and
more implicit distributions of the sensible, such as in the designation of “men’s” and
“women’s” public restrooms—distributions that make people who identify as
transgender, for example, invisible in a social order. This distribution of the sensible is

153

beyond exclusion in that the invisible are not even counted among what is excluded in a
social order (for example, women are excluded from a “men’s” restroom and vice versa).
In contrast to the police is what Rancière designates as politics. As I explain in
chapter 3, Rancière actually limits politics to very specific practices and processes that
rarely occur; however, this limitation, in the spirit of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and JeanLuc Nancy’s “retreating the political” (see my Introduction), actually empowers and even
saves politics from the ubiquity that enables pundits and journalists to label ad hominem
rhetorics, for example, as “just politics.” Rather than argue that politics is overarching all
acts, Rancière suggests that “politics only occurs when these [police] mechanisms are
stopped in their tracks by the effect of a presupposition that is totally foreign to them . . . :
the presupposition of the equality of anyone and everyone” (Disagreement 17). Note,
again, however, that politics is not the presupposition of equality itself, which occurs in
everyday speech, but a practice whose condition is this presupposition. This practice is
not one of distributing human rights, as liberal paradigms would have it. Such systems
would still be policing. In contrast, Rancière reserves “the term politics for an extremely
determined activity antagonistic to policing” (29). Thus, rather than politics being actions
“from the top down,” per se, which attempts to achieve consensus and order, Rancière
sees politics solely as acts of a particular kind of dissensus from the bottom up.
Of course, by a particular kind of dissensus, I mean that any act of
decategorization or declassification is not necessarily political dissensus. Just because I
might say, “I think we should break the categories for how we understand car parts,” for
example, does not mean I am taking part in an act of political dissensus. Simply put,
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political “dissensus is not the confrontation between interests or opinions.” Rather, “it is
the manifestation of a distance of the sensible from itself” (“Ten Theses” 8:24) that
requires a verification of the presupposition of the equality of a human intelligence. Thus
politics, along with dissensus, is also “a matter of subjects or, rather, modes of
subjectification (Disagreement 35),” which is “the enactment of equality” (“Politics,
Identification, and Subjectivization” 61).
By subjectification I mean the production through a series of actions of a
body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a
given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the
reconfiguration of the field of experience. (Disagreement 35, original
emphasis)
Subjectification is the emergent community of equals that appears simultaneously with
political dissensus. Another way of putting it is that subjectification is part of the same
process of the verification of equality that creates dissensus, only it is perceived from a
different perspective. Subjectification is a practice that enables a person who is invisible
in a social order to become visible, a person who is unheard to become heard. This
invisibility and unheard-ness occurs because the current distribution of the sensible, the
current social order, neither recognizes this person as part of the order nor as part of what
is able to be perceived by that order. Subjectification is thus the act of a person (or
community) who was not a subject becoming a subject through actions that acknowledge
or verify his or her equality with others; dissensus is this same process from the
perspective of the social order, one might say. Those relying on the social order’s
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distribution of the sensible to determine meaning will see an act of subjectification—a
person verifying his or her equality—as dissensus, as a de-categorization and
declassification of the social order they rely on. It is a rhetorical disruption of the
senses—of what is thought to be knowable and capable of being experienced—that
occurs because of this exposure to a subject who is not a subject within the social order’s
distribution of peoples and legitimation of powers. A brief example may help explain
Rancière’s complex and often elusive political thought.
Coy Mathis is a Colorado 7-year-old whose parents identified her as a boy at
birth; however, Coy has been identifying herself as a girl since at least the age of three. In
2011, even as Coy’s parents were becoming accustomed to their child’s transgender
identification, they still checked “boy” when registering Coy for kindergarten. But when
Coy refused to wear “boy” clothes to school, and with the help of transgender support
groups and the school psychologist, Coy’s parents finally decided to let Coy wear the
kind of clothes she preferred and supported her decision to identify as a girl at school.
This identification included using the girls’ bathroom. While the complexities of Coy’s
story deserve more attention than I am giving it here, simply put, when Coy’s use of the
girls’ bathroom became known to district administrators (with the help of other parents,
of course), “Coy was banned from the girls’ restroom” at her elementary school (see
Erdely). Six months after a filing a discrimination complaint, the Colorado Rights
Division ruled in favor of Coy Mathis, allowing her to identify as a girl at school and use
the girls’ bathroom.1
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To place this powerful story in Rancière’s terms, in the very act of using the girls’
bathroom, Coy was verifying her equality as a transgender student with the other students
at the school who may have identified as either a boy or a girl through more accepted,
traditional gender assignments. She was performing an act of subjectification. She made
count what according to how the social order’s distribution of the sensible did not count.
From the perspective of the school district, her act was one of dissensus. Her transgender
identification as a girl ruptured how the sensible had been distributed to that point—a
seemingly clear line demarcating what allows someone to equate as boy or girl. This
demarcation legitimated only those who identified with the traditional roles of the
assigned distribution. In effect, this gender distribution, reified in the restroom signifiers,
empowered those who identified with traditional gender assignments and made invisible
those who did not. Coy’s act to use the girls’ bathroom (and her parents’ and supporters’
acts to support her) thus was a recognition of the inequality being committed and a
verification of her equality with the other students. This was an act of subjectification,
and act that no longer made her invisible to the social order. This process, following
Rancière, is politics.
While Coy’s story made headline news, Rancière points out that such political
acts can be “spectacular or otherwise” (Disagreement 30), and one’s ability to judge a
successful verification of equality is not located in the creation of a new law or policy or
the advent of a news-breaking broadcast. Rancière argues that political emancipation is
not the freedom or liberation from all restrictions, whether they be legal, political, or
social. Rather, political emancipation is the moment one recognizes one’s own equality
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and that enables “the verification of the equality of any speaking being with any other
speaking being” (“Politics” 58-60). After one is emancipated, others can be emancipated.
All that is required for this emancipation to be verified is for one human being to
“mobilize an obligation to hear” (Shores 86) in another human being—for one being to
incite another into seeing what he or she had not recognized before: a person’s equality. It
is important to note that this other human being can even be one’s self, for to verify the
equality of another, one must recognize the presupposition at work in his- or herself:
“Proving to the other that there is only one world and that one can prove the legitimacy of
one’s action within it, means first of all proving this to oneself” (Shores of Politics 50).
Thus, this recognition of one’s equality, this process of emancipation and the
communal subjectification that may follow, can occur in a conversation with a loved one
at home; they can occur on national television or watching television by oneself; they can
occur while surfing the Internet; they can occur at a political rally. Political emancipation
can occur anywhere. In sum, Rancière’s politics is a practice or series of actions that “that
undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order.” This undoing occurs through
putting into effect a presupposition that the order itself denies: the equal recognition of
“those who have no part” in that order. The implementation of this presupposition, this
test of equality, exposes “the sheer contingency of the order, [and demonstrates] the
equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being” (Disagreement 30),
resulting in the formation of a community of equals.
However, lest my readers forget, it is important to remember that this ability to
verify equality in any moment does not mean that such a notion of politics occurs often.
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In fact, as I state earlier, politics in these terms occurs rarely (see Disagreement 17), for it
cannot be institutionalized. “Equality is not a given that politics then presses into service,
an essence embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining. It is a
mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it” (33).
This discernment of equality is actually very temporal. Rancière calls it a “one-off
performance” (34): as soon as an act of subjectification—the verification of equality of a
person who is not counted among the social order—is no longer perceived as dissensus
and becomes identifiable by the social order, whether one is then identified as a citizen, a
community member, or some other identification, then the verification of equality is not
necessarily still in action. Though the equality of intelligences is always presupposed in
any communicative act, the verification of that equality is a practice that “is forever in
need of reiteration. No matter how many individuals become emancipated, society can
never be emancipated. Equality may be the law of the community, [but] society
inevitably remains in thrall to inequality” (Shores 84).
No doubt, it is because of this one-off performance, as Rancière puts it, that most
political thinkers actually confuse policing with politics. They find or fear the inability to
institutionalize the temporal verification of equality; or, as part of the social order, they
only see subjectification as dissensus and thus posit a political theory that relies on the
legitimation of hierarchical powers, law, and a distribution of meaning (roles, languages,
rights) for the people. This, however, even if performed in the name of equality, is
actually policing, not politics. “Anyone who wants to cure politics of its ills has only one
available solution: the lie that invents some kind of social nature in order to provide the
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community with an arkhê,” or a structure that holds the community together and
perpetuates the distribution of the sensible as all that there is to perceive (Disagreement
16).
In fact, the most prominent political systems of thought are, for Rancière, not
actually politics but versions of policing whose goal is actually “the end of politics” or, at
minimum, “eliminating the difference between politics and police” (63). These systems
of thought confuse (if they do not deny it altogether) the practice of verifying a
presupposition of equality as politics with systems of distribution, in which rights, such
as equality (but sometimes not even this), are thought to provide the people via a
governing body. Rancière designates such systems of thought as archipolitics,
parapolitics, and metapolitics.
The most prominent version of archipolitics is found in Plato’s Republic. It is the
idea that the best way to aggregate groups of people and achieve consent, and thus
harmony, is by assigning each person his or her place or role in society. In an
archipolitical community, notions of equality are not even considered, because equality
would actually disrupt the rule of harmony. Such a system finds no need to even attempt
to distribute or simulate equality because archipolitics relies on the belief that all are not
equal (Disagreement 65-9). Parapolitics informs the political thought of Aristotle and
later thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes. Aristotle and Hobbes each recognizes that “all by
nature are equal” (Politics IV, 1292), but fears the disruptive character of politics or at
least cannot reconcile it with a system that views “the greatest good [as] the rule of the
best,” or the elite (Disagreement 71). Unlike archipolitics, parapolitics is interested in the
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appearance of equality but is willing to sacrifice actual equality for a belief in the greater
good, an interest parapolitics shares with archipolitics. From Rancière: “The good
[parapolitical] regime is one that takes on the appearances of an oligarchy for the
oligarchs and democracy for the demos [the ‘commons’ or ‘citizens’]” (74). In a
parapolitical community, people are still assigned various, unequal roles, but they may
perceive themselves as being considered equals by the social order, if their role demands
that perception. (70-81).
Metapolitics, unlike archipolitics and parapolitics, is an invention of modernity. It
is less a political system than a philosophy of how politics works. This is the thought
associated with Karl Marx and (for some, ironically) with neoliberal thought. In
metapolitics the truths about social conditions are never what they seem. Politics on the
surface is only masking an economic agenda privileging one community or individuals
over others—the Marxist version is the idea of false consciousness. The truth of politics
for metapolitics “is located beneath or behind it, in what it conceals” (82). In other words,
for metapolitics, politics exists merely as a means to conceal the truth of economic
conditions. Similarly, Marxism’s enemy neoliberalism argues there is no need for
politics, because the invisible hand of the marketplace will correct all forms of injustice
(81-91). Thus, metapolitics is a philosophy that sees the discovery of the truth and the
righting of injustice occurring only in the “end of politics” (86). All of these forms of
political thought and systems, which again Rancière refers to as police, require structures
to maintain a sense of stability and require some to know more than others and have
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power over others. None require the belief in a presupposition of equality, a
presupposition that is the basis for Rancière’s politics.2
One can imagine that if there were a political system that was to embody the
verification of equality as its primary practice, then it would probably look something
akin to collective anarchism, and I would hesitate to call it a “system.”3 Nevertheless,
Rancière does not give up completely on the thought that practices verifying equality can
affect communities beyond the initial one-off performance of subjectification. Even while
equality cannot be institutionalized in a community, the traces of an act of
subjectification can influence how a community acts and perhaps help that community
look for verifications of equality when the social order is seemingly breaking down and
seemingly only perceiving dissensus.
The there is of the event [the verification of equality] brings out the
facticity of being-there-together. In the movement of the event replayed,
of the text restaged, the community of equals occasionally finds the
wherewithal to imprint the surface of the social body with the traces of its
actual effects.” (Shores 87)
Thus, there are moments when an act of subjectification, which momentarily creates a
community of equals, occurs within a social order or a community of a policing character
or is the reason that a community came into existence in the first place. There are even
moments when such a “community of equals appears as the ultimate underpinning of the
distribution of the institutions and obligations that constitute a society” (91). In this way,
the trace of the effect of such previous acts of subjectification do not necessarily
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disappear “without a trace,” as a punster might have it. This appearance of equality being
the basis for the distribution of the sensible for a community can occur each time “an
impertinent dialectic is created by those who have no rights in the matter, but who
nevertheless assert such rights” and thus disrupt the social order and create a “new
beginning” in invoking remembered past acts verifying equality (91). When the
recollection of what was once dissensus but is now an equal subject in the eyes of the
community—what was once only white noise or what was once invisible to that
community and eventually became identifiable through a rupture to that community’s
order—when this recollection becomes the motive for action and that rupture is
reinscribed into the community, the community may take on the appearance of one based
in the verification of equality. Such a community will find its ability to cause social
change in the trace of those earlier acts of subjectification and each time the community
re-practices such acts. Thus, the political effectiveness of a community “is predicated on
a violence [to the social order] which antedates it” (85). These traces of subjectification,
which may have been originally perceived as dissensus, can continue to have effect
through a remembrance of the “appeal to what [was] inscribed earlier” (91)—the
verification of the presupposition of the equality of intelligences.
For example, when Jack Baker and Michael McConnell applied for a marriage
license in Hennepin County, Minnesota in 1970, they were taking part in a practice of
subjectification, and the trace of their act of verifying equality remains to this day.4 In the
act of verifying their equality with that of married couples who identify and whom the
state identified as heterosexual, Baker and McConnell created “an impertinent dialectic
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by those who,” according to United States and Minnesota law at the time, had “no rights
in the matter, but who nevertheless assert[ed] such rights” (91). As such, this practice was
perceived as dissensus to the social order, to those who could only imagine marriage
between a man and a woman because of the particular distribution of the sensible of the
sensible in Minnesota and the United States at large. The effects of this practice of
equality have been far-reaching, including the emancipation of other couples who
identify as gay and the creation of national organizations such as Marriage Equality USA,
which has helped influence district courts to deem amendments attempting to ban samesex marriage as unconstitutional, even in conservative states such as Utah, Oklahoma,
and Texas.5 This does not mean that each act carried out by Marriage Equality USA is a
practice of equality or that it is an institution able to distribute equality. Marriage
Equality USA has become institutionalized: it has a board of directors and staff members
assigned various roles. These facts alone mean that the organization itself contains what
Rancière would call “policing.” However, the organization finds its power and political
effectiveness in the trace of subjectifications that preceded it and in which it finds its
motive for existence and motive to attempt to keep practicing this equality. Each time
Marriage Equality USA (and other groups like it) works to verify the equality of a couple
that “does not count” within a particular state’s distribution of the sensible, it is drawing
on an appeal of equality that was reinscribed earlier, and whose trace informs the attempt
to continue to practice verifications of equality.
It is highly likely that Marriage Equality USA will continue to have influence for
some time, not unlike the community with which I would like to close this chapter: Black
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Wall Street, a community whose struggle for survival and immunity from white
oppression in the early twentieth century was equally a struggle for equality.

Black Wall Street: A Community Practicing Immunity, Subjectification, and
Dissensus to Verify Equality
I close the previous chapter by mentioning that judging a community by an ethics
of absolute inclusion relies on an insufficient understanding of community and is
problematic normatively. While such an ethic encourages those in power to be more
cognizant of recognizing marginalized groups, this ethic also works to freely condemn
those communities that are the most vulnerable, those communities that have, at times,
relied on practices of exclusivity to protect their own or another endangered community. I
would argue that certain of these communities even have practiced some forms of
exclusivity to verify their own equality with other communities. Along similar lines,
judging a community’s political action as a success by its ability to establish new laws or
policies is just as unsympathetic an approach to understanding community practices and
politics in general. Black Wall Street was a community in Tulsa, Oklahoma that not only
took part in exclusivities that are arguably ethical in the context in which they took place;
it was a community that engaged in what Rancière would call political action, or
verifying the presupposition of the community members’ equality (i.e., subjectification)
with that of the white citizens in Tulsa during the early part of the twentieth century.
Black Wall Street’s politics were actions observed by the ruling order of white citizens as
only dissensus; however, these acts of dissensus were heard by the black community and
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its sympathizers at large in the United States as subjectification, and they continue to be
heard and have influence today.6
In the early twentieth century, Tulsa, Oklahoma was a major site participating in
the oil boom that marked the turn of the century. While in economic terms the city was
thriving, “it was a tale of two cities,” as historian, playwright, and lawyer Hannibal
Johnson puts it, “one black, isolated, and insular; the other white, boundless and bustling”
(2). Nevertheless, even with this divide stemming from the nineteenth century, many
African-Americans saw Oklahoma as a land of opportunity where they could avoid
racism, violence, and death. Treaties between Native American tribes and the United
States resulted in certain tribes allotting land to freed slaves in the area. This fact, in
concert with the actions of boosters like Edwin McCabe, who once envisioned Oklahoma
becoming an “all-black state,” led to the development of many African-American
communities in Oklahoma, communities that “opened their arms” to freed slaves and
their progeny “from all across the country.” Though the state never reached McCabe’s
vision, many of these predominantly African-American communities did emerge in
Oklahoma. Indeed, these communities in Oklahoma thrived to such a degree that at one
point more than thirty African-American newspapers were being published in the state
alone (Johnson 3-5).
According to Johnson, these communities’ rapid developments occurred for two
related reasons: African Americans discovered protection from white oppression—
whether in the explicit form of the Ku Klux Klan or more subtle systemic racism—and
found more opportunities to control their lives politically and economically (5). Sadly, if
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predictably, this rapid growth did not occur with the blessing of the white communities,
at large. From a 1907 article in The Independent, a national magazine:
[I]n the Oklahoma, or Western half of the new State, the negro was as free
to homestead land as the whites. . . . in both divisions of the State there are
probably a larger percentage of negroes who own their own homes and are
in comfortable circumstances than elsewhere in the United States. So it
will be seen that Oklahoma’s negro population is hardly to be termed
improvident. . . . I have yet to find the [white] Oklahoman who does not
admit a strong personal antipathy toward the blacks. . . . [i]n Oklahoma the
negro can hope for no political or social position that requires white
encouragement. (Abbott 209-211; qtd. in Johnson 7-8)
In spite of the efforts of boosters such as McCabe and many African-American families
encouraging friends and relatives to make a new start in Tulsa and the rest of the state,
“the culture of the day was decidedly racist” (Johnson 8). Nevertheless, even with the
culture structurally divided in this way, many of the African-American communities
continued to grow and prosper, particularly economically, and particularly in Tulsa. With
newspapers warning that “Tulsa appears now to be in danger of losing its prestige as the
whitest town in Oklahoma” and referring to the small section of Tulsa proliferating with
African-American communities via racial epithets such as “Little Africa” or
“Niggertown,” it is no small wonder that these communities prospered for as long as they
did (8).7
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No small wonder because segregation was the ruling distribution. While African
Americans could be employed as servants in the white Tulsa communities, the racial
politics of the time made it impossible for African Americans to participate equally,
politically or economically: they could not live in the white communities and were
discouraged from patronizing white businesses. The effects of this segregation could have
been devastating (and no doubt were, in terms of self-perception and general morale);
however, as a means of resistance to this perpetuation of inequality and as a means of
survival, the African-American community in Tulsa began “buying black,” as such.
Ranging from legitimate business practices to what Johnson calls their “less-desirable
counterparts,” such as brothels and speakeasies, “black consumers [were deliberately]
doing business with black vendors” (Johnson 9), exclusively investing earnings that came
from outside the district back into the district (18).
Segregation, for all its practical, moral, and philosophical deficiencies,
forced the development of an insular African-American economy to cater
to the needs of this walled-off community. With it, an affluent class of
African-American entrepreneurs developed. In Tulsa, this increasingly
prominent African-American entrepreneurial pool congregated primarily
in a single business district. (9)
This district was so successful between the years of 1905 and 1921, that according
to legend, Booker T. Washington dubbed the district “Negro Wall Street,” now referred
to as “Black Wall Street” (Johnson 9).8 This concerted effort of African Americans
deliberately investing solely in their own community led to the development of an
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African-American trade union in 1910 (14) and the construction of African-American
hospitals and schools, including Booker T. Washington High School, where principal
E.W. Woods made every effort to acknowledge the students’ equality of intelligence:
“You’re as good as 99 percent of all the people [in Tulsa] and better than the rest” (qtd. in
Johnson 12).9 According to Hannibal Johnson, African Americans comprised ten percent
of the population in Tulsa at the time. During this period, the first African-American
police officer was appointed, Barney Cleaver, though his jurisdiction only pertained to
enforcing the laws in the African-American sections of Tulsa (14).
“Buying black” was equally an act of immunity from white oppression as an act
verifying the African-American community’s equality with the surrounding white
community—an act that enabled the growth of the African-American community and
made visible their equality to those white communities. However, what appeared to those
in the Greenwood District as progress and as community members asserting their
equality, looked only like dissensus and disruption to the social order in Tulsa, whose
distribution of the sensible was defined by white privilege (19). Of important note, of
course, is that these verifications of equality by the African-American community did not
solely occur in Tulsa. As African-American soldiers returned from World War I in 1918
wearing United States uniforms, communities across the country began to recognize their
equality with the white communities, and their rising expectations and sense of self-worth
emboldened them to assert this equality in multiple situations. For example, in
Mississippi, one returned soldier wore his uniform in public, within the eyesight of white
returned soldiers and communities. In response, a white mob formed. The mob forced the
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soldier to remove his clothing, threatening that if he did not leave town that night, his
family’s lives would be in danger (20). Around the same time period, in Michigan, four
African-American boys decided to swim in the vicinity of what had been designated a
“white beach.” The violent response of the white community ended in the death of one of
the swimmers and more than thirty additional people in the area (28). Thus, the practices
of verifying equality carried out by the Black Wall Street community did not occur in a
vacuum; rather, they were part of a bigger communal movement by members of the
African-American community at large.
That many in the white community saw these verifications of equality as
dissensus and rupture to the order they perceived seems quite clear. From 1919 to 1921
there were 179 lynchings recorded in the United States. In the context of this knowledge
and the oppressively racist laws and customs in Oklahoma, including a considerable Ku
Klux Klan presence, the Black Wall Street community survived, prospered, and asserted
their equality in the Tulsa area through “serving almost exclusively the needs of its own
residents” (27). This exclusivity was definitely a product of the segregation laws, actions,
and customs enforced by the dominate order, the white community at large, whose
actions should be condemned. However, the “buying black” exclusivity perpetuated by
the Black Wall Street community, a marginalized and vulnerable group in this context, is
understandable. Furthermore, within an ethics that recognizes the affirmation of the
quality of life through practices of protection and sharing that verify equality and care for
singularity (see chapter 3), the actions of Black Wall Street are beyond understandable;
they are justifiable.
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While the continual practices of verifying equality in the community were largely
perceived as disruption to the social order by those in power, namely the white
community at large, rather than seeing only dissensus in Black Wall Street’s
“uppityness,” some white Tulsans actually began to recognize this protective, insular
activity for what it was—repeated practices of subjectification by the African-American
community. Some white community members even heard this voice from the voiceless
and took actions to verify the equality of those in Black Wall Street. The International
Workers of the World, a white group sympathetic to socialist politics, publicly
condemned the racial inequality in Tulsa as a result of this recognition. However, their
own acts of verifying another’s equality were also perceived as dissensus by the
dominant order. In one instance, the IWW members, en route to a court appearance, were
seized by a group called the “Knights of Liberty.” The “Knights,” governed by racist
ideology, tied the IWW members to trees and tarred and feathered them, meeting no
opposition from law enforcement (34).
The most prominent and terrible event that resulted from this racial tension, a
tension that was the result of the African-American community asserting its equality with
the white community in Tulsa, was of course the 1921 race riots. On the morning of May
30, 1921, Sarah Page, a seventeen-year-old white girl, alleged that Dick Rowland, a
nineteen-year-old African-American, had sexually assaulted her in an elevator. Though
within hours she withdrew her statement, saying that Rowland had only fallen against her
when the elevator lurched, scaring her in the process, the initial accusation had legs of its
own in a social order that was continuing to see African Americans asserting their
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equality where none was supposed to be found (35-8). Based upon the initial allegation,
Rowland was arrested and taken to the city jail to be questioned. The next night, while
Rowland was detained for questioning, a lynch mob of 2,000 white men formed to “take
the matter into its own hands” (37). To protect Rowland, a group of armed AfricanAmerican men numbering around 200 met the mob at the city jail. In an attempt by a
white police officer to remove the weapons from only the African-American men, a shot
went off and gunfire on both sides erupted (45).
Utter chaos ensued. African-Americans fled east and north, toward the
home turf, toward Greenwood Avenue. They tried in vain to protect and
defend themselves, their families, and their community. Outnumbered and
underarmed, they were at once valiant and vanquished. (45)
As the African-American men ran back to their community to protect their loved ones,
large groups of white men obtained a later recorded $43,000 in guns and ammunition,
including nitroglycerin and kerosene bombs to be dropped from the air via planes. The
next morning, 15,000 whites attacked the center of the African-American community, the
Greenwood District (46). Many horrific memories were recorded of the event: truckloads
of African-American male corpses; one corpse being dragged behind a vehicle as if in
warning or as a trophy of the riot; the execution of an elderly African-American couple
after being ripped from their home; airplanes dropping fire bombs onto family’s homes
and businesses, setting them ablaze; and more (46-50). By the afternoon of June 1, 1921,
“Tulsa’s thriving, prosperous African-American community lay in ruins, leveled and
charred beyond recognition” (50).
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This terrible moment in American history is not as well known as the civil rights
movements of the 1950s and 60s. It is not as well known as Rosa Parks and the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Greensboro sit-ins, and Martin Luther King Jr. and the
Selma to Montgomery marches. One could speculate about many reasons for why this is,
such as the lack of press media or the absence of a change in policy following the event.
From a perspective that views politics as governmentality, as policy-making, or as the
distribution of rights, roles, and identities, Black Wall Street was a political failure. It did
not influence change—at least not initially. However, Rancière’s political thought
enables us to recognize Black Wall Street not as a political failure, as only a forgotten
community in history, but rather as a group continually practicing acts verifying the
equality of the African-American community in Tulsa. Even though the subjectification
they practiced—which in the eyes of many members of the white community was
nothing but violence to the social order and their accepted way of being—even though
this violence to the social order resulted in the dominant community’s response of
physical violence, this does not mean that the original verifications of equality were not
successful or that they did not occur. Subjectifications will not always lead to policy
change or cultural awareness. Sometimes a culture may not be ready to recognize that
equality and will only see dissensus. Responses to political dissensus can range from
confusion to violence. Sadly, in the case of Black Wall Street, the latter prevailed.
However, as Hannibal Johnson’s history shows, the traces of the verifications of
equality that the Black Wall Street Community practiced have not been forgotten. While
reparations for the atrocities that occurred in 1921 Tulsa are rightfully still being
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demanded, many activists, reinscribing the trace of equality in their ancestors and the
previous inhabitants of the Greenwood area, continue to practice politics and to make
heard what has been forgotten in the Tulsa area. I would not be writing this chapter, if not
for these traces. These traces have resulted in structures such as the Greenwood Cultural
Center (123), a product of what Hannibal Johnson calls the renaissance and regeneration
of Black Wall Street, which continues to this day.10
In closing, I want to reiterate that one way in which the ethics of community I
articulate in chapter 3 can be employed is through politics (another way is through
pedagogy, as I articulate in chapter 5). However, an ethics that sees affirmation of a
higher quality of human life occurring through taking seriously equality and singularity
cannot be advocated through paradigms that require hierarchical observation and
normalization; such a politics of equality and singularity, as I see it, can only be produced
through acts of subjectification, and their result will be dissensus of the dominant social
order. Though not conceived in these terms, it is no doubt one of the reasons writing that
disrupts unity appears to thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy (Sense of the World 88-93;
103-22) as a form of politics (as well as rhetoricians such as Diane Davis, Victor Vitanza,
Pat Gehrke, and other rhetorical theorists interested in Nancy’s work). My caveat is that
such writing and communication is not always political. Such acts of writing
compositions of disunity can be political; however, to enact politics, they require an act
of dissensus occurring in direct connection with a verification of the condition that even
makes it possible for communication and composition to occur—the presupposition of
the equality of human intelligences.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RECONSIDERING DIGITAL SAMPLING RHETORICS
FOR THE COMPOSITION CLASSROOM THROUGH AN ETHICS OF
COMMUNITY
I begin with an analogy: teaching research-based argumentation and
critique in composition studies is like learning how to perform hip-hop
music.
Jeff Rice
While I see value in both Rice’s and Sirc’s arguments in favor of the
ability to play freely in texts and techniques in the writing classroom, . . .
the mixtape as rhetorical practice offers composition pedagogy and digital
writing theory far more than a whimsical pursuit of the cool.
Adam Banks
The vulnerable is not the same as the killable. The latter stands poised
between death and life, the former between the wound and healing care.
Adriana Cavarero
For it is certainly easier to create without answering for life . . . .
Mikhail Bakhtin
In chapter 3, I construct the beginnings of an ethics of community. My ethics of
community contrasts the ethical thought of rhetorical theorists who have, in essence,
argued for an ethics of community built upon radical inclusivity, such as those drawing
upon the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy and his notion of community. Though I still reflect
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upon and apply much of Nancy’s thought to my own, I argue that ethics like his privilege
recognizing relationality and absolute inclusivity as inherent values in and of themselves
rather than as temporal means to affirm a higher quality of human life, a value I see
informing the very appeal of the radical inclusivity he and others endorse. It is to Roberto
Esposito I turn to discover that this affirmation of the quality of human life occurs
through both communal sharing and protective immunities—not solely one over the
other, as other theorists of community have situated radical inclusivity in relation to
exclusivity. Once this precedence is acknowledged, one can quickly perceive situations
where an absolute ethics of inclusivity, while productive in most cases, might actually put
the affirmation of the quality of human lives in danger of erasure—particularly for groups
of people and communities on the margins of a social order. By groups on the margins, I
am thinking of people on the lower ends of power relations dominated by those identified
as white, male, heterosexual, abled, etc. Should an ethics of community ask such
marginalized communities to accommodate those in power absolutely? The short answer
is no. In fact, I discuss a community in such a situation, Black Wall Street, in chapter 4: a
community whose practices of exclusivity temporarily affirmed a higher quality of life of
the members of that community by protecting them within the decidedly racist context of
early twentieth century Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Thus, my ethics of community is concerned with the affirmation of a higher
quality of human life. In acknowledging this value as preceding inclusivity, or the
recognition of relationality, I discover ethical values that pertain to how we might better
share and protect the quality of human life in ways that enable communities to practice
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treating those within and those outside a community in a manner that enables singular
beings to live meaningful lives—this includes having some control over the shape of
one’s life. This, rather than a life whose meaning is solely determined by another’s
influence—something I consider intolerable. The ethical values that I believe better
enable this relative control over communities’ or persons’ lives are equality and
singularity. Rather than an ethics of community built upon absolute inclusivity, which I
also critique as impossible and at times unethical, my ethics of community sees the
affirmation of a higher quality of human life occurring through taking seriously Jacques
Rancière’s concept of equality and Adriana Cavarero’s care for singularity, which I
discuss in relative depth in chapter 3.
In chapter 4, I suggest that one way this ethics can be advocated in social spaces
is through political action, and I continue to rely heavily on the thought of Jacques
Rancière to articulate how this political action takes place. A politics of community that
is based upon equality and care for singularity, following Rancière, cannot be
institutionalized; it is not a system for better distributing rights of citizenship or
ownership (though it can inform such systems). Rather, it is a bottom-up politics that is
enabled in momentary acts verifying one person’s equality with another’s in a context
where a person was not previously counted as an equal among the social order’s
distributions of meaning. My examples include Coy Mathis, a transgender girl using the
“girls’ bathroom” in defiance of the Colorado state school system’s distribution of gender
assignments; Jack Baker and Michael McConnell, the first gay couple to register for a
wedding license in the United States, when neither the state of Minnesota nor the country

177

at-large recognized gay marriage; and Black Wall Street, an African American
community in early twentieth century Tulsa whose members built a thriving community
and defied the inequality established by segregation laws and customs in Oklahoma. To
the verifiers of equality, these acts are ones of subjectification, where one who was not a
recognized subject of the social order becomes recognized as an equal subject, even if
this act of recognition is by a few, including him- or herself. To those who dominate the
social order, such political acts appear as dissensus or decategorization, because the
system of meaning the social order relies on does not have the means to recognize the
person or community as an equal.
Finally, in this chapter, I perform a bit of an about-face by deliberately turning a
portion of this ethics of community toward pedagogical application. While I dedicate
chapter 4 to Rancière’s political thought, here I extend Cavarero’s notion of care for
singularity to see how a major element of the ethics of community I establish in chapter 3
might be applied to the multimodal composition classroom. This split (Rancière in
chapter 4 and Cavarero in chapter 5) is more of a rhetorical move made out of an
exigency for clarity and applicability to specific sites of struggle (politics and pedagogy)
than it is necessary for explication in totality of the application of my ethics of
community: care for singularity obviously plays a role in verifying one’s equality with
another, and subjectification would seem to be a requirement to care for another’s
singularity; however, for this chapter I want to speak to a very popular topic currently
being discussed in rhetoric and composition studies—digital sampling—on which I see
the values on singularity I develop from Cavarero’s thought having a particular impact. I
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try to make connections back to Esposito and Rancière in places where the connection is
not obvious; otherwise, I devote most of this chapter to the problems of digital sampling
that I see Cavarero’s thought informing. A significant explanation of this exigency is no
doubt in order.
Recently, a college student in Detroit was suspended for writing an essay about
his creative writing instructor titled, “Hot for Teacher.” In the essay, he described his
teacher as “stacked” and compared her to the character Ginger in the 1960s sitcom
Gilligan’s Island. In response to the assignment, which was to “write honestly and that no
topic was off limits,” the student freely associated his instructor, Gilligan’s Island, and
the once-popular Van Halen song, also titled, “Hot for Teacher” (White). While this
assignment was for a creative writing course, I open with this brief anecdote because
versions of such “limitless” writing assignments are being advocated for use in the
multimodal composition classroom. Scholars more attune to the inventive strengths of the
associative rhetorical strategies found in the digital sampling and remixing practices of
hip-hop and other artistic practices that employ sampling, such as DJing, have made
limitless invention criteria a particular focus their work. Other thinkers have countered
this idea by demonstrating how these digital sampling and remixing choices are actually
informed by a complex awareness of communal difference and cultural histories. The
latter position has critiqued the former as potentially endorsing naïve cultural
appropriation at best, and at worst implicitly endorsing the production of racist, sexist,
and homophobic content. Thus, in sum, there is a dynamic range of positions regarding
how to approach digital sampling and remixing in the multimodal classroom. On one side
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there are the pedagogies most concerned with invention, artistry, and enabling students to
create at a moment’s notice; on the other hand are those pedagogies warning that such
free play in digital sampling is problematic when considered in light of many of the
important ethical and cultural concerns historically associated with rhetoric and
composition studies.
My initial reaction is to posit that this latter position is more persuasive. However,
there are incredibly powerful benefits to both arguments, incompatible though they may
appear to be at first glance. My purpose in this chapter is to show that they are not
completely incompatible, and that, as composition instructors, we can bring both
positions into the classroom to help our students produce inventive and ethical
multimodal compositions without dogmatically prescribing ethical norms to them. To do
this, I explain some of the logics of the main proponents of these positions and then,
drawing on feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero, I offer a heuristic of vulnerability
that rehabilitates the free association stance with the ethical concerns its respondents have
brought to bear—ethical concerns in line with those I articulated in chapter 3, which also
should have resonance with the concerns of chapter 4. In brief, this heuristic asks students
and scholars to account for and justify their acts of sampling and remixing in terms of
wounding or caring for the people and communities who took part in the creation of the
sampled-from compositions.
A review of some of multimodal rhetoric and composition studies’ most
prominent thinkers—such as Jeff Rice, Cynthia Selfe, and Anne Wysocki—suggests that
more emphasis on associative rhetorics needs to take place in the composition classroom.
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By associative rhetorics I broadly mean rhetorical practices that privilege juxtaposition,
collage, montage, and other nonlinear compositional acts over or at least equal to more
conventional argumentation practices of using claims, evidence, and other cause-andeffect logics seen in five-paragraph and other conventional academic genres. These
associative rhetorics often draw attention in their presentation to all the available means
of invention and persuasion that took and take part in the production and presentation of a
particular rhetorical act. This attention includes pointing out the various historical and
cultural considerations, human and non-human elements, especially those in relation to
digital media. One example of these types of associative rhetorics can be found in the
collage, whether considered as medium and/or trope. As a form of research writing the
collage draws both explicit and implicit attention to the texts, images, and media that not
only took part in the creation of the text; it also presents them as part of the text.1
There are many justifications for advocating the teaching of associative
multimodal rhetorics in the composition classroom: maintaining the relevancy of
composition studies in a world where traditional print literacies are being dominated by
less-constrained multimedia texts (Selfe, “Students Who Teach Us”; Multimodal
Composition); the appeal of democracy found in allowing students “multiple modalities
of expression, multiple and hybrid ways of knowing, communicating, and establishing
identity” (“Movement of Air” 617); the increased capability for more student-to-student
and teacher-to-student collaboration and a renewed interest in the writer’s relation to the
materiality of media (Wysocki, “Sticky Embrace of Beauty”); as well as to challenge the
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grand narratives in the history of composition while inventing new theories and practices
to resist and even supplant formalist writing pedagogies (Rice, Rhetoric of Cool).
Whether this emphasis on associative multimodal rhetorics is meant to replace,
subvert, or supplement more conventional argumentative rhetorics, the practice of
sampling—more popularly, digital sampling—seems to be a perfect fit for this type of
rhetorical composition. As I discuss below, Rice is one of the rhetoric and composition
scholars advocating this practice.
In his book Rhythm Science, Paul D. Miller, also known as the writer, musician,
and artist DJ Spooky that Subliminal Kid, defines sampling as “a new way of doing
something that’s been with us for a long time: creating with found objects. The rotation
gets thick. The constraints get thin. The mix breaks free of the old associations. The script
gets flipped. The languages evolve and learn to speak in new forms, new thoughts” (25).2
Positing that “there is no such place as an ‘immaculate perception,’” Miller sees
creativity in “how you recontextualize the previous expression of others” (33). One of
Miller’s goals is to expose academic discourses to the sampling and remixing art of the
DJ. He maintains that the DJ is an archetype of contemporary artists and writers who use
multimedia, in that the DJ’s ability to create art is contingent upon an embrace of
technologies that can reproduce sounds and video from previous works through sampling
and remixing: “DJ-ING IS WRITING/WRITING IS DJING” (56). Along with the
emphasis on artistic invention, other scholars have noted that the practice of sampling,
under a broad umbrella of hip-hop culture, has been and can be used as a rhetorical
means of political resistance to dominant societal norms of ownership, including those of
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language, identity, and property (e.g., see Alim; Alim and Pennycook; Alim, Lee, and
Carris; Banks; Pennycook).
Of course, viewing writing as the sampling, remixing, and recontextualizing of
others’ works is not necessarily a completely new idea for those scholars familiar with
the works of Roland Barthes or Mikhail Bakhtin,3 thinkers that challenged modern
notions of authenticity and authorial creativity in their critiques by positing an always
present excess of historicity preceding and surrounding the meaning of any written or
spoken utterance. While this by no means equates in totality to what a DJ does, perhaps
this is one of the reasons sampling as a means of multimodal rhetoric has found
legitimacy in composition studies. As I mention above that Jeff Rice is one of the more
prominent scholars at the forefront of advocating sampling as an associative rhetorical
practice in the multimodal composition classroom. Provocatively for some readers, Rice
draws on the history and practices of hip-hop music to situate the relevancy and
effectiveness of teaching sampling practices in the writing classroom.

Sampling as a Strategy for Rhetorical Invention and Analysis
In The Rhetoric of Cool, Rice challenges conventional histories and pedagogies of
composition, which find their tradition and purpose in a stable, linear, and continuous
story (13-17). Like Victor Vitanza (see Negation), Rice draws on Jean-François
Lyotard’s criticism of “grand narratives” and Foucault’s critique of the history of
thought’s reliance on stable structures, to problematize composition studies’ history and
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to argue for histories and pedagogies of composition that include engagements with
discontinuity. From Foucault:
Rather than seeking the permanence of themes, images, and opinions
through time, rather than retracing the dialectic of their conflicts in order
to individualize groups of statements, could one not rather mark out the
dispersion of the points of choice, and define prior to any option, to any
thematic preference, a field of strategic possibilities? (The Archeology of
Knowledge 37; qtd. in Rhetoric of Cool 15)
Rice sees Lyotard’s and Foucault’s arguments, or what Rice will call the “postmodern
move” (15) as an impetus to write alternative histories of composition studies. If a history
of a field necessarily affects the current way the field works, then these alternate histories
enable Rice and other composition scholars to work against the status quo of formalist
writing practices (8-10) and produce alternative pedagogies that involve the production of
new media.4
While The Rhetoric of Cool maps out Rice’s larger theory and pedagogical
philosophy, it is in an earlier and not unrelated work, the influential article, “The 1963
Hip-Hop Machine: Hip-Hop Pedagogy as Composition,” that he sees the importance of
sampling in relation to contemporary writing practices. Specifically, his goal in this
article is to propose a “whatever-pedagogy,” advocating “a writing practice that models
itself after digital sampling’s rhetorical strategy of juxtaposition” (453). Rice, building
upon Houston Baker’s argument to approach English studies pedagogy through a hip-hop
lens, as well as Baker’s description of sampling, defines sampling as “the hip-hop process
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of saving snippets of prerecorded music and sound into a computer memory. These
sounds become cut from their original source and pasted into a new composition” (454).
Perhaps the most radical, productive, and also problematic element Rice adds to
this hip-hop pedagogy and to the art of sampling is the notion of “whatever.” The
“whatever” of Rice’s pedagogy comes from a few places: specific examples of popular
hip-hop music; popular, mainstream discourses; and Barthes’s notion of punctum in
connection with contemporary thinkers Gregory Ulmer, Geoffrey Sirc, Patricia Harkin,
and Victor Vitanza. Therefore, “whatever” for Rice stems from many places and means a
lot of things. First, Rice argues that, “‘take whatever you find and use it,’” is the principle
in hip-hop that “acts as the dominant force in sampling”: “Whatever is available to
composers (samplers) often includes TV shows, political speeches, past musical
recordings of a variety of genres, or any sound at all. Through the complex juxtaposition
of these isolated sounds, samplers construct new forms of meaning” (454). Rice then
goes on to cite examples of popular musicians, like Public Enemy and the Beastie Boys,
to show how their music was made through the sampling and remixing of others’ work.
He concludes that, based upon these and other examples of sampling, “hip-hop teaches
that cultural research and awareness produce composite forms of writing” (455).
The second element Rice associates with the “whatever” principle is how the term
whatever works in youth culture discourses as a word that “evokes not so much a lack of
response but either a sense that something has eluded the meaning of the response or
defiance, dismissal, and opposition” (455). To support this claim, Rice draws on the hip-
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hop star Redman’s song “Whateva Man,” determining the meaning of whatever in that
song to be “something indefinable, obscure, out of reach” (455).
The third element Rice defines whatever by is Roland Barthes’ concept of
punctum developed in Camera Lucida. Punctum is a reading practice similar to or in the
realm of what has been called “reader response.” In contrast to studium, which draws on
the political and cultural contexts to understand a film or image, a punctum reading
would acknowledge the excessive details isolated from those contexts that establish an
impactful, even avant-garde meaning for the reader or viewer. Since one of the ways
Barthes describes punctum is as “the anything whatever, the sophisticated acme of value”
(Camera Lucida 34; qtd. with emphasis in Rice 456), Rice is able to sample and remix
punctum as whatever. This enables him to see his whatever-centered pedagogy as a
“[challenge to] conventional reading practices” because it privileges “cutting a detail
from its original source and recontextualizing it within a different setting” (456). He
notes that such a notion of whatever (or punctum), which takes into consideration the
excess of meaning emanating from any juxtaposition of reader and text, is particularly
useful in our digital age. If a punctum reading exposes the excess of meaning in a
composition, then a “whatever” composition would intentionally use those excesses to
create meaning. Drawing on Ulmer, Rice advocates a “whatever-pedagogy” as an
alternative to conventional composition practices: “in contemporary culture, elusive
meanings abound as the emerging, electronic tools of expression rapidly alter discourse
in general. Print culture’s linear, nonassociative methods of reasoning break down in an
electronic realm where cutting and pasting guide communication” (456).
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The fourth attribute Rice wants to incorporate into his whatever-centered
pedagogy is the classroom “whatever,” for which he draws on Patricia Harkin’s
“Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures As an Articulation Project,” and Victor Vitanza’s
response to it. In brief, Harkin worries that when students meet difficulty or contradiction
in their research, they will respond with a “whatever” attitude. Harkin sees this as a
challenge to be overcome. In contrast, Vitanza sees the “whatever” attitude as a heuristic
opportunity, enabling students to “[reinvent] by way of ‘whatever’” to create
compositions that otherwise would be excluded in conventional writing genres (“Seeing
in Third” 173; qtd. in Rice 458).
In sum, a whatever-centered pedagogy would consist of the four following
elements: (1) a methodology privileging taking whatever one can find and using it; (2) a
defiant, dismissive, and/or oppositional critique of and (3) alternative to conventional
methods of discovery and composition—in particular this alternative method looks for
the excess meaning in a composition; and (4) a pedagogical lens that would see such acts
of defiance and dismissal in the classroom as teaching and invention opportunities. After
describing these main elements of a whatever-pedagogy, Rice claims to put this
perspective in practice by applying the logic of this pedagogy in the article itself.
Sampling and remixing descriptions of the photographic images of Gordon Parks and
Leonard Freed, the record covers and sounds of Blue Note Records and James Brown,
and the method of African-American artist Romare Bearden, Rice makes the argument
that “information technology informs power relations at the levels of race and class,” and
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that this argument emerged from the practice of juxtaposition rather than through a more
conventional model of argumentation, such as Stephen Toulmin’s (465).
Earlier in this chapter I posit that Rice’s whatever-pedagogy applied to sampling
is radical, productive, and problematic. I have already explained how Rice views it as a
radical alternative to conventional composition pedagogies and more conventional
argumentation strategies. Barring a response from Toulmin scholars who might argue that
Toulmin’s model of argumentation was originally intended for analytic purposes rather
than a heuristic for invention, or that the values of a “whatever logic” could easily be
subsumed under what counts as data or warrants for certain field variants, I agree that
Rice’s whatever-pedagogy and research methodology are a radical departure—at least
from how composition instructors have traditionally and broadly taught argumentation.
However, is this pedagogy actually productive in classroom settings? And what might be
its negative effects?
Rice is not alone in promoting such sampling practices in the composition
classroom. Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart Selber, Geoffrey Sirc, as well as Mickey
Hess, and more, also have been influential in promoting a sampling methodology for
multimodal writing instruction and practice, and note successes in teaching it. Yet with
new methodologies come critiques. Adam Banks, drawing on Carmen Kynard’s
“Wanted: Some Black Long Distance Writers,” notes that “trying to scratch or sample the
practices of the DJ, MC, or hype-wo/man in Hip Hop and drop them into our scholarship
without thorough, searching attention to the discursive and rhetorical traditions from
which they emerge” is “foolishness” (Digital Griots 13). Here he seems to be most
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critical of the “take whatever you can find and use it” method that Rice and others
promote.5 Banks argues that such “isolated sampling or ripping” risks problematic
cultural appropriation “if we somehow build our theorizing on individual practices
without full recognition of the people, networks, and traditions that have made these
practices their gift to the broader culture” (13). Nicole McFarlane goes further by
maintaining that when students sample without an awareness of the socio-political
contexts from which the sampling and remixing borrow and appropriate, they are more
likely to uncritically “deliver assignments with sexist, homophobic, and/or racist,
content” (“Digital Memory and Narrative”).
Now Banks’s and McFarlane’s similar concerns that unchecked or uninformed
associative sampling rhetorics (in particular, those modeling the DJ and hip-hop) may
result in uncritical cultural appropriation or worse, namely explicit heterosexism, sexism,
or racism, are important and valid concerns. It is addressing these concerns that is the
focus of this article. In my own teaching experiences I have found evidence that
uncritical, or “isolated” sampling practices motivated by a “take whatever you can find
and use it” method can produce uncritical and even harmful results, in and out of the
classroom, unless supplemented directly with certain ethical frameworks. However, it
should be noted that research methods informed by a whatever logic also bring to the
forefront concerns about assessment, in particular those related to aesthetics. For
example, while a “take whatever you can find and use it” method enables students to
experiment freely under the auspices of lower stakes, how can a teacher rightly judge or
inform them of what is “good” or “effective” composition? Most of us do not have the
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ethos of an art or music historian. Of course, this is part of the point of such a whateverbased method—it challenges our traditional notions of assessment. But do we really want
our students’ creations to model after Hearst Castle, or parallel unfettered capitalist
consumption ideologies? For a full-fledged investigation of aesthetic and assessment
concerns in teaching multimodal composition as avant-garde art (such as collage,
montage, etc.), see Patricia Suzanne Sullivan’s Experimental Writing in Composition.
Sullivan exposes many of the benefits and problems in projecting the identity of avantgarde artist onto our students.
Nevertheless, for this chapter, I am more interested in the ethical problems that
can arise as a result of employing a whatever-pedagogy in the multimodal composition
classroom and how instructors might anticipate and address those issues. Some students
in my own classes have created some questionable material following a whatever logic.
Most of the “whatever” projects that are frustrating are those by students that, given the
license to “take whatever you can find and use it,” literally take the first 10 trivial things
they find on the Internet and attempt to make a multimodal composition from those
things in order to fulfill the assignment requirements. A greater (though not necessarily
unproductive) challenge can be when students follow the logic to make a historically
inaccurate argument or one charged with sexism, racism, or other prejudices. One
student, not unlike comedian Jon Stewart’s mimicking of Glenn Beck, though minus all
of the irony, juxtaposed images, sounds, and video of Barack Obama and his policies
next to and over images and video of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. Straight-faced, this
student proceeded to make an argument about the apocalyptic consequences of electing
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Obama—not unlike those arguments of Glenn Beck or other fear-mongering radio or
cable television news pundits. Though it was not this student’s intent, the implied
excesses of this presentation had racist overtones. I revisit this experience later in this
chapter to show how the students responded to this presentation.
Of course, employing a whatever logic outside of the classroom can also produce
unethical consequences. David Hesmondhalgh, in his influential article, “Digital
Sampling and Cultural Inequality,” raises some of these broader cultural concerns of
unconstrained digital sampling. He draws from legal studies and media studies to
question the problems of “cultural borrowing” inherent in digital sampling practices. Not
unlike writing scholars like Rebecca Moore Howard, or Johnson-Eilola and Selber, who
advocate for plagiarism policy reform, Hesmondhalgh acknowledges that copyright laws
that view digital sampling without permission from the original creator as unlawful often
discourage the creative and political powers of African American and other marginalized
groups, which have historically employed sampling techniques to produce music and
other artistic compositions. However, using as a case study the problems of international
music star Moby’s sampling and remixing of African-American musicians like Bessie
Jones and Vera Hall on Moby’s album Play, Hesmondhalgh resituates the issue by
demonstrating how less constraints on digital sampling laws can also increase the
already-present unequal dynamics that privilege dominant groups in a power relation.
Moby’s 1999 Album Play samples and remixes a number of current and past
African-American musicians. As Hesmondalgh explains, “one track makes use of a
sample from a more recent hip hop record, another of a 1943 gospel hit, and other tracks
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make use of live singers and choirs who perform in styles associated with AfricanAmerican music (mainly gospel)” (57). However, the most praised and controversial
samples are those taken from Alan Lomax’s field recordings, which can be heard in a
compilation of his recordings called, Sounds of the South. As Hesmondhalgh notes, these
field recordings are only used on three of the eighteen songs on the album; however, what
is significant for Hesmondhalgh is that Moby’s use of these particular samples received
considerable attention and praise by music critics, while the African-American musicians
sampled initially received little to no credit and “very little compensation for their work”
(57-8). I encourage scholars of digital rhetorics to read Hesmondhalgh’s entire article. He
explains the many complexities of digital sampling copyright, and his analysis of Moby’s
use of sampling on the ablum Play brings to mind the kinds of questions we should be
asking in our own multimodal compositions that draw on digital sampling practices—
questions that interrogate how other cultures, traditions, and people are being represented
and acknowledged in our remixes, and questions that ask “why certain, highly partial,
representations of these traditions and peoples are especially privileged in the musical
and interpretative practices of the white western mainstream” (57). Since someone with
Moby’s prestige and access to power is able to more easily take whatever he can find and
use it to produce art, publish it, and present it to an audience of millions, giving him
further license to digitally sample from anywhere and any person or group can actually
work against the interests of marginalized groups’ political and artistic interests.
Hesmondhalgh’s critique is important: put into Rice’s terms and bringing the
discussion back into the composition classroom, might a whatever-pedagogy unfettered
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by ethical questions actually contribute to the perpetuation of white privilege that is
already well under way in the U.S. higher education system?6 My answer: yes, but it does
not have to. Banks argues that rather than teach the sampling practices advocated by Rice
and others, in which he sees the risk of “isolated ripping,” composition instructors should
follow what he deems to be the values of a “digital griot.” Banks describes griots as a
combination of “storytellers, preachers, poets, standup comics, DJs, and even everyday
people [who] all carry elements of the traditional griot’s role in African American
culture”—a multifaceted role Banks describes as equal parts historian, social critic,
archivist, entertainer, and cultural interpreter (Digital Griots 25). Adding “digital” to this
identity, Banks shows how the griot’s role persists and is important in our multimedia
age. He argues that some of the values of the digital griot include the ability to
demonstrate
-

knowledge of the traditions and cultures of his or her community (is grounded
deeply in those traditions, and can “tell it”);

-

the technological skills and abilities to produce in multiple modalities;

-

the ability to employ those skills for the purposes of building community and/or
serving communities with which he or she is aligned;

-

awareness of the layered ethical commitments and questions involved in serving
any community;

-

the ability to “move the crowd”—that is, use those traditions and practices and
technologies for the purposes of persuasion. (26)
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Now some of Banks’s goals appear to be audience specific, that is, in places he
articulates that he his “grounding a discussion of digital ethics for African Americans in a
theoretical frame . . . that would encourage black people to make use of technological
systems and tools” toward progressive political and ethical goals (123). I also understand
that one of his aims in Digital Griots is to increase the awareness of multimodal theorists
and instructors, in particular how sampling and practices related to it are rooted deeply in
historically black music and story-telling traditions. However, I think any multimodal
composition instructor would love to see the set of goals Banks articulates (see above)
emerge in his or her students’ work, especially in a course that draws heavily on practices
of digital sampling. In other words, the ethos of the digital griot, as Banks describes it, is
a model we should help our students work toward becoming. However, I also know that
our students come into the composition classroom with varying degrees of knowledge,
skill, and self-confidence regarding their writing abilities. As bell hooks notes, students
often find engaging in critical pedagogies “difficult, frightening, and very demanding”
(53). This is one of the great strength’s of Rice’s methodology. It enables students to
envision themselves as potentially great writers no matter their background and
experience, and it does not hold them to the sometimes overwhelming and even
paralyzing standards of paying due “attention to the discursive and rhetorical traditions”
from which they sample (13), let alone considering themselves “grounded deeply”
enough in their own traditions that they feel authorized to “tell it” (27) as Banks puts it.
So can we get from one to the other? I think we can, and for the remainder of this chapter
I describe and suggest a heuristic for ethical invention that enables students to see their
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digital sampling practices through a lens that finds political and ethical value in acts of
caring and wounding. I call this heuristic, a heuristic of vulnerability and the type of
ethics it helps discover and enact, a rhetorical ethics of community, which by now the
reader should know is concerned with the affirmation of the quality of human life through
equality and care for singularity.
Now, as David Foster argues, notions and tropes of community simultaneously
have been endorsed and vilified in composition studies (“Community and Cohesion”). As
I have established in previous chapters, by a rhetorical ethics of community, I am by no
means promoting nostalgic notions of unity, cohesion, or commonality as ethical values
that should be endorsed in absolute in the classroom. I agree with Carrie Shively
Leverenz that such notions can lead to the erasure of difference (“Peer Response in the
Multicultural Composition Classroom”). Rather, this ethics of community speaks to the
verification in a presupposition of equality, as articulated by Rancière (see chapters 3 and
4). This ethics of community also speaks to feminist ethics of care articulated by
composition scholars like Gesa Kirsch and Joy Ritchie: “Unlike rule-bound ethics,
‘caring’ requires one to place herself in an empathetic relationship in order to understand
the other’s point of view” (“Beyond the Personal” 21); it speaks to the elements of the
respect for the difference of others (singular beings and communities) advocated by
Jacqueline Jones Royster (“When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own”); and of
course, this ethic of community would, then, find value in maintaining “our collective
responsibility for the physical lives of one another,” as Judith Butler writes (Precarious
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Life 30), as well as a collective responsibility for the social lives of others—in terms of
equality.7
I see the combination of these ethical positions as potential first steps in
developing, and not inconsistent with, a complex and mature ethos like that of Banks’s
digital griot. In many ways I am calling for a reconsideration, reapplication, and revision
of some the feminist ethics of care (I mention above) in respect to practices of digital
sampling. In fact, as I state in the introduction of this chapter, the heuristic of
vulnerability I describe below, which enables these ethics to be put into practice, stems
from contemporary feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero’s notion of vulnerability. I
suggest that this heuristic of vulnerability, in helping students develop such an ethic of
care, can help bridge the seeming incompatibility of Rice’s and Banks’s digital sampling
rhetorics and pedagogies. Specifically, this heuristic works by enabling our students to
start from a rhetorical sampling methodology of “take whatever you can find and use it”
and still work toward a digital griot ethos, so that students might begin to display an
“awareness of the layered ethical commitments and questions involved in serving any
community” (26).

A Heuristic of Vulnerability for Digital Sampling Ethics: Caring or Wounding?
In Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence, one of Adriana Cavarero’s
prominent aims is to distinguish horror from terror. For Cavarero, horror is not the same
thing as terror, which “moves bodies, drives them into motion. [Terror’s] sphere of
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reference is that of a menace to the living being, which tries to escape by fleeing. This
menace is directed, substantially, at life itself: it is a threat of violent death. He who is
gripped by terror trembles and flees in order to survive, to save himself from a violence
that is aiming to kill him” (5). In contrast, “horror does not concern imminent death from
which one flees, trembling, but rather the effects of a violence that labors at slicing, at the
undoing of the wounded body and then the corpse, at opening it up and dismembering it”
(12). While one might interrogate and even argue with this differentiation, I am more
interested in one of the concepts Cavarero says is key in understanding how horror is
invoked: vulnerability. Her concept of vulnerability has enabled me to develop a heuristic
I suggest can help scholars, instructors, and students begin composing with Rice’s
“whatever” methodology for digital sampling practices and work toward the kind of
multimodal ethos Adam Banks describes as embodying a digital griot.
Drawing on the works of Hannah Arendt, Judith Butler, and even Thomas
Hobbes, Cavarero posits that one of the ontological characteristics of being human is
vulnerability. Following up her work in For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy
of Vocal Expression, in which she maintains that voice is the primary characteristic that
expresses a singular person’s uniqueness and necessary relation to others (as I discuss in
chapter 3), Cavarero adds vulnerability as an additional characteristic of uniqueness and
relationality: “If, as Hannah Arendt maintains, everyone is unique because, exposing
herself to others and consigning her singularity to this exposure, she shows herself such,
this unique being is vulnerable by definition” (20-21). Not unlike Jean-Luc Nancy’s
notion of “being singular plural,” which posits that no person exists separate from his or

197

her relations to other being,8 Cavarero rejects ontologies of individualism, which
“[refuse] to admit dependency and relationship” (21). She argues that each human being
is still unique and singular, but that each person’s uniqueness and singularity is
constituted in concert with the constant relational exposure to difference and dependency
upon others. Just as no human’s voice is identical to another’s (see chapter 3), no two
humans’ lifetimes of vulnerable exposures to others are identical.
By designating vulnerability as an ontological category, Cavarero means that part
of what makes a human being a human being is that throughout life, “the singular body is
irremediably open” to two responses: “wounding and caring” (Horrorism 20). Not only
are no two persons’ vulnerable exposure to others identical, the degree to which one is
vulnerable to others also changes depending upon one’s circumstances. In other words,
though humans are always vulnerable, context governs the degree to which we can be
wounded and the degree to which we require care.
Even though, as bodies, vulnerability accompanies us throughout our
lives, only in in the newborn, where the vulnerable and the defenseless are
one and the same, does it express itself so brazenly. The relation to the
other . . . in this case takes the form of a unilateral exposure. The
vulnerable being is here the absolutely exposed and helpless one who is
awaiting care and has not means to defend itself against wounding. Its
relation to the other is a total consignment of its corporal singularity in a
context that does not allow for reciprocity. (20-21)
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As the above passage makes clear, “‘vulnerable’ and ‘helpless’ are not
synonymous terms” (30); vulnerability is irreducible to helplessness. One might say that
helplessness is the most extreme form of vulnerability. However, understanding
vulnerability through a theme of infancy (and thus helplessness) enables Cavarero to
theorize how just as our degree of vulnerability changes depending on the context, so too
can the “drastic alternative between violence and care” shift in degree and change in
character as an active response to someone else’s vulnerability. For example, “refraining
from wounding,” as Cavarero puts it, can be an act of care or violence, depending on the
degree of vulnerability of the person to whom one is responding. In the context of an
adult, the active response to wound or care may be the difference “between a hand that
strikes and one that does not rise to do so.” But if the vulnerable person is an infant, a
marginalized community, or an extremely sick person in one’s care, “the arresting of a
violent hand is not enough.” As Cavarero points out, in such cases “it is necessary that
the alternative inscribed in [the helpless person’s] primary vulnerability should also bring
into account a hand that cares, nourishes, and attends” (24). This lifetime of vulnerability,
in which the intertwining relationship between the degree of one’s vulnerability,
contingent circumstances, and responsive acts—redefined as either caring or wounding,
depending on those circumstances and the degree of vulnerability of the person acted
upon—is best summed up in the following passage:
As a body, the vulnerable one remains vulnerable as long as she lives,
exposed at any instant to vulnus [wound]. Yet the same potential also
delivers her to healing and the relational ontology that decides its
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meaning. Irremediably open to wounding and caring, the vulnerable one
exists totally in the tension generated by this alternative. As though the
null response—neither the wound nor the care—were excluded. Or as
though the absence of wound and care were not even thinkable. And yet
you might call that indifference, and even bless it, if it were just the
absence of wounding, whereas, if it were the absence of caring, we would
perhaps have to call it desolation. But exposure to the other that persists
over the arc of an entire life renders this absence improbable. In fact,
given that every human being who exists has been born and has been an
infant, materially impossible. (30)
While we, as human beings, are vulnerable throughout the entirety of our lives, and there
is no human who has never been vulnerable to another, the degree to which we are
vulnerable is contingent upon the circumstances we find ourselves in; thus, we are
“always vulnerable but only sometimes helpless, as contingency dictates and with a
variable degree of intensity” (31). Similarly we cannot escape responding to another’s
vulnerability to which we are exposed—even leaving someone alone is a response—and
the degree to which our response is one of wounding our caring is also contingent upon
circumstances.
Here is where I want to suggest a heuristic of vulnerability, based upon
Cavarero’s thought, for ethical practices of digital sampling rhetorics. No, I am not
equating sampling to the dismembering or disfiguring of vulnerable human bodies, which
Cavarero suggests is a mark of horror. In fact, as I will explain, in the practice of this
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heuristic of vulnerability for digital sampling, writers may find certain instances where
wounding can function as an act of caring, particularly if that act of wounding is an act of
symbolic violence to an oppressive social order’s distribution of the sensible, as Rancière
would put it. Still, just as there are differences between terror and horror for Cavarero,
there are differences between ignoring or erasing “the desires and material existence of
others,” in our scholarship and pedagogies (see Ratcliffe 40)9 and sampling from others
for purposes interested in the re-appropriation of meaning. While both practices are
problematic, and deserve the attention of our concerted thought and actions, I believe the
concept of vulnerability can make a particularly productive impact regarding how we
practice re-appropriation methods like digital sampling and remixing.
I suggest that when we use Rice’s whatever logic (“take whatever you can find
and use it”) for our own research and multimodal projects, or when we teach it as a
method of invention in the composition classroom, that we supplement this method with
a heuristic of vulnerability. Such a heuristic would view each composition students
sample as coming from or in relation to a vulnerable human being or community, and
would require the student to ask, “in my sampling and remixing of this work, am I
wounding or am I caring for the people who created the works I’m sampling from?”
AND “In my remixing of these works into a new composition, am I wounding or caring
for those who might be exposed to my own remix?” I believe such a heuristic enables
scholars and our students alike to work toward becoming more culturally conscious
multimodal writers—toward carrying an ethos like that of Banks’s digital griot. In
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essence, this heuristic works toward embodying an ethics of community as I have
articulated in chapter 3.
While in its essence such a heuristic of vulnerability sounds simplistic, it actually
has many layers. It also has no guarantees of leading to an ethics of community as I
envision above. Nevertheless, it does require students and teachers to attempt to
recognize and acknowledge our relationship between those from whom we take and those
to whom we give (potentially the same people) when we practice digital sampling; for to
ask the question, “am I wounding and/or am I caring?” requires that scholars and our
students ask a host of other questions regarding our actions, and it enables us to consider
additional concerns.
One concern is that to understand if I am practicing caring or wounding in my
acts of sampling and remixing, I must be able to identify or even address those people
from whom I am sampling. Whether I sample from a Martin Luther King Jr. speech,
footage of the Arab Spring, or a Westboro Baptist Church protest, asking this question
requires some research into various people or communities from which came the images
and sounds I have sampled. I have to ask, “where did this come from?” and “Who created
this work?” The problems of ethnography and of “speaking for others” are real, and
acknowledging for whom I am caring or wounding requires some acknowledged and
careful speculation and identification on my part—actions that expose my subject
position and open me up to responses of wounding and caring, as well, from fellow
scholars or classmates. And, of course, I must also presuppose that I am neglecting the
recognition of someone, even if unintentionally.
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An additional concern: I should be able to explain how my practice of sampling
and remixing is an act of caring or wounding, or perhaps both. As Cavarero argues, an act
of caring for one person may be an act of wounding for someone else, depending on the
degree of vulnerability, and the context in which my response takes place. Like the
previously mentioned concern, to address this problem requires additional research on my
part beyond discovering the names of those who composed the media from which I am
sampling. It also requires that I research (to the best of my ability and in the time
allowed) the cultural values of those people and communities, so I might understand why
my response could be an act of caring and/or one of wounding. Now realistically, no
student in one semester (let alone scholars) will ever be able to fully discover the totality
of the values of a community, particularly if he or she is not already a member of that
community. As such, attempting to discover these values and discern if my sampling and
remixing is an act of caring our wounding will require great empathy on my part. It
should be noted, however, that “empathy is not an unproblematic concept,” as Kirsch and
Ritchie have argued. Drawing upon Gregory Clark’s essay, “Rescuing the Discourse of
Community,” and others, Kirsch and Ritchie posit, “the complex power dynamics
between researcher and participants can undermine, threaten or manipulate” their
relationship, even if enacted through an expression of empathy. And while sampler and
samplee, as such, are very different than researcher and participant, the relationship can
all too easily be one governed by acts of manipulation and threat.
As such, my empathetic position should also theorize how what I think is care
may actually be an act of wounding. Of course, there are no perfect answers to these
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questions; however, this acknowledgement can help lead to discussions of cultural
appropriation, property ownership, identity construction, politics of (mis)representation,
and as the late Stuart Hall might say, the very real consequences of cultural
representation and signifying practices (“The Work of Representation”). The key in these
types of discussions, in my experience, is to move away from a sense of someone owning
a production, as we see in copyright law; in other words, we should move away from a
notion that is solely worried about who owns the product or “originally created it”
(though this should not be ignored), since this can take a person down an endless trail
searching for authenticity that may not exist; rather, this discussion should ask how my
sampling and remixing might affect certain persons, groups, or communities that have
taken part in the creation, reception, and previous meaning of a particular work.
Following Royster, such recognition requires a subject position that admits, “what we
think we see in places that we do not really know very well may not actually be what is
there at all” (614). In sum, this heuristic requires a multimodal composer to begin
developing the kind of self-reflexivity described in Catherine Fox's "The Race to Truth:
Disarticulating Critical Thinking from Whiteliness."
Fox promotes the notion of a "spirit of critical affirmation" where, as scholars and
teachers, we acknowledge our fixation with critiquing others' work and take part in more
self-reflexive processes (198). Though this practice of criticizing others is often done in
an attempt to enter into the academic conversation, and may stem from original intentions
worthy of merit, we often neglect applying this criticism to ourselves and our ideologies;
thus, we perpetuate a replacement of ideologies potentially as oppressive as those we
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criticize, prohibiting any goals we may have regarding social transformation for our
students. As Fox deduces, "there is nothing radical or transformative about supplanting a
conservative, hegemonic truth with a leftist, marginalized truth" (202).
Thus, in acknowledging that perhaps both caring and wounding are taking place I
have to ethically justify those actions. In other words, sometimes a digital sampler may
ironically find wounding to be appropriate for a particular political situation, and
negotiating such a claim can be tricky. For example, were I to cut and sample from
footage of the Westboro Baptist Church community’s funeral protests of gay and lesbian
lifestyles and then overlay it with loops of music and audio that implies a critique of the
Church’s actions, I would acknowledge that my sampling and remixing could easily be
construed as an act of wounding to that community. My perpetuation of this act would
need ethical and political justifications, in this case acknowledging my concerns for
equality of the Westboro Baptist Church’s targets and the problems of hate speech.
Hopefully I do this in a spirit of critical affirmation, as Fox explains. From a certain
perspective, I might argue that this act of wounding to one group is actually (or at least it
is my hope that it is) an act of caring for that group and for others. This justification, of
course, complicates the heuristic and ethic and hopefully leads to classroom discussions
about the problems of universal or foundational claims to morality, deontological and
consequential ethics, and perhaps even normative and descriptive ethics.
Just as important, I should consider how I am exposing my own vulnerability
(how might I be cared for or wounded?) in presenting my remix. As I note above, any
attempt to recognize and justify my practices of sampling and remixing also exposes my
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own vulnerabilities to critique from scholars, colleagues, and in the case of our students,
instructors and fellow classmates.10 Thus, a heuristic of vulnerability, while accounting
for potentially wounding or caring for another’s work, also can increase the critical
awareness of putting forth my own work to be sampled from and remixed by others. This
should also lead to discussions of the ethics and politics of researching social media sites
like Facebook (see McKee and Porter), the dissolution of the border between public and
private, systems of surveillance, and the practice of exposing our daily actions and
identification information on the Internet.
In explaining some of these concerns that students and scholars should ask
themselves when applying a heuristic of vulnerability to their practices of sampling and
remixing (in particular those that follow Rice’s whatever logic), I have suggested some of
the benefits of using a heuristic of vulnerability as a supplement to Rice’s whatever-based
method of invention: furthering practices of empathy, discussions of social construction,
and the acknowledgment of political and ethical consequences of rhetorical actions, to
name a few. There are additional benefits to supplementing a whatever logic with a
heuristic of vulnerability.
For one, a heuristic of vulnerability enables me as an instructor to avoid
didacticism. Rather than enforce my ethics of community or tell my students they are
wrong if they do not think a certain way, this heuristic requires them to continually ask
the kinds of questions necessary for developing or at least considering such an ethic. As
David Sheridan, Jim Ridolfo, and Anthony Michel make clear with their notion of the
“Kairotic Web” (68-9), there are so many elements that contribute in the constitution of

206

any multimodal composition, that encapsulating the specific ethical responsibilities of the
multimodal composer is difficult. This often seems to lead to a very unsure ethic: “What
is off limits one day is routine the next” (xvii):
In multimodal compositions, the whole exceeds the sum of the parts,
resulting in both challenges and new possibilities. Some of these
challenges concern a set of ethical considerations that emerge from
multimodal semiosis. Some of the potentials concern the reality that
culture itself is multimodal, as are the cultural products of identity and
consciousness. (xvii-xviii)
Thus, in the process of applying of a heuristic of vulnerability, students and
scholars might find themselves changing their minds regarding their own identifications
of wounding or caring; nevertheless, by putting the heuristic into practice, they will have
at minimum considered their ethical relation to some communities and cultures they
otherwise may have ignored or not known existed. Even in our “globalized” world of
multiculturalism I have learned not to be surprised when students are themselves
surprised to learn about the challenges of being in a group Antonio Gramsci would call
“subaltern,” such as the African American musicians participating in a predominantly
white punk-rock lifestyle, as depicted in the documentary Afropunk.
Another benefit is that there are multiple ways to practice pedagogically a
heuristic of vulnerability. An instructor might assign a digital sampling project that
endorses a “take whatever you can find and use it” methodology simultaneously with a
heuristic of vulnerability, in which the recognition of caring and wounding would
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immediately follow or actually be part of the remix. Alternatively, an instructor might
decide to present them as two different assignments where the heuristic follows the
sampling and remixing as a form of self-analysis and/or peer review. Personally, I
privilege the latter method because it enables the students to appreciate the differences
between the genres of sampling and traditional academic writing. As Mickey Hess points
out, the way one establishes credibility in sampling is quite different from ethos-building
in academic writing (282),11 and acknowledging one’s sources too explicitly in sampling
can actually damage one’s ethos.
In the case of the student who overdubbed images and video of the Nazis and
Hitler with sounds, images, and video of Barack Obama, I had added a version of the
heuristic to the assignment during peer review to encourage ethical considerations in the
students’ revisions of their remixes. As a result of peers’ comments, the student, while
maintaining the argument about the apocalyptic consequences of the Obama
administration, did end up acknowledging how the remix might be received negatively as
racist or anachronistic. Though no one in class felt comfortable during that presentation,
it was followed by a productive discussion of the problems in deciding what counts as
nationalism and patriotism, and how certain communities are continually privileged,
viewed as unequal, or even excluded and/or included within different definitions. Had the
heuristic been implemented when the digital sampling assignment was introduced, this
student may have made a completely different argument, and both the discomfort and the
productive discussion may not have occurred. This is a decision instructors have to make
depending on their own teaching styles, philosophies, and course goals. Discomfort is
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always a possibility when using a heuristic of vulnerability. Unlike expressivist
pedagogies that have also drawn on the term vulnerability, a heuristic of vulnerability
does not attempt to avoid “confrontations over social differences” and instead attempts to
learn from conflict and uncomfortable situations (see Jarratt 109).
Hopefully, practicing the heuristic in more formal settings leads to practicing it
outside the classroom and outside of scholarship. I consider the application of this
heuristic of vulnerability as a problem-based learning approach in which the students are
not given the answers to how they should ethically respond to others when sampling and
remixing; rather, it enables them to ask the right questions for developing such a
rhetorical ethic. Studies have shown that problem-based learning approaches can increase
students’ long-term memory of what they have learned, and can increase their tendencies
to apply and transfer the skills across disciplines (Barrows and Tamblyn). Thus, the
application of such a heuristic would hopefully lead to results similar to Hesmondhalgh’s
suggestions for musicians who engage in digital sampling, no matter what the current
copyright laws are:
I suggest that when recordings rely as enormously for their impacts on
sampling ‘other’ musics . . . musicians and others in the music business
should consider two sets of options. First, full and prominent credit should
be given to the sampled musicians and the musical traditions to which they
belong, giving indications of the cultural sources of the music, instead of
mystifying the origin of the track in interviews and elsewhere (such as
[Moby’s] misleading title ‘Natural Blues’). This would not require
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academic notes, merely some basic research. Second, musicians should
make strenuous efforts to establish ways of recompensing musicians, their
descendants, or representative organizations. (73)
Finally, a heuristic of vulnerability also works even if the assignment or research project
contains more specific constraints—in other words, a student or scholar does not need to
be employing a whatever logic for a heuristic of vulnerability to find value (though I
believe Rice’s logic does enable students to experiment and take important risks). For
example, if students are creating a community history website as described by Darold
Leigh Henson (see “Using the Internet as a Tool for Public Service”), a heuristic of
vulnerability would be equally beneficial, and ask of the web designer to consider his or
her articulations of a community’s history as acts of wounding and/or caring.
Some of my students have produced some very creative and powerful multimodal
compositions through digital sampling and remixing by supplementing Rice’s whateverbased method with a heuristic based upon Cavarero’s notion of vulnerability. One recent
student group produced a mockumentary-style video on the political battles regarding sex
education instruction in one of the group member’s very conservative home state.
Juxtaposing honest interviews with acted interviews, actual footage of the state’s
legislative and education institutions with loops of “sex education instruction” footage
from the films South Park, Mean Girls, Boy Meets World, and American Pie, this group
of students parodically endorsed an extremely conservative slippery-slope argument that
better sex education and access to contraception leads to rampant sexual promiscuity and
social irresponsibility.
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The group followed up this multimodal presentation with a self-analysis of their
own sampling choices, applying traditional rhetorical critique (appeals of ethos, pathos,
logos, etc.) with a version of a heuristic of vulnerability. They theorized that their use of
the footage from Hollywood was consistent enough with the message of those movies to
be an act of caring (though consistency does not equate to caring); however, they
attempted to express empathy for potentially wounding those people they interviewed
who were anti-sex education, as well as the type of characters they satirically depicted in
“fake interviews.” Originally finding ethical and political justification in these potential
acts of wounding (not unlike a Michael Moore film or a Daily Show interview), the group
elected to remove the actual interviews from their final revision. This subtractive choice
did not lessen the impact of their remix in the eyes of their peers, but strengthened it.

Conclusion
My larger purpose in this chapter has been to show how Jeff Rice’s “take
whatever you can find and use it” method for digital sampling can lead to the kind of
ethical and political concerns Adam Banks and others have raised. Arguably, Rice does
this himself, implicitly. A generous reading of Rice’s article, “The 1963 hip-hop
machine,” will recognize that Rice does not in totality follow his methodology of
“whatever,” which he says governs the sampling choices in hip-hop. While he does take
some “whatever” liberties in establishing the main properties of a whatever-based
pedagogy, when he “cuts,” “samples,” and “remixes” to make an argument about how
technologies influence race and power relations, largely to contest traditional print
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literacies, Rice shows the reader that an amount of cultural awareness, historical
knowledge, and an ethical framework were required to make his own argument.
To conclude this chapter, I have suggested that one way to help Rice’s and
Banks’s seemingly disconnected perspectives on digital sampling find connection is
through a heuristic of vulnerability that asks of scholars and students alike to account for
their free association sampling decisions through a lens of caring and wounding. Though
my intention in bringing together these disparate lines of thought has been one of caring
for each, I understand that I may have potentially wounded them and others, as well. In
sampling and remixing Jeff Rice’s, Adam Banks’s, and Adriana Cavarero’s different
ideas to address the exigencies I have brought to bear, there is always a chance for
misrepresentation, especially from my own privileged subject position (white and male).
Nevertheless, I have tried to care for all three by showing how we might set their ideas to
work with each other for productive classroom and research objectives. I have found
enormous power in all three thinkers’ theories and hope that I have communicated that
care and concern clearly, alongside a call to continue attempts at reconciling their
important works. Lastly, I acknowledge my own vulnerability in writing this chapter, and
hope that others will sample and remix my own work, applying a heuristic of
vulnerability to further enact ethics of community.
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NOTES

Introduction
1

“Mormon” is a colloquial term (for some people it is derogatory, for others it is

historically accepted) used to describe members of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints (LDS). LDS members believe in scripture in addition to the Bible, in
particular a text titled, The Book of Mormon.
2

Mormonism is broadly considered the culture of the LDS Church. See Mormon

historians like Richard Lyman Bushman for further examples of this delineation.
3

See Ornatowski and Bekin’s “What’s Civic about Technical Communication?” for

thought that is also skeptical of romanticizing of “community.”
4

For examples of this kind of scholarship that privileges consensus see Phyllis

Mentzell Ryder’s Rhetorics for Community Action, the edited collections The Handbook
of Community Practice, by Marie Weil, and Writing and Community Engagement,
Thomas Deans, Barbara Roswell, and Adrian J. Wurr’s Writing and Community
Engagement, Karyn Hollis’s “Desktop Publishing for Community and Social Justice
Organizations,” and even Joss Hands’s @ Is For Activism, though Hands’s treatment of
consensus is quite complex. Each of these are great texts, but each, ultimately, leaves the
concept of community unexamined.
5

Nancy himself points us in the direction of Heidegger and Georges Bataille for the

foundation of his thought.
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Chapter One
1

For other scholars who have followed Rueckert’s claim that A Rhetoric of Motives is

founded on the principle of identification, or who have implied that Burke’s thought in
general is founded on this concept, see also Ambrester; Biesecker; Briggs; Carpenter;
Davis Inessential; Day; Quigley; Rosenfeld; and Wright. I do not wish to conflate these
various scholars’ work. In fact, some of them are opposed to one another; however, each
of them make a reference (sometimes critical) to identification being the foundation of
Burke’s thought.
2

In 1992 Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin count over 200 critical essays in rhetorical

theory alone that have applied Burke’s thought (“A Feminist Perspective” 331).
3

More common are perspectives like Paul Stob’s (see “Kenneth Burke, John Dewey,

and the Pursuit of the Public”). Stob acknowledges Burke’s emphasis on identification to
be a constitutive rather than normative argument, but then still presents the concept as an
amelioratory aim of Burke’s, as well. Diane Davis, in Inessential Solidarity, also
criticizes Burke for privileging identification over difference, but she focuses on the
constitutive argument as well. There is more evidence for this position. Nevertheless, for
a persuasive counter-argument to both positions (that Burke privileged identification
constitutively and normatively), see Bryan Crable’s “Distance as Ultimate Motive,”
which I reference in this chapter. Crable posits that Burke actually saw difference and
distance preceding and thus necessary for identification to occur.
4

For a few examples of this scholarship, see how Roland Burkart applies Habermas’s

notions of consensus and understanding to public relations communication, and how Joss
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Hands employs Habermas’s notion of consensus to digital democratic activism; how Sun
Youzhong applies Dewey’s thought toward the development of a “global public”; how
Paul Stob applies both Burke’s and Dewey’s distinct but similar thought to argue for
language as a community builder and problem solver; and how Fraga-Cañadas employs
Wenger’s notion of communities of practice toward building communities of foreign
language teachers.
5

My own normative theory of community has some affinities with Clark’s, though it

will also depart significantly from it.
6

Davis acknowledges Michelle Ballif making this critique first in “Seducing

Composition.”
7

See also Agamben’s Homo Sacer and State of Exception; also, Esposito’s Immunitas

and Bios; and Cavarero’s Horrorism. Each of these texts is interested in problems of
community. Esposito’s Immunitas and Cavarero’s Horrorism each draw directly on
Nancy’s thought.
8

Nancy himself points us in the direction of Heidegger and Georges Bataille for the

foundation of this essay.
9

Scholars interested in Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrecht-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric

will also recognize this rhetorical tactic as dissociation.
10

See Janet Davis’s “Stasis Theory” for a clear and concise explanation of stasis

theory.
11

I write “even” here because Nancy devotes a great deal of attention to Bataille’s

community Acephale, and later in “The Confronted Community,” credits a current study
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of Bataille for motivating him to write the original essay, “The Inoperative Community”
itself.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  12	
  Locke believed that things of nature are given in common, but that what one
produces through one’s labor is one’s property, and that one’s property becomes part of
one’s being (see Second Treatise of Government 27, §44).	
  The idea of humans producing
their own essence can also be seen in Sartre’s notion that each individual can define his
or her own essence separate from deterministic causes (for examples of this argument,
see Existentialism is a Humanism). Nancy gives credit to Rousseau for being the “first
thinker of community” (9), but also criticizes Rousseau for lamenting a sense of loss for a
more perfect primordial community, which Nancy argues has never existed. Rousseau, of
course, advocates attempting to work to rebuild this primordial community. Though I do
not list him above, Hobbes, on the other hand, while similar to Rousseau and Locke in
some ways (of course, his thought preceded theirs), believed that community preceded
civil society. However, as Roberto Esposito and Werner Hamacher have pointed out,
Hobbes actually describes this community as one founded on absence—the renunciation
and transference of one’s rights to no one—making it uncontrollable and thus to be
feared. As a result Hobbes argues that the sovereign is the solution to this fear of an
absence of control of rights, which are then transferred to the sovereign to be able to bind
the community, or commonwealth, in the protection of those rights. (See Hobbes,
Leviathan; Esposito, Communitas 20-40; and Hamacher, “Justice and Language.”) 12 For
Marx, it is in human nature to produce; therefore, humans affirm their humanity through
producing. However, this production has to be free from alienation. According to Marx,
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alienation occurs when, because of capitalism, laborers no longer see themselves as
directing their own production. He argued that an unalienated community is a community
of those who are aware of and control their own production, thus producing their own
essence (see Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844; notes in class).	
  
13

Nancy is careful to preface his essay with a warning: though his critique implicates

many of the great political thinkers of modernity, from Marx to Sartre, his critique
remains “from the left,” which for him means, “that the political [for Nancy, this is the
place where community is], as such, is receptive to what is at stake in community”
(xxxvi-xxxvii). In other words, leftist politics are those that are concerned with
maintaining a place where community can exist.
14

See, in particular, “The Paradox of Purity” in Burke’s A Grammar of Motives 35-38.

15

While in The Inoperative Community Nancy addresses this mainly as a problem of

logic, he eventually articulates it as ontologically problematic, as well. However, he will
begin to refrain from using the term community to explain this phenomenon. See, for
example, The Sense of the World, Being Singular Plural, and “The Confronted
Community,” in particular.
16

Anasemia is a grammatological mode of invention Derrida discusses in

Dissemination (see 81, for example). For more on anasemia, see Gregory Ulmer’s
Applied Grammatology, where Ulmer describes it as the process of invention that begins
to put “the very notion of the proper and familiar…in question” through a “reversal of the
figurative-proper relation” (83).
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Chapter Two
1

This, of course, is one of the figures of liberalism Foucault genealogizes in The Birth

of Biopolitics.
2

Considering nonhumans as singularities is a line of thought Nancy will explore

further in The Sense of the World.
3

This singularity might be considered what Mikhail Bakhtin called a part of a

“mechanical whole” (“Art and Answerability” 1). From Bakhtin: “A whole is called
"mechanical" when its constituent elements are united only in space and time by some
external connection and are not imbued with the internal unity of meaning. The parts of
such a whole are contiguous and touch each other, but in themselves they remain alien to
each other” (“Art and Answerability” 1).
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  4	
  This seems to be interchangeable with the French term, “partage,” which means
“sharing out” or “sharing and dividing,” and which Nancy will continue to use in later
texts while basically abandoning the terms comparution and compearance. See
Armstrong 85, 107.	
  
5

“Being in common means that singular beings are, present themselves, and appear

only to the extent that they compear (comparaissent), to the extent that they are exposed,
presented, or offered to one another. This compearance (comparution) is not something
added on to their being; rather their being comes into being in it. Hence community does
not disappear. It never disappears. The community resists: in a sense, as I have said, it is
resistance itself. Without the compearance of being—or of singular beings—there would
be nothing, or rather nothing but being appearing to itself, not even in common with
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itself, just immanent Being immersed in a dense pearance (parence). The community
resists this infinite immanence. The compearance of singular beings—or of the
singularity of being—keeps open a space, a spacing within immanence” (58, original
emphasis).
6

Nancy will refer to this as the “groundless ground” (Inoperative Community 27).

7

One of the reasons I apply Todd May’s notion of practices, other than the fact that it

is a sound theory, is because it does not presuppose individuals as autonomous beings.
Other “practices” theorists, like Etienne Wenger may not either, but they do not explicitly
argue against it like May does (see Our Practices, Our Selves 12).
8

See James Gee’s work on “Discourse,” with a capital “D.”

9

For a Foucauldian history that does attempt to explain the emergence of the

privileging of immunity, see Ed Cohen’s A Body Worth Defending.
10

For more from these thinkers on this issue, see Derrida’s “Signature, Event,

Context,” as well as “Structure, Sign, and Play.” I mention Burke’s discussion of the
paradox of substance, in particular, the paradox of purity in chapter 1—see also A
Grammar of Motives 21-58.
11

For more on immunosuppression in political contexts, see Donna Haraway’s “The

Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies” (in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention
of Nature). Haraway’s work is in tension with works like those of Derrida (see fn. 34
below), who sees practices of immunity falling too easily into autoimmunity, where the
body begins to see itself as something to protect against. Haraway argues that
immunosuppression is just as dangerous as autoimmunity, and that focusing too much on
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the latter enables us to not “take responsibility for the differences and inequalities of
sickness globally” (252, fn. 2).
12

I can already see how this example could be taken literally as a pro-life politics.

This is not my intention, and I do not believe it is Esposito’s. Even though Esposito is
calling on an actual biological process to inform our notions of community and
immunity, he makes no indication that this example is a metaphor of an actual ethics or
politics, but only constitutive processes that should inform our ethics and politics.
13

For a slightly different take on autoimmunity in social contexts, see Jacques

Derrida’s “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides” in Philosophy in a Time of
Terror, as well as Rogues.
14

Though not using the same terminology, Jean-Luc Nancy also recognizes this

necessary reticulated process of sharing and protection for any being’s existence. In the
term partage, Nancy expresses how all sharing is also simultaneously dividing (see
Inoperative Community 57).
15

He will call this productive model, “common immunity.”

16

See, for example, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency).”

17

I am paraphrasing the definition of normative from the New Oxford American

Dictionary, though a quick Internet search shows other dictionaries to have similar
definitions. I hate to sound too analytical by drawing upon dictionary definitions;
however, my goal is not to establish the correct use of the term, but to understand that
demonizing such a term unnecessarily problematizes necessary political normativity for
the rhetoricians.
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18

In contrast to the examples I explain shortly, rhetoricians interested in the fields of

argumentation use the term normative in a similar manner as I do. See, for example, the
works of David Zarefsky, Frans van Eemeren, Jeanne Fahnstock, Jean Goodwin, and
Robert Rowland.
19

It is important to note that Jordan’s use of normativity is not necessarily with a

negative connotation. However, he unnecessarily uses the term to distinguish one practice
from another.
20

“Normativity is a field of power, a set of relations that can be thought of as a

network of norms, that forms the possibilities for and limits of action. Norms are the
imperatives that materialize particular bodies and actions. As Judith Butler points out, for
example, “sex,” insofar as it is a norm, materializes sexed bodies through power that is at
once constructive and constraining. The normal could be simply the average, the
everyday, or the commonsensical, but norms and the normal can also become hooked
together so as to make the average not only normal but normative” (517). Though I agree
with Jakobsen’s definitions of normativity and norms, she seems to be giving normal a
very neutral definition, with which I would wholeheartedly disagree.
21

May cites Hoover and Howard’s “The Political Correctness of Controversy

Revisited” as one example of this assumption. I think the works of rhetoricians like Pat
Gehrke and Victor Vitanza are also consistent with this thought.
22

The processes of normalization are (arguably) also discussed in Foucault’s History

of Madness and The History of Sexuality, where he genealogizes the various figures of
social deviancy.
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23

For the purpose of this analysis it is only important to know that the Church

considers the priesthood to be the power and authority of God on Earth to teach the
doctrines of the Church, administer ordinances, and lead the church; the higher
priesthood is obviously accompanied with more privileges and authority.
24

I am well aware that some queer activists and other progressives argue against the

need for government to concern itself with marriage at all. There are merits to many of
these arguments. See, for example, Tom Boellstorff "When Marriage Falls."
25

This passage from Wittgenstein, though a slightly different translation, is also

quoted in May’s Political Thought (105). May also draws upon Wittgenstein in his theory
about practices (see Our Practices, Our Selves).

Chapter Three
1

The Venice Biennial website now touts that, “the Biennale has an attendance today

of over 370,000 visitors” each summer it occurs.
2

I am presenting this quote from Bishop slightly out of context. In “Safety by

Numbers,” Bishop is actually pointing out that biennialism performed these functions at
its peak but not longer does, implying that biennialism is on a decline in terms of social
impact.
3

Important to note: Ai Weiwei originally oversaw the manufacture of these tents for

an exhibition in Beijing, and Weiwei’s original intentions were for drawing a connection
to the Ruhr region of China. ““The motifs and patterns on the tents convey a particular
message. They are meant to evoke entirely different feelings than those associated with
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the former industry- and capitalism-oriented history of the region, which have also left a
permanent mark on the ecology of the Ruhr region. It was important to create a colourful
and carefree ambiance, and most importantly: not to leave a permanent mark on the land.
This project is all about communication and interaction, not production” (“Ai Weiwei’s
Tents for Emscherkunst”). Thus, the motive to include “normal” people was not in the
origins of the work. Nevertheless, Emscherkunst seems to have appropriated Weiwei’s
original intents, with permission, of course.
4

See also, for example, Enwezor’s contributions to written works about art, such as

Rise and Fall of Apartheid: Photography and Bureaucracy of Everyday Life and “The
Postcolonial Constellation: Contemporary Art in a Sate of Permanent Transition.”
5

See one example of historical work about art’s interest in community, participation,

and collaboration in Charles Green’s The Third Hand: Collaboration in Art From
Conceptualism to Postmodernism. Green’s research discusses art that predates many of
the works Bourriaud identifies as “relational.”
6

Though I discuss briefly how Esposito reads Bataille and Hobbes in this section,

others have made similar commentary regarding each thinker’s notion of community. For
more on Bataille, see the edited collection The Obsessions of Georges Bataille:
Community and Communication by Andrew Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree. See also
The Dismembered Community: Bataille, Blanchot, Leiris, and the Remains of Laure by
Milo Sweedler. For more on this protective motive in Hobbes, see Adriana Cavarero’s
Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence and, of course, Hobbes’s Leviathan.
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7

See Esposito’s Communitas, Adriana Cavarero’s Horrorism, Jean-Luc Nancy’s The

Inoperative Community, Maurice Blanchot’s Unavowable Community, Mitchell and
Winfree’s The Obsessions of Georges Bataille and Milo Sweedler’s The Dismembered
Community for in-depth investigations of Bataille’s thought on this issue.
8

Again, this is not to say that sharing is the same as inclusion and that protection is

the same as exclusion. In fact, as I show in Chapter 4, even acts of protection (which may
take part in exclusivity) can be recognized as verifications of equality.
9

Looking ahead to chapter 4, I see The importance of this voice being heard will be

even more important, or at least take a more prominent place in chapter 4.

Chapter Four
1

Though I was aware of Coy’s story as a result of radio and television news media,

my summary of her story is mainly indebted to Sabrina Rubin Erdely’s article in Rolling
Stone, “About a Girl: Coy Mathis’ Fight to Change Gender,” and two CNN articles by
CNN Staff and Ed Payne.
2

See Todd May’s The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière for more on

archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics (chapter 2). May also brings this discussion in
the context of more contemporary political thinkers such as John Rawls, Iris Young,
Amartya Sen, and Robert Nozick.
3

For more of this argument, see chapter 3 of Todd May’s The Political Thought of

Jacques Rancière.
4

See “History of Gay Marriage in the United States.”

224

5

For more, on these rulings, see Watkins (Utah), Brandes (Oklahoma), and Calkins

(Texas).
6

One of the reasons I share this brief version of the story of Black Wall Street is that I

had never heard of the community until I was approached by African-American rhetorics
scholar Austin Jackson at the Conference for the Rhetoric Society of America. After
giving a presentation on Esposito and Rancière, I was approached by Jackson, who was
in the audience. He suggested that my theory would speak well to understanding
communal phenomena such as Black Wall Street. To him I owe a debt for sharing his
knowledge with me. See also “The Regeneration” and “The Renaissance” in Hannibal
Johnson’s Black Wall Street for how the actions of the early twentieth century Black Wall
Street community continue to have influence on civil rights politics to this day.
7

Hannibal Johnson cites these quotes from an article by Jonathan Z. Larsen, titled

“Tulsa Burning” in Civilization.
8

According to the San Francisco Bay National Black Newspaper, when Black Wall

Street was at its peak, the dollar circulated “36 to 100 times, sometimes taking a year for
currency to leave the community” (“What Happened to Black Wall Street”).
9

Hannibal Johnson cites Scott Ellsworth’s Death in a Promised Land (50-51) as the

source of this quotation.
10

See “The Regeneration” and “The Renaissance” in Johnson’s Black Wall Street.
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Chapter Five
1

Scholars have argued that this emphasis is beyond traditional citation and exposes

how texts and writers are an effect of language (see Scholes, Comley, and Ulmer; Ulmer,
“Object of Post-Criticism” 86).
2

Many other composition scholars have drawn on Miller to understand the

relationship between sampling and composition. See, for example, Banks, Brown.
3

See, in particular, Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination and Speech Genres, as well as

Barthes’s Image-Text-Music.
4

I should note, Rice is influenced heavily by the work of Gregory Ulmer, a scholar

who draws on Jacques Derrida to develop a notion of digital literacy he calls “electracy.”
Like Ulmer, Rice rejects instrumentalist views of technology and writing.
5

To say that Hess, Sirc, and others all promote a whatever-pedagogy would not be

completely accurate; however, each draws on similar justifications of the benefits of free
association (Sirc) or makes claims such as “sampling is not plagiarism” (Hess), and thus
not beholden to traditional academic acknowledgment and citation. While I do not
necessarily disagree with the benefits of these viewpoints, my concern, like Banks and
McFarlane, has to do with the ethical and political assumptions made in these
methodologies.
6

See Anthony Carnevale and Jeff Strohl’s study, “Separate & Unequal,” as well as

Casey McDermott’s commentary on that study in the Chronicle of Higher Education.
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7

See Jacques Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster for arguments positing that all

humans are equal in intelligence. See Roberto Esposito’s Immunitas for understanding
the protection and negation of life in political, and social terms, as well as biological.
8

Rhetoricians (such as Diane Davis, Pat Gehrke, and Victor Vitanza) have drawn on

Nancy’s work to expose the myth of the autonomous individual found in capitalist and
liberal individualisms.
9

Krista Ratcliffe’s particular interests are when scholars ignorantly or intentionally

neglect the work of women and scholars who identify with marginalized communities.
10

As Wendy Wolters Hinshaw advocates, hopefully as instructors, we are also

generally willing to make ourselves vulnerable to critique and resistance in the
classroom.
11

I should note that Hess might disagree with the application of this heuristic because

it asks that one acknowledge his or her sources. Of course, to what extent
acknowledgment is required will be the instructor’s choice, and may have to be decided
in the context of the course. It is one thing to teach sampling as a mode of resistance, as
described by Alim and others; however, if it is described as a license to take freely from
others and use, a notion Banks and this essay challenge, then we are promoting
something entirely different. In other words, context may be the deciding factor on how
much the heuristic should factor in one’s teaching of digital sampling.
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